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ABSTRACT   
 
This dissertation addressed the lack of interdisciplinary research and 
understanding about the Indonesian military operations during the Indonesia-
Malaysia Konfrontasi, 1963-67. It examined how use of interdisciplinary 
research can address way that politicisation of the ABRI might have affected 
the implementation of the operations. This qualitative study emphasised two 
aspects, namely, process of politicisation of the military and political behaviour 
in organisations. Indeed, the existing literature of political behaviour in 
organisations remained predominantly focused on private organisations. But, 
this dissertation argued that study of political behaviour in organisations theory 
is beneficial to assist the scrutiny of political behaviour in military organisation. 
The research methodology consisted of archival research, interviews and 
secondary sources. To be more specific, the research adapted explaining 
outcome process tracing and time series analysis technique to develop valid 
interpretation.  
The study finds that political behaviour in the ABRI contributes to the failure of 
Dwikora Operation, as hypothesised. The policy of Konfrontasi has 
substantively boosted the politicisation of the ABRI. This can be seen in the 
diversity of key military actors’ motives toward the policy. In particular, the 30 
September Movement Affair has significantly changed the behavioural 
repertoire. Based on these findings, political behaviour in the ABRI toward the 
Konfrontasi generated both dysfunctional and functional individual, 
organisational and national consequences. Although, the main focus of the 
research is the Indonesian military operation during the Konfrontasi, the 
implications for certain civil-military relation theory and recommendations for 
future research were discussed.  
Keywords: ABRI, TNI, Dwikora Operation, political behaviour in military 
organisation 
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NOTE ON ORTHOGRAPHY AND TRANSLATION 
 
In 1947, the official Indonesian spelling conventions were changed. So that ‘u’ 
replaced ‘oe’, and in 1972 further changes were made so that ‘c’ replaced the 
former ‘tj’, ‘j’ replaced ‘dj’, ‘kh’ replaced ‘ch’ and ‘y’ replaced ‘j’. The new spelling 
conventions have been used for all geographic names and the names of 
persons, parties and organisations. As regards proper names, this study refers 
to the spelling used in the latest Indonesian official publication. In cases where 
the old and the new spelling have appeared to be equally commonly used, the 
new spelling has generally been chosen. 
All translations from Indonesian are, unless otherwise stated, by the author. 
Quoted passages from English-language sources, however, follow the 
















Malaysia adalah untuk menyelamatkan timah bagi imperialis. Malaysia adalah 
untuk menyelamatkan karet bagi imperialis. Malaysia adalah untuk 
menyelamatkan minyak bagi imperialis… Jikalau pimpinan Negara Malaya 
terus menerus begini, apa boleh buat kita menjalankan politik konfrontasi 
terhadap Malaya, kita menjalankan politik konfrontasi terhadap ide Malaysia. 
Konfrontasi bukan saja politik, tetapi juga konfrontasi ekonomi. 
[Malaysia is created to protect tin for the imperialists. Malaysia is created to 
protect rubber for the imperialists. Malaysia is created to protect oil for the 
imperialists… If the State of Malaya’s leadership continues its policies, 
Indonesia will have no choice but to implementing confrontation politics against 
the idea of the creation of Malaysia. It is both a political and economic 
Konfrontasi] 
Speech of President Sukarno on 13 February 19631 
1.1 Making the Case for Study 
The politics of the Konfrontasi (Confrontation) that was executed by the 
Indonesian government against Malaysia in 1963-1967 is worth studying. First, 
this dissertation argued that the Konfrontasi was a critical juncture in the 
Indonesian history. Both internal and external to Indonesia resulted in the 
creation of a complicated situation. For Indonesia, the conflict with Malaysia 
was not solely the result of opposition to the creation of the Malaysia Federation 
but more because of poor economic performance,2 domestic political turmoil, 
military and Cold War rivalry. The Konfrontasi was pivotal event because 
President Sukarno had to step down in 1966, before he succeeded in fulfilling 
his ambition – crushing the Malaysia Federation. Second, as the relationship of 
                                            
1 Pengurus Besar Front Nasional [Central Board of National Front], Jalankan Panca 
Program Ganyang Semua Tantangan [Implementing the Five Programs Crush All Challenges], 
(Pengurus Besar Front Nasional: Jakarta, 1963), 17-19 
2  Pauker explained that in early 1960s, Indonesia was suffered by massive deficit 
financing as a consequence of the Konfrontasi against Dutch over the island of Western New 
Guinea. By launching, “Crush Malaysia” policy, Indonesia would only get more suffers in 
economic sector. He added, “The inflationary pressure affecting the spirit of the Indonesian 
people is becoming markedly stronger.” Guy J Pauker, Indonesia in 1963: The Year of Wasted 




Indonesia-Malaysia is the love-hate relationship, the memory of Konfrontasi 
embodied strongly among the people of Indonesia. After the fall of Suharto 
administration in 1998, the slogan of Ganyang Malaysia3 (Crush Malaysia) is 
still frequently used when anti-Malaysia sentiment breaks out.4 However, the 
major reason to study the Indonesian military operations during the Konfrontasi 
is that there is a lack of explanation from the Indonesian side over this episode, 
as western authors produced most of extant literature.5 Owing to the complexity 
of the Konfrontasi, this study made a valuable empirical contribution by 
comprehensively analysing Indonesian military operations during this event. 
This research attempts to examine how the politicisation of the Indonesian 
military affected its military operations during the Konfrontasi. It is also hoped 
that the present research may serve as a basis for future studies on Indonesian 
military operations. 
Sukarno first employed term of Konfrontasi6 as a policy during the dispute with 
the Netherlands over the island of Western New Guinea, now divided into two 
provinces of Papua and Wes Papua.7 Mackie described the Konfrontasi as a 
policy that was made by Sukarno in order to serve his own agenda and 
                                            
3 In Indonesian publications published before 1972, term of “Ganyang Malaysia” was 
written as “Ganjang Malaysia” 
4 Budiawan, “How do Indonesians remember Konfrontasi? Indonesia–Malaysia relations 
and the popular memory of “Confrontation” after the fall of Suharto,” Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, 
18:3 (2017): 365. 
5 JM Pluvier, Confrontations: A Study in Indonesian Politics. (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford 
University Press, 1965); H James, and Denis Shell-Small, The undeclared war: the story of the 
Indonesian confrontation, 1962-1966, (Singapore: Asia Pacific Press, 1971); JAC Mackie, 
Konfrontasi The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute 1963-1966, (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University 
Press, 1974); Raffi Gregorian, “Claret Operation and Confrontation, 1964-1966,” Conflict 
Quarterly, Vol. XI, No. 1 (Winter 1991); Greg Poulgrain, The genesis of konfrontasi: Malaysia, 
Brunei and Indonesia, 1945-1965, (Bathurst: Crawford House Publishing, 1998); David Easter, 
Britain and the Confrontation with Indonesia 1962-1966, (London: IB Tauris, 2004); Nick Van 
der Bijl, Confrontation: the War with Indonesia, 1962-1966, (Barnsley, S. Yorkshire: Pen and 
Sword Military, 2007); Christopher Tuck, Confrontation, Strategy and War Termination: Britain’s 
Conflict with Indonesia, 1963-66, (Surrey: Ashgate, 2013); Mushahid Ali, Konfrontasi: Why 
Singapore was in Forefront of Indonesian Attacks, RSIS Commentary No. 062 – 23 March 
2015, (Singapore: RSIS, 2015). 
6 Although it was firstly employed to describe the Irian campaign, term of konfrontasi is 
often associated with Malaysia or ‘Crush Malaysia’ by Indonesian people or politicians.   




influenced by the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia/PKI) 
and China’s government manipulation.8 Later, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, 
Subandrio, used this term to challenge the creation of the Federation of 
Malaysia. Sukarno defined the Konfrontasi as: 
A contest of power in all fields, Confrontation amounted to a 
practice of coercive diplomacy, employing military measures 
stopping short of all-out war, which was designed to create a sense 
of international crisis in order to provoke diplomatic intervention in 
Indonesia’s interest.9  
As a term, both in the Oxford Dictionary and the Great Dictionary of the 
Indonesian Language (Kamus Besar Bahasa Indonesia), Konfrontasi is known 
as a way against enemy or “a hostile situation between parties.”10 Meanwhile, 
Schwarz defined Confrontation as “a situation when some form of a limited use 
or threat of force in international relationships is answered by an opponent with 
a symmetrical threat.”11 As a political term, Konfrontasi in Indonesian is defined 
as a difficult situation to directly confront an enemy. Undoubtedly, the 
Konfrontasi between Indonesia and Malaysia is often described as undeclared 
war. But not all Indonesians accept this definition. The late Indonesian prose 
writer Pramoedya Ananta Toer12 argued Konfrontasi was closer to the spirit of 
anti-colonialism, imperialism and capitalism. He rejected common arguments 
from western scholars who have denoted Konfrontasi as an anti-Malaysia 
                                            
8 JAC Mackie, Konfrontasi: The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute 1963-1966, (Kuala Lumpur: 
Oxford University Press, 1974), 1-2. 
9 Michael Leifer, Dictionary of the Modern Politics of South-East Asia. (London-New 
York: Routledge, 1995), 54 
10 Oxford University Press Dictionaries, accessed April 12, 2015, 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/confrontation. For Indonesian, definition of 
konfrontasi refers to Kamus Besar Bahasa Indonesia [Great Dictionary Indonesian]. Kamus 
Besar Bahasa Indonesia, by Pusat Bahasa Departemen Pendidikan Nasional [Language 
Centre, Department of National Education], accessed April 12, 2015, 
http://badanbahasa.kemdikbud.go.id/kbbi/index.php  
11 Urs Schwartz, Confrontation and Intervention in the Modern World, (Dobbs Ferry, New 
York: Oceana Publications, 1970), 15 
12 Pramoedya Ananta Toer was a prominent Indonesian writer. He was also knowingly 
as a President Sukarno’s loyalist. He aligned with communist-sponsored cultural groups during 
1960s. Following the communist coup in 1965, the Indonesian military put him in prison. During 
his imprisonment, he produced a series of novel that made him more popular and government, 




policy. He defined Konfrontasi as “furthering the anti-colonialist ideal.”13     
Figure 1-1, located on the next page, outlined several key events of the 
Konfrontasi, which will be discussed further in Chapter Three and Four. The 
tension between Indonesia and Malaysia has started years before the 
Konfrontasi against the Malaysia Federation was launched in 1963. Since 1958, 
Indonesia-Malaysia relationship was warm following the uprising in the West 
Sumatra, known as the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia 
(Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia/PRRI).14 Sukarno accused the 
Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman supported the revolt by providing 
shelter for several people who allegedly involved with the PRRI,15 As a result, 
the government established a Consulate in Singapore in November 1958 that 
was aimed at delivering intelligence operations in Malayan Peninsula. The 
operations were to monitor foreign intelligence activities that linked to 
rebellions.16  
However, the Crush Malaysia campaign began when the Indonesian 
government opposed a plan of the Malayan administration to extend the 
Federation concept, which embraced Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak.17 
Soekarno dubbed the Federation plan as a neo-colonialist project and 
considered it a breach of the 1963 Manila Accord.18 In a move against this 
project, Soekarno announced “People’s Twofold Command Operation” (Operasi 
Dwi Komando Rakyat/Dwikora Operation), aimed at crushing the Malaysia 
Federation. This campaign began on 3 May 1964.19 
                                            
13 Pramoedya Ananta Toer, Foreword, in Poulgrain, vi-xiv  
14 The case of PRRI Revolt will be elaborated further in Chapter Three.  
15 TNA, DO 187/28, Telegram No 441, CRO to Kuala Lumpur, 13 March 1963 
16  Pusat Sejarah Markas Besar TNI [Centre for the Indonesian Military History], Operasi 
Dwikora 1962-1966 [Dwikora Operation 1962-1966]. (Jakarta: Pusat Sejarah Markas Besar TNI, 
2005), 31-32 
17 Mackie, Konfrontasi, 3. 
18 Pusat Sejarah Markas Besar TNI, Operasi Dwikora, 1-2. Details regarding the Manila 
Accord see Chapter Three. 

















Since the beginning of Konfrontasi, the Indonesian Army supported Soekarno’s 
Konfrontasi policy half-heartedly. On one hand, it recognised that the PKI was 
the main actor behind anti-Malaysia policy.20 This situation made the army less 
supportive of the Konfrontasi because the PKI would gain more political 
advantages than the armed forces. On the other hand, the army did not want its 
enormous budget cut.21 As Polomka explained, the “Malaysian Confrontation 
evoked a turbulent domestic climate that damaged army cohesion and 
promoted the position of Sukarno and the Communist Party.”22 
Although it was not the largest military operation, the Dwikora Operation was an 
incomparable military operation for the Indonesian Armed Forces (Angkatan 
Bersenjata Republic Indonesia/ABRI).23 There are several reasons why this 
operation was exceptional. First, it was launched during the Cold War era, 
which means that the military operation was also influenced by the ideological 
battle between democracy and communism. Second, the Dwikora Operation 
was launched against Indonesia’s neighbouring country, Malaysia, which had 
never occurred before. Third, Sukarno, the Indonesian military and the PKI 
utilised the Konfrontasi issue to achieve their own different agendas. Within this 
context, Ricklefs noted that “Sukarno could again drive the revolutionary spirit 
onward, the army could look forward to increased budgets and PKI could take 
                                            
20 Ulf Sundhaussen, “The Political Orientations and Political Involvement of the 
Indonesian Officer Corps 1945-1966: the Siliwangi Division and the Army Headquarters” (PhD 
Dissertation, Monash University, 1971), 522-590. 
21 Prior to the Operasi Dwikora, the ABRI launched the Trikora Operation in order to fight 
against the Dutch regarding the issue of Papua. Due to this operation, the Indonesian 
government established a martial law status and the military was gaining huge budget during 
that time. Sundhaussen added that some military leadership did not want to lose their credibility 
and grasp public outcry because of wasting resources. Sundhaussen, “The Political 
Orientations,” 536 
22 Peter Polomka, Indonesia Since Sukarno, Australia: Penguin Book Australia Ltd, 
1971), 69 
23 Prior to the year 2000, ABRI consisted of the police force and 3 forces of Indonesian 
military (TNI): the army, the air force, and the navy. Since 2000, there was a separation 
between TNI and the Police Force. This study prefers to use term of ABRI to describe the 
Indonesian military as a whole organisation, since the role of police in the ABRI’s decision-
making during that time was less significant. The present research recognises term of the army, 
the navy, and the air force as a different service. To describe all three services, this study uses 




the lead in mass agitation.”24 This event drastically pushed Indonesia into 
political domestic turmoil. Lastly, during this operation Sukarno had to step 
down. This political event also created controversy. For many scholars, 
especially those in the West, this political incident was described as a military 
coup,25 conducted by a faction within the army.26 Meanwhile, the term “coup” is 
infrequently used in Indonesian literature until the collapse of authoritarian 
regime in 1998. For more than three decades, Suharto’s government imposed 
the term “30 September Movement/Indonesian Communist Party”, or Gerakan 
30 September/Partai Komunis Indonesia (G30S/PKI) to explain the affair.27 
As alluded to previously, the Indonesian army half-heartedly supported 
Soekarno’s anti-Malaysia policy. The Konfrontasi policy, had divided the 
Generals into two factions. On one side were the Generals who supported the 
hostility against Malaysia. The Defence Minister/Chief of Staff of Armed Forces 
(Kepala Staf Angkatan Bersenjata/KSAB), General Abdul Haris Nasution led 
                                            
24 MC Ricklefs, A history of Modern Indonesia since c.1200, (Basingstoke: Parlgrave, 
2001), 330-331; variety of military elites’ motivations can be seen in Chapter 4 Section 4.3 
 25 See, for instance, Benedict Anderson, and Ruth McVey, A Preliminary Analysis of the 
October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia, (Singapore: Equinox Publishing Ltd, 2009); Harold Crouch, 
“Another Look at the Indonesian “Coup”," Indonesia 15 (15) (April 1973), 1–20; Daniel S Lev, 
“Indonesia 1965: The Year of the Coup,” Asian Survey, 6, 2 (February 1966): 103–110.  
26 See John Roosa, Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and 
Suharto's Coup d'État in Indonesia. (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 
2006) 
27 After Sukarno stepped down, new regime led by Suharto tried to control 30 September 
1965 incident narrative. His government produced a documentary propaganda movie 
“Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI” (G30S/PKI Treachery). Then he obliged all national television to air 
the movie on the evening of 30 September, every year. Indonesian scholar, Asvi Warman 
Adam, argued Suharto administration intended obviously control the story of coup in order to 
“legitimise the New Order regime’s rise to power”. See Asvi Warman Adam, “Studies on ‘65 
still trying to reveal truth,” The Jakarta Post, January 27, 2015, 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/01/27/studies-65-still-trying-reveal-truth.html. Also 
read Katherine E McGregor, History in Uniform: Military Ideology and the Construction of 
Indonesia's Past. (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2007); Sukarno referred 
to the September Affairs ‘Gestok’ (Gerakan Satu Oktober/Movement of 1 October). Meanwhile, 
the ABRI employed the term of ‘Gestapu’ (Gerakan September Tiga Puluh/Movement of 
September 30). Van Langenberg explained the term ‘Gestapu’ was presumably aimed at 
associating the affairs with the Nazi political police (Gestapo/Geheime Staatspolizei). In 
addition, the Movement named itself as Gerakan 30 September (G30S/Movement of September 
30). For consistency, this study used term of ‘G30S’ throughout. See Michael Van Langenberg, 
“Gestapu and state power in Indonesia,” in The Indonesian Killings of 1965–1966: Studies From 
Java and Bali, ed. Robert Cribb, (Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 




this group.28 In February-March 1963, Nasution did a cross command by 
dispatching troops to the Indonesian-Malaysian border in Kalimantan Island. He 
was bypassing the chain of command of Commander in Chief of the Indonesian 
Army, Lieutenant General Ahmad Yani.29 According to Sundhaussen, 
Nasution’s motive at that time was “damming up the decline of the army’s 
political role, and in buying time to reorganise the army’s defence.”30 Nasution’s 
actions did not purely propose to confront Malaysia, but more on overcoming 
the PKI’s effort.  
On the other side were Generals who were resistant to pursue the Konfrontasi 
policy against Malaysia. Yani led this faction.31 Both Yani and Nasution shared 
similar views regarding the creation of the Malaysian Federation. They gave 
sympathy to the North Kalimantan National Army (Tentara Nasional Kalimantan 
Utara/TNKU) movement and rejected the idea of the Federation.32 However, 
Yani had less interest in confronting outside power by using a military approach. 
He much more preferred using political settlement rather than exploiting hard 
power. 
At that time, the ABRI struggled to improve unity, cohesion and military 
professionalism. Notosusanto argued the ABRI did not “extensively [develop] 
professionalism and a professional tradition.”33 There was also internal 
disagreement within the Indonesian military services during that period. Even 
                                            
28 During the Sukarno administration, it was common that one person held two or more 
strategic positions at the same time. 
29 At that time, Nasution did not have an authority to deploy any troops. Details regarding 
this incident will be explained later in Chapter Three. 
30 Sundhaussen, “The Political Orientations,” 546 
31 Nasution was definitely Yani’s senior in the army. A more comprehensive and detailed 
rivalry and different perception among generals will be included in Chapter Three and Four. 
32 TNKU is known as the rebellion that caused the ‘Brunei Revolt’. For detail explanation 
on Brunei Revolt see, for instance, Nick Van der Bijl, The Brunei Revolt, 1962-1963, (Barnsley: 
Pen and Sword Military, 2012); and HA Majid, Rebellion in Brunei: The 1962 Revolt, 
Imperialism, Confrontation and Oil (International Library of Twentieth Century History), (London: 
IB Tauris, 2007) 
33 Nugroho Notosusanto, “Indonesia: Armed Forces and Society into the 1980s,” in 
Political-Military Systems: A Comparative Perspective, ed. C. McA. Kelleher, (Beverly Hills: 




though the ABRI formally launched the Dwikora Operation against Britain and 
its allies, some individuals launched another operation. Under Yani’s approval, 
the Commander of Army Strategic Reserve Commander (Komando Cadangan 
Strategis Angkatan Darat/KOSTRAD), Major General Suharto, created a special 
operation (Operasi Khusus/Opsus)34. He also established political contact with 
Malaysia, Britain, Japan and United States (US).35 Therefore, the Opsus was 
clearly opposed to the main objective of Dwikora Operation, to normalise the 
tension. In other words, one of factions within the ABRI weakened the military 
operation.  
1.2 Research Problem 
As a concept, the politicisation of the military is contested. It has a wider 
spectrum of discourse. 36 Extant literature has captured the politicisation of the 
military topic within the civil-military relations field. When dealing with the 
problem of a politicised military, the debates have focused on the problem of 
military intervention on politics and praetorianism. Although the domain of civil-
military relations studies is large, for example, covering from military budget, 
regulation, the use of the military, to complex relations between civilians and 
military – the most frequent aspect of its theories is still about the relation 
                                            
34 This study utilised Tugwell and Charters’s definition on special operation as “small-
scale, clandestine, covert or overt operations of an unorthodox and frequently high-risk nature, 
undertaken to achieve significant political or military objectives in support of foreign policy. 
Special operations are characterised by either simplicity or complexity, by subtlety and 
imagination, by the discriminate use of violence, and by oversight at the highest level. Military 
and non-military resources, including intelligence assets, may be used in concert. For details 
see Tugwell and Charters, “Special Operations and the Threats to United States Interests in the 
1980s,” in Special Operations in US Strategy, ed. FR Barnett, BH Tovar and Richard H Schultz, 
(Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1984), 27-52. 
35 Chalis, 50-70.  For a detailed discussion on the Opsus see Chapter Three and Four. 
36 Chuter and Cleary explained politicisation of the military as the intervention within 
military that was conducted by civilian. Meanwhile, in ABRI’s case, the politicisation of the 
military was also conducted by senior officers in order to achieve their personal goals.  A more 
comprehensive and detailed discussion on politicisation of the ABRI will be included in Chapter 
Three and Four. David Chuter, and Laura R Cleary, “Civilians in defence,” in Managing defence 
in a democracy, ed. Laura R. Cleary and Teri McConville, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2005), 




between the government and the military.37 Most studies acknowledge that the 
military is not immune from the dynamics of domestic politics. As Stepan 
pointed out: 
... because the military is not isolated from politics but in fact 
performs diverse political functions, simple descriptions of "ideal" 
military institutions which may emphasise such features as military 
unity or national orientation often conceal more than they reveal 
about the interactions between the military and the political 
system.38    
As external environment may affect to the institution, military often keeps its 
independence in order to maintain unity and solidity. As an institution, the 
military applied autonomy mechanism in the decision-making authority.39 Pion-
Berlin defines military autonomy as “the military’s aversion towards or even 
defiance of civilian control.”40 The autonomy itself seems ambiguous. As a 
concept, military autonomy could be seen as an effort to reject external 
influences. However, the military could not effectively neglect politics. On the 
contrary, military recommendations could influence policy and civilian opinions. 
Betts acknowledges two forms of military influence, direct and indirect.41 As he 
explained:  
Direct influence flows from formal and explicit recommendations, or 
control of operations. Indirect influence flows from ways in which 
the soldier may control the premises of civilian decision through 
monopoly of information or control of options.42 
 
                                            
37 James Burk, “Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations,” Armed Forces and 
Society, Vol 29, No 1 (Fall 2002): 7, accessed December 13, 2015, doi: 
10.1177/0095327X0202900102 
38 Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics Changing Patterns in Brazil, (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1971), 7. 
39 David Pion-Berlin, “Military Autonomy and Emerging Democracies in South America,” 
Comparative Politics, Vol 25, No 1 (October 1992): 84. 
40 Pion-Berlin, “Military Autonomy,” 85. 
41 Richard K Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises, (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 1977), 5-6. 
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Over the years, most research on the Indonesian military, although increasingly 
broadened, remained preoccupied with civil-military relations studies. To the 
extent that the existing literature has addressed the politicisation problem of the 
Indonesian military, these works have done so by highlighting the political 
orientation of the ABRI’s officers,43 the expansion of the ABRI’s non-military 
roles,44 and the political nature of the ABRI’s birth45. The extant literature failed 
to explain the wider impact of politicisation of the ABRI into its operations. 
Another weakness in the literature was the lack of utilising organisational theory 
that is predominantly associated in the civil-military relation field.46 For this 
reason, this study seeks to address the gap in the debates about political 
behaviour in the military organisation. In particular, by examining the ABRI’s 
operations during the Konfrontasi, this study demonstrated how political 
behaviour of military affected the execution of its operations. 
1.2.1 Working Definitions 
Following paragraphs described some key concepts that are used in this study. 
Providing some definitions will help avoid ambiguity and slippage later in the 
dissertation. Indeed, as Huntington pointed out politics is:  
beyond the scope of the military competence, and the participation 
of the military officers in politics undermines their professionalism, 
curtailing their professional competence, dividing the profession 
against itself, and substituting extraneous values for professional 
                                            
43 See, for example, Harold Crouch, Militer dan Politik di Indonesia [Military and Politics 
in Indonesia], (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1999)  
44 See, for example, Ulf Sundhaussen, Politik Militer Indonesia 1945-1967: Menuju Dwi 
Fungsi ABRI [The Indonesian Military Politics 1945-1967: the Road to ABRI Dual Function], 
(Jakarta: LP3ES, 1988); Salim Said, Tumbuh dan Tumbangnya Dwifungsi [The Making and 
Unmaking of The Dual Function of the Indonesian Armed Forces], (Jakarta: Aksara Karunia, 
2002); Salim Said, Legitimizing Military Rule: Indonesia Armed Forces Ideology, 1958-2000, 
(Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 2006). 
45 See, for example, Salim Said, Genesis of Power: General Sudirman and the 
Indonesian Military in Politics, 1945-49, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991) 
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However, in transitional and established democracy, military institution is part of 
political institutions. To some extent, it has major influence in political decision-
making. Pauker argued  
the officer corps, particularly of the army and air force looms as one 
of the major sources of political power and administrative capacity 
in the country, along with the Communist Party and with the radical 
nationalist.48  
In this study, the term ‘military political behaviour’ does not necessarily mean 
domestic military intervention in politics or civilian power.49 Pion-Berlin stated 
there are both institutional and political dimension to the military behaviour.”50 In 
particular, according to Stepan, political variables are frequently far more 
important for determining the role of the military in society than the size of the 
military.51 The term military political behaviour in this study is the political 
behaviour by individual Generals or a faction within military institutions to 
achieve their own personal objective and it relates both to military institutions or 
civilian authority. The term political behaviour in this study referred to Buchanan 
and Bedham’s definition: “the practical domain of power in action, worked out 
through the use of techniques of influence and other (more or less extreme) 
tactics.”52 In addition, power is defined as the capacity of individual or groups to 
exert their will over others. 
                                            
47 Samuel P Huntington, The Soldier and the State. (Cambridge and London: Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 71 
48 Guy J Pauker, “The Role of the Military in Indonesia,” in The Role of the Military in 
Under-developed Countries, ed. JJ Johnson, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962), 
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49 A more comprehensive discussion on military political behaviour will be included in 
Chapter Two.  
50 Pion-Berlin, “Military Autonomy,” 84. 
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The phenomenon of politicisation of the military is not exceptional in new 
nations.53 As Indonesia acquired independence after the end of the Second 
World War, the ABRI played an important role in shaping Indonesian domestic 
politics.54 Since its birth, the ABRI had a political culture. Furthermore, since 
1958, the ABRI had been involved in all civilian matters, which was widely 
known as “middle way” concept.55 By acknowledging this situation, the present 
research defined the ABRI as a political military institution that “considers 
involvement in – or control over – domestic politics and the business of 
government to be a central part of their legitimate function.”56 This study 
recognised that the politicisation of the military was caused by both internal and 
external factors of the ABRI. According to Webster, to politicise is defined as “to 
give a political tone or character to.” In the context of this research, adapting 
from Ransom theory, the term of politicisation referred to:  
when preferred self or group interest and political dimension within 
military dominate decision making, overt or subtle pressures are 
applied on military institution, resulting in self-fulfilling military 
strategy.57 
While political activity is acknowledged as an action “when military affairs have 
become intertwined with politics, appointments and promotions are made on the 
                                            
53 Janowitz described new nation as a country that had achieved its independence since 
the end of World War II. He added new nation is a country “where some form of political 
revolution has taken place” (p.vii). Further explanation of the involvement military in new 
nations' domestic politics see Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New 
Nations: An Essay in Comparative Analysis, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1964)  
54 Crouch, Militer dan Politik, 21. 
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basis of the political affiliations of the officer rather than on his professional 
qualifications.”58  
The strong political role of the ABRI during that time was a consequence of the 
presence of military political behaviour by generals. As Janowitz advocated 
“military organisations seem particularly vulnerable to rivalries generated by the 
clash of personalities, which in turn may develop into political rivalries.”59 
Certainly, military political behaviour was not the sole factor leading to the 
failure of the Dwikora Operation. There are also other factors involved in this 
problem such as domestic politics, the leadership of Sukarno, and foreign 
intelligence activities. However, this study argued that friction and rivalry within 
the ABRI has created major effects in delivering military operation. 
1.3 Research Aim 
The aim of this research is to examine the effect of politicisation of the military 
on Indonesian military operations during the Indonesia-
Malaysia Konfrontasi (1963-1967).  
1.3.1 Enabling Objectives 
In order to achieve the above research aim, a number of enabling objectives 
have been set: 
a. Critically review the key literature and seminal works regarding the 
Konfrontasi and Indonesian politicised military theme 
b. Evaluate the concept of politicisation of the military and political 
behaviour in organisations 
c. Discuss the implementation of the Indonesian military operations during 
the Konfrontasi 
d. Examine the failure of the Dwikora Operation 
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e. Contribute to the literature in explaining the effect of politicisation of the 
ABRI on the Dwikora Operation during the Konfrontasi 
f. Draw conclusions, lessons learned and propose recommendations for 
future research 
1.4 Research Questions 
The following main research question will be investigated: in what way did the 
politicisation of the military affect the implementation of the Dwikora 
Operation?  
To answer the research question, there are consequently three sub-questions 
to be answered:  
1) How was the Indonesian military operations delivered during the 
Konfrontasi? 
2) Why and how did the Indonesian military become politicised? 
3) How did military political behaviour affect the implementation of the 
Dwikora Operation?  
In seeking to address these questions, this research considers two important 
aspects of the Indonesian military operation, namely, process of politicisation of 
the military and political behaviour in organisation.  
1.5 Hypothesis 
The hypothesis pursued in this thesis is that the political behaviour of the ABRI 
contributed to the failure of Dwikora Operation.  
1.6 Analytical Framework 
While the literature on the politicisation problem of the Indonesian armed forces 
is replete with the civil-military relations field, systematic studies of military 
organisation have seldom been made. From the literature, that is presented in 




related to the politicisation of the military and that may offer potential 
explanation regarding military as organisational politics. These two variables 
are (a) the process of military institution to become more politicised; and (b) 
political behaviour of military that affects the outcomes of military operation. The 
relationships between these two variables are discussed further in the next 
chapter.  
The need to build the framework arises from the research gap that will be 
illustrated later in Chapter 2 Subsection 2.4. Little has been produced to 
understand how politicisation of the military affects its operation. The framework 
constituted a plot to guide the empirical analysis of the Indonesian military 
operations during the Konfrontasi. In developing the analytical framework, this 
study examined two ways of politicisation of the ABRI, both internally and 
externally. The in-depth analysis of the Indonesian military operations during 
the Konfrontasi aimed to answer the main research question of in what way did 
the politicisation of the military affect the implementation of the military 
operations.  
The analytical framework is derived from certain relevant theories that will be 
elaborated in Chapter 2, Subsection 2.3.60 Through this framework, the present 
study aimed to reveal the process linking the policy of war to the failure of the 
Dwikora Operation. The implementation of military operation was 
conceptualised as a multi-level, multi actor process where policy of war, main 
actors within the military and coalitions, politicised military, and military 
operations are the main factors and building blocks of the Indonesian military 
operation management during the Konfrontasi. Each factor is an essential part 
of the analytical framework. The existing theoretical explanations to 
politicisation of the military will be tested during process tracing analysis. To 
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verify the empirical findings against the existing theory, it must be clear under 
what circumstance the analytical framework can be employed. The framework 
explained the relationship only when all factors are present and the 
environment is in crisis or wartime.  
The analytical framework consisted of four main building blocks, namely: (a) 
Policy of war, (b) Main actors and coalitions, (c) politicised military, and (d) 
military operation. To explain the Indonesian military operations during the 
Konfrontasi, it is also necessary to specify and inter-relate the sets of factors, 
that are perceived as causing politicisation of the ABRI to occur during the 
military operation-making and implementation process. As noted earlier, non-
military actors has certain roles and influence in several factors. Janowitz 
argued, “political warfare is more likely to be effective if the official declarations 
of politicians and military leaders about their intentions are realistically based on 
the military resources at their command.”61 Consequently, non-military actors 
can also play important role in influencing the military operations making and 
implementation during the Konfrontasi. The relationship between the blocks is 
represented in Figure 1-2 (p.20). The analytical framework will focus on two 
aspects. The first three building blocks dealt with aspect of politicisation of the 
military. The last block scrutinised aspect of political behaviour in military 
organisation. The contents of each building block are described in the separate 
subsections below. 
1.6.1 Policy of War  
This block aimed to illustrate the early setting of policy of war. Traditionally, after 
government set out policy of political warfare,62 military is required to translate 
the policy into action. However, capturing various key actors motivation toward 
the policy is necessary. As motivation reflects action and the internal and 
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external forces that influence one's choice of action,63 motivation is crucial in 
explaining such conflicts or discrepancies.64 Also, as Manzoor argued, 
motivation stimulates a performance that is intended as an objective.65 In this 
regard, key actors’ motivations and possible consequences over the policy will 
be illustrated.  
1.6.2 Main Actors and Coalitions 
Here, it is important to note that coalitions among main individual actors may 
develop during the military operation making. As Janowitz argued, “an officer’s 
perspectives are influenced by his network of personal alliances and contacts. 
So, in the case of the military operations making, the existences of main actors 
and coalitions should be taken into account. When considering this building 
block, it is important to determine what elements influenced the actors and 
coalitions. This requires identification of a wider internal environment to 
determine the context. Reasons why politicised military becomes common 
feature in the new state will arguably an important element influencing 
configuration of main actors and coalitions shapes the military operations 
making. Therefore, as Indonesia was a new state during the Konfrontasi, those 
reasons will also capture the opportunities66 (p.55) and motives67 of military 
involvement in politics (p.57-8).   
1.6.3 Politicised Military 
Further, it can be seen that the politicisation of the ABRI during the Konfrontasi 
can be identified through policy development and organisational resources to 
ensure that the decisions are implemented. In this block, it is essential to 
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assess the internal variables that are central in shaping the politicisation. The 
internal variables are political strengths and weaknesses68 (p.53-4), level of 
military influence69 (p.58-9) and direction of politicisation of the military70 (p.59). 
1.6.4 Military Operations 
Thus, at the core of the framework is aimed at examining the effect of 
politicisation of the ABRI on its operations during the Konfrontasi. This block will 
also probe the unity of command during the implementation of military 
operations. At this stage, the main hypothesis of this study will be tested, 
whether the politicisation of the ABRI was causing the disunity of command in 
the military operations during the Konfrontasi. In this regard, the research traces 
consequences of the ABRI as organisational politics at three levels: individual, 
organisational and national. To support the analysis, the present research 
adapts the pathway model that was developed by Buchanan and Badham71 
(p.73). The model consists of three variables: antecedents, behaviours and 
consequences. Antecedents illustrate the factors that trigger political behaviour 
in the ABRI. Behaviours discuss the tactics that had employed by key actors. 
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Figure 1-2 Causal Pathway of the Indonesian Military Operation 
Management during the Konfrontasi 
Source: Author 
1.7 Contribution to Knowledge 
This study’s originality derives from the research that focuses on analysing 
politicisation of the ABRI and its effects on its operations during the Konfrontasi. 
As such, the research findings offer an original contribution to knowledge, 
because they are be based on the body of knowledge of politicisation of the 
military and political behaviour in organisations. Furthermore, the access to the 
Indonesian military archives provides a unique insight and will add to the 
original contribution to knowledge. 
More research on politicisation of the military and its effects on its operation 




reasons. First, there has never been any study about the Indonesian military 
operations during the Konfrontasi. The existing publications from the Centre for 
Indonesian Military History (Pusat Sejarah TNI/Pusjarah TNI) lack the 
comprehensive scrutiny needed for the field of social science. Therefore, the 
ABRI employed the terminology of Konfrontasi to maintain the strength of both 
military and political positions.72 Second, a critical analysis of Indonesian 
military operations is useful to fill the lacuna of research on the Konfrontasi. The 
Dwikora Operation was one of the biggest Indonesian military operations that 
employed more than 26 battalions excluding air and sea power.73 As Suharto’s 
Opsus might indicate the form of insubordination and disunity of command in 
military operation, it will serve as key case study to highlight the political 
behaviour in the ABRI and its effect on military operations during the 
Konfrontasi. Consequently, the results of this research will enrich the 
historiography of the ABRI, which, until now, has not been done sufficiently. It 
provides a more explanation to scholarship and practical policymaking in 
improving the professionalism of the Indonesian Armed Forces. Further, this 
research seeks to provide a critical analysis of the Dwikora Operation by using 
an Indonesian perspective.  
As this research’s emphasis is on the politicisation of the military and its effects 
on the military operation, the views and responses of Indonesian opponents 
regarding the Konfrontasi would not be considered in depth. Previous research 
has been conducted to cover Indonesia’s rivals during the Konfrontasi. This 
study is also limited by a focus on the examination of politicisation of the 
Indonesian military and its linkage to its operations during the Konfrontasi. The 
view of Indonesian diplomacy conducted by Ministry of Foreign Affairs including 
the effect of military operation on diplomacy is beyond the scope of this 
research. However, this research attempts to explain, and verify or challenge, 
the existing studies. 
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1.8 Research Methodology 
The way of responding the research questions will be influenced by research 
philosophy to research techniques. In this regard, the researcher has selected a 
research methodology and research methods that are suitable to be employed 
in examining the effect of politicisation of the TNI on the implementation of 
Dwikora Operation during the Konfrontasi. The study will employ the research 
onion suggested by Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill.74 The selected research 
design onion is shown in Figure 1-3, located on the next page.  
The present research tended to provide a critical analysis of the Dwikora 
Operation. Therefore, the research philosophy that fitted with this objective is 
interpretivism, as the study will enrich the narrative of the Konfrontasi by using 
Indonesian perspective. The research design ‘onion’ (Figure 1-3), located on 
the next page, showed that the present research adapted abductive or mixed 
approach. It followed a ‘bottom up’ approach to data gathering. So, the present 
research attempted to gain a specific detailed narrative. However, while 
converting the data into an analytical causal explanation of why the Dwikora 
Operation was a failure, the present research tested several existing theories, 
which were discussed in Chapter Two, whether they fit with the case study. 
Further, the present research employed qualitative as research method. More 
specifically, this research applied qualitative historical analysis75 and using a 
case study and archival research as research strategies. Borrowing Thomas’ 
explanation, 76 by using case study, the present study explored and analysed 
the Indonesian military operation during the Konfrontasi. Of course, it would not 
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go to generalise the TNI operations but to gain deeper understanding and 
knowledge on the politicisation of the military and its effects to the Dwikora 
Operation. By focusing on some key elements such as military political 
behaviour and politicisation of the military, this case study helped to address a 











Figure 1-3 Research Design 'Onion' 
Source: Adapted from The Research Onion in Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill, 
Research Methods, 124 
 
This study applied the qualitative research method for two reasons. First, the 
qualitative research method allowed the researcher to gain a deep and holistic 
overview of the research case study. Although the researcher might have little 
or no control to the subject under study, the qualitative research method 
provided opportunity for the researcher as a key instrument to gather data 
through examining documents or interviewing participants.77 Second, the 
                                            




qualitative method was the most appropriate technique to be employed when 
the aim of this study attempted to capture a complex picture of the Dwikora 
Operation. By applying the qualitative research method, therefore, the 
researcher was able to capture many facets of a central phenomenon. As 
Cresswell posited “the key idea behind qualitative research is to learn about the 
problem or issue from participants and to address the research to obtain that 
information.”78 
As the research questions have many facets, the study applied an 
interdisciplinary approach. This study combined three approaches in order to 
answer the questions: 1) Political Studies, 2) History, and 3) Management 
Studies. Political Studies, in this study, also covered Strategic Studies and 
International Relations. International Relations reflected the external factors of 
military, particularly from outside Indonesia, while Political Studies perspective 
identified how the military was politicised, both from within organisations and 
civilians and political parties in Indonesia. In relation to Indonesia, strategic 
studies particularly examine the execution of the Dwikora Operation. Moreover, 
a management studies perspective assessed the complexity of political 
behaviour in military organisation. Historiography, as a part of academic 
discipline of history methodology, enriched the understanding of the case 
through an interpretation of a case’s chronology.79 This research employed 
historiography and a critical analysis of military records held in the Indonesian 
Military Headquarter, memoirs, and interviews. 
Considering the case study period was during 1960s and not aimed at 
generating new theoretical position, this research applied two research 
strategies that were suitable for the present study, namely archival research 
and case study. The archival research was suitable for data collection of the 
present research, as the study acknowledged the Indonesian military archives 
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as the main source. The researcher gathered archives and related documents 
from various archival centres for gaining insight on how politicisation of the 
ABRI affected the Dwikora Operation. 
Furthermore, the case study was selected for the following reasons. This study 
attempted to examine the effect of politicisation of the military on the Indonesian 
military operations during the Konfrontasi. In addition, this research 
acknowledged that the Konfrontasi was a complex phenomenon. Thus, the 
study did not go to generalise the ABRI operations but to gain deeper 
understanding and knowledge on the politicisation of military and its effects on 
its operations, particularly the Dwikora Operation. Indeed, the phenomenon of 
military politics in Indonesia is not a new issue. Several studies have provided 
comprehensive analysis of military politics in Indonesia.80 Nevertheless, none 
examine the relation of the politicised military and the implementation of military 
operations. A study of examining the impact of politicisation of the military within 
TNI’s operations therefore needs to be conducted in order to provide a wide-
ranging explanation of the military politics phenomenon in Indonesia.   
There were several reasons why this study is possible to be conducted by an 
Indonesian civilian. First, the reformasi has resulted in a change of the 
Indonesian military behaviour towards civilian access to military archives. The 
Pusjarah TNI and The Centre for the Army History (Dinas Sejarah TNI 
Angkatan Darat/Disjarahad) are more open to provide access for civilians to 
read military archives.81 Second, the Konfrontasi issue including the Dwikora 
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Operation is not considered as a sensitive issue, compared to other military 
operations.82 Lastly, the status of researcher as a lecturer at the Indonesian 
Defence University has provided advantages in accessing larger military 
archives located at the Pusjarah TNI and the Disjarahad. 
As this study aimed to examine the effect of politicisation of the military to the 
Indonesian military operations during the Konfrontasi, this research approach 
was conditioned by the historiography of the Konfrontasi era of Indonesian 
history. There was as yet, no comprehensive study of the Konfrontasi era from 
the Indonesian perspective, and most accounts83 tended to focus on the 
dynamics of domestic politics and foreign policy. This study did not aim to 
correct this lack of a comprehensive study of the Konfrontasi era. Moreover, this 
research sought to take a closer look at this event and to demonstrate how the 
implementation of the Dwikora Operation was affected by the politicisation of 
the TNI. To support this, narrative analysis was utilised for illustrating and 
explaining the connection of politicised military with the Dwikora Operation. 
Due to time and resource constrains, the present research employed cross-
sectional research, analysed the Dwikora Operation and related archives from 
1963 to 1967, and conducted interviews from August-December 2016. 
Furthermore, in order to provide a comprehensive analysis, this study combined 
four data-gathering techniques, namely semi-structured interviews,84 snowball 
sampling,85 archival analysis, and secondary data. Face-to-face interviews were 
undertaken with witnesses and experts on the Konfrontasi and Indonesian 
military history. As explained by Cassel, “the selection of interviewees was 
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Publication, 2009), 373. 
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influence by the research questions and the purpose of the interview in regard 
to the type of information sought.”86 The witness interviews were conducted with 
retired military soldiers and civilians who were involved in the Dwikora 
Operation, or other events that have linkage with the period of the Konfrontasi. 
Meanwhile, the expert interview referred to an interview, which was conducted 
with retired military soldiers, and civilians with knowledge and information on the 
TNI, the Konfrontasi or history of the Indonesian socio-politics. The interviews 
took place in a diverse set of location: home, workplace of the respondents, 
within or outside Indonesia.  
While it was difficult to trace the living witnesses who involved in the 
Konfrontasi, the study applied snowball sampling. The first step was the 
researcher set up a list of potential informants who were assumed to have 
sufficient knowledge of the Konfrontasi. They are mainly book authors and 
scholars who have written publications regarding the Indonesian military topics. 
The researcher developed this list based on relevant secondary data such as 
books, journals, magazines, and newspapers. Subsequently, the initial 
respondents were requested to suggest other potential informants who have 
relevance to the object of research.  
This research acknowledged that the ages of the living witnesses are around 70 
and 80 years old. Consequently, the responses may be subjective, bias, poorly 
recalled or inaccurate. However, these interviews still played a role in verifying 
and providing background information regarding the military archives. In other 
words, the interviews were part of applying a triangulation method and enriching 
research materials. 
The field research was undertaken in the Netherlands, Indonesia and the UK 
during October 2015–September 2017. In this stage, researcher was 
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conducting the data collections through in-depth interviews, gathering primary 
and secondary data from several places. The researcher also accessed the 
Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Jakarta Library, the 
Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy (ELSAM) Jakarta Library, SOAS 
Library in London, Leiden University Library, and the Indonesian Documentation 
Association (Perhimpunan Dokumentasi Indonesia) in Amsterdam to collect a 
rich array of secondary data. Finally, the researcher also spent four months on 
a fellowship programme at the KITLV, Leiden (August – September 2016) and 
the CSIS Jakarta (November-December 2016) for supporting efforts in the data 
gathering.    
The researcher interviewed a total of twenty individuals. In the Netherlands, four 
individuals were interviewed, comprising one expert and three living witnesses. 
There were eight living witnesses and eight experts interviewed in Indonesia. 
The summary of the fieldwork’s respondents can be seen in Table 1.1, below: 
Table 1-1 Participants of the Case Study  
 
 Witness Experts 
Civilian Retired Military Civilian Retired Military 
Indonesia 3 5 5 3 
The Netherlands 3 0 1 0 
Total 6 5 6 3 
Source: Author 
 
The present study utilised archival analysis in data gathering because it will 
provide essential information, which can be explored further through interview 
and other relevant archival data. Even though, the archives might reflect bias, 
Yin explained these documents are still useful to verify and enhance data from 
other sources.87 The archival research emphasised on how the ABRI perceived 
the Konfrontasi and the implementation of the Dwikora Operation and other 
related-military operations. 
                                            





As the main focus of the research was applied the Indonesian perspective, a 
rigorous scrutiny of the Indonesian military archives regarding the Konfrontasi 
period (1963-1967) was undertaken in two places, the Pusjarah TNI and the 
Disjarahad.88 The study acknowledged records from these two archival centres 
as primary sources. These included letters, radiograms, reports, presidential 
decrees, assessments and command instructions of the military operations 
during the Konfrontasi. These important files have never been used in any 
international publication (English language - red). In this context, analyses of 
TNI’s archives are used as the primary data-gathering techniques in this 
research. To enhance research material, the study also used secondary data 
such as relevant memoirs and biographies, and also archives from the 
Indonesian National Archives (Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia/ANRI), the 
Foreign Relation of the United States (FRUS) archives, the UK National 
Archives and the KITLV collections in the Netherlands. 
Further, the archival analysis was conducted before, during, and after the field 
research. Before the field research, more than 1,400 pages of TNI’s archives 
regarding the Dwikora Operation have been gathered. These data provided 
essential information about the implementation of the Dwikora Operation. 
During the field research, archival analysis was necessary in supporting 
interviews with witnesses and experts. In addition, after the field research, the 
archival analysis was aiming at verifying, amplifying and providing triangulation 
for all information that has been gathered. 89 In addition, the present research 
adopted secondary data technique to gather data from secondary sources such 
as newspaper, magazines, and relevant research publications in order to enrich 
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the data set. 
1.8.1 Data Analysis and Research Limitation 
This study acknowledged the importance of reliability and validity issues.90 Gray 
pointed out three steps in order to explain the process of case study 
construction.91 Firstly, assembling raw case data. In this step, all data regarding 
the case are gathered. Secondly, constructing a case record. In this part, the 
collected data will be organised, classified, and edited. Interpreting the data is 
also a part of this step. Lastly, writing the case study narrative.    
Process Tracing       
In order to develop valid interpretation, this study adapted process tracing 
(PT)92 and time series analysis technique93. George and Bennett explained PT 
method tries to identify intervening causal processes between an independent 
variable and the outcome of dependent variable.94 Tannenwald added good 
process tracing requires deep knowledge of the case.95 There are three variants 
of PT, namely (a) theory testing PT that aims to test a theory; (b) theory-building 
PT that aims to build a theoretical explanation from empirical evidence of a 
case; and (c) explaining outcome PT that is a case-centric that attempts to 
provide an explanation of an outcome.96 Strengths of PT method are it offers an 
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approach to examine causal change and also may applicable for assessing 
causality where attribution is difficult.97 Meanwhile, the challenges of this 
method are time intensive, theory-dependent, the need of empirical sources, 
and cognitive bias.98  
To be more specific, this study adapted explaining outcome PT. Due to 
research limitation, this research did not totally employ the explaining outcome 
PT. Still, adapting some parts of this method helped the researcher to reveal 
the specific issues within the case study under scrutiny, and to clarify the 
relation between those issues. Although this study did not aim at drawing 
conclusions beyond the case of the Indonesian military operations during the 
Konfrontasi, the results of this research might be useful for cross case studies 
with a higher ambition for generalisation. As the present research recognised 
the Konfrontasi as a multifaceted episode, explaining outcome PT could 
contribute in crafting a minimally sufficient explanation regarding the case 
study.99 Although explaining outcome PT is knowingly as inductive approach, 
the present study combines the analysis with deductive approach by applying 
theory testing. In this sense, as PT is also knowingly as theory-guided method, 
several existing theories will be tested through the analytical framework. It is 
aimed at engaging with the previous research.  
In employing the time series analysis technique, this study interpreted and 
developed arguments, which were based on chronological sequences. Yin 
explained that the complying of chronological events could cover wider 
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variables. As Yin pointed out “the chronology can be richer and more insightful 
than general time-series approaches.”100   
Referring to Figure 1-2 (p.20), the analysis began with discussing the input, 
which for this research focus on early setting of the Konfrontasi policy. The 
analysis then continued to examine the main actors and coalition during the 
Konfrontasi period. In key actors and coalitions block, the discussion covered 
the wider aspects that influenced the actors and coalitions, including the 
opportunities and motives of military involvement in politics.   
Next step to analyse the main qualities of politicisation of the ABRI during the 
Konfrontasi. The scrutiny comprised the internal, namely: political strengths and 
weaknesses. As external environment also might influence military 
professionalism, the analysis included the role of non-military actors in shaping 
the military operation making. In this block, the analysis also encompassed the 
level of military influence and direction of politicisation.    
Later, the effect of politicisation of the ABRI on its operations during the 
Konfrontasi was analysed. This part discovered the relationship between 
political behaviour of the ABRI and the implementation of Dwikora Operation. In 
this block, the discussion included the consequences of the politicisation of the 
ABRI post the Dwikora Operation at three levels: individual, organisational and 
national.  
Validation of the research findings will be undertaken through triangulation 
method.101 To ensure the validity of the military archives, the research 
addressed the potential shortcomings by corroborating information across other 
relevant publications, interviews and primary data from other sources. The 
proposed triangulation model for this study was illustrated in Figure 1-4. 
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Figure 1-4 The Dwikora Operation: Triangulation to Validate Findings 
Source: Author 
Research Limitation 
Moreover, this research was limited in the following ways: First, this research 
was limited by the availability of data gathered from the Pusjarah TNI and the 
Disjarahad. This study relied on TNI’s archives during 1963-1967. However, 
these records might be incomplete102 and lack a standard format. The archives 
numbering system was different with other institution. Archives from the 
Pusjarah TNI did not apply any numbering system to record the archives.  
Second, this research source was mainly military archives from the ABRI. It 
meant all of information on archives solely reflected military’s view regarding the 
Konfrontasi. The distortion of evidence, inaccurate or falsified text might be 
ensued. This research recognised that the information from the archives is 
possibly subjective and bias.   
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Third, this research only focused on examining politicisation of the Indonesian 
military, which comprised three services, namely the Indonesian Army (TNI 
Angkatan Darat/TNI AD), the Indonesian Navy (TNI Angkatan Laut/TNI AL) and 
the Indonesian Air Force (TNI Angkatan Udara/TNI AU). Indeed, since 1962, 
government had restructured the ABRI) and attached the Ministry of Police to 
the ABRI. However, the position of the Police was not comparable to other 
services. Nasution admitted the Police as non-military element in the ABRI.103 
During the 1960s, the Police also was not seen as major player in shaping the 
political behaviour in the armed forces organisation.  
Lastly, this study concerned the time frame of the case studies. This research 
examined case studies that occurred between 1963 and 1967. However, some 
related event before 1963 would also be covered just to enhance the 
description and analysis of military strategy. Meanwhile, this study used 1967 
as the end of the time frame because until that time the ABRI was still 
publishing documents related to the Konfrontasi.  
Given these limitations, this research acknowledged the restriction of data and 
scope in this study. However, to overcome problem of record system, this 
research used the title of records, place, and/or issuing date in referencing for 
the archives from the Pusjarah TNI. Meanwhile, in relation to avoid bias, 
falsification or inaccurate and incompleteness, this research also collected other 
primary sources such as memoirs, biography, archives from British National 
Archives, Historical Document and National Archives and Records 
Administrations (NARA) of the US; conducted interviews with witnesses and 
experts and also used secondary sources such as existing relevant 
publications, pamphlets and journal articles. Using other sources were also part 
of triangulation process. 
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1.9 Structure of Thesis 
This thesis consisted of six chapters. Chapter One set the context and 
background and also covers summary of case. The analytical framework that is 
employed in this study also is illustrated in this section. Chapter Two examined 
the existing key literatures relate to the case study. The discussion of extant 
literature is divided into two main parts. The first part reviewed key publications 
and seminal works regarding the Konfrontasi and the Indonesian politicised 
military theme. The second part discussed theories that will be divided into two 
main strands: politicised military and political behaviour in organisation. 
Thereafter, Chapter Three and Four addressed the case study. Chapter Three 
explained the broader setting of the Konfrontasi and the outset of the Dwikora 
Operation. This included the contextual background of Indonesian political-
security landscape Then, Chapter Four analysed the Dwikora Operation. The 
major influence of foreign countries, the US and United Kingdom (UK), during 
the Konfrontasi will not discuss in a separate section. As these countries had 
certain influence to many aspects, the analysis is provided throughout Chapter 
Three to Four. This thesis highlighted the US as an important feature because 
this country used to have good relationship with President Sukarno and ABRI. 
Meanwhile, UK is also essential because this country played a significant role 
and represented Indonesia's biggest opponent during the Konfrontasi. Chapter 
Five analysed the failure of the Dwikora Operation. Finally, Chapter Six covered 














2 LITERATURE REVIEW: EXAMINING THE POLITICAL 
ASPECT IN MILITARY ORGANISATION 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The existence of national armed forces is primarily to confront external threats. 
However, for the new nation,104 military often expands its roles. Stepan 
explained military in the new state also as an integral part of a political system. 
In other words, military plays significant roles in some civilian areas. He posited 
“military institution which may emphasise such features as military unity or 
national orientation often conceal more than they reveal about the interactions 
between the military and the political system.”105      
The problem laid regarding politicisation of the military during crisis, as 
mentioned in Chapter 1, Section 1.2. Ideally, once a government has decided to 
use force, policy implementation will be left to the military. However, the 
contextual problem still remains. As Betts argued, “the problem is not only that 
the boundaries between policy, strategy, and the tactics are rarely clear but 
civilian leaders may insist on the right to control operations because of their 
political implication.”106 At the same time, factions within the military also led the 
problem to be more complicated. In this regard, the politicisation of the military, 
both caused by internal and external factor of the military, gave significant 
impact to the implementation of military operation.  
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This chapter examined the key literature and seminal works and discusses the 
analytical framework employed in the research. In particular, this part assessed 
the concept of politicisation of the military and political behaviour in an 
organisation. In addition, the purposes of this chapter are to achieve two 
enabling objectives (p.14), namely to: (a) critically review the key literature and 
seminal works regarding the Konfrontasi and Indonesian politicised military 
theme; and (b) evaluate the concept of politicisation of the military and political 
behaviour in organisations. 
In doing so, this chapter is divided into five sections. The first section provided 
introduction of the chapter. The second section reviewed the existing literature 
related to the case study. This section is divided into two clusters: the 
Konfrontasi and Indonesian politicised military theme. The third section 
discussed the evaluation of the relevant theories. This theoretical review is 
separated into two main strands. The first subsection discussed various 
theories on politicised military especially in new nations. Then the discussion of 
theories on political behaviour in organisation is presented in the second 
subsection. Based on these theoretical reviews, the fourth section explained the 
research gap. A summary concluded this chapter. 
2.2 Reviewing the Context 
This section focused on reviewing the extant literature relating to the case 
study. In this regard, the literature is categorised in two themes: the Konfrontasi 
and Indonesian politicised military theme. By examining the relevant seminal 
works, this section provided a context for the present research and places it in 
the existing body of knowledge. 
2.2.1 The Konfrontasi Theme 
Studies on Konfrontasi have been viewed from many perspectives. The most 
comprehensive literature on this event is JAC Mackie’s research 




covered the tensions between both countries during the Konfrontasi, explaining 
how and why the dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia emerged. He 
contends, during the Konfrontasi, there was a complex relationship between 
President Sukarno, PKI, and the army in relation to domestic politics. 
Meanwhile, the rest of the political parties had less influence due to poor 
performance during earlier period of parliamentary democracy.107 
Overall, this book provided a broad picture and context of Indonesia and 
international fora. Mackie argued that since the beginning, Sukarno was not 
seriously delivering the policy of Konfrontasi. Sukarno became more aggressive 
toward the western bloc after the US cut its aid to Indonesia. However, while 
mentioning aspects of the Indonesian military, Mackie did not provide detailed 
explanation of the military operation. 
Although the Konfrontasi was executed during the same decolonialisation 
period, it was not clearly defined when it started in 1963.108 Greg Poulgrain 
explained that the hostilities between Indonesia and Britain began at the end of 
World War II when Britain had tried to reclaim some Indonesian territories on 
behalf of the Netherlands. Then this was followed by a trade war during 
1950.109 Worse, Britain was involved in the 1958 Sumatra Revolt. On 15 
February 1958, some military commanders and civilian politicians announced 
the PRRI based in Padang, West Sumatra. This movement was aimed to 
overthrow Sukarno administration. 110 Regarding this event, this book provided 
some details of how Britain and the US supported the Sumatra Revolt that 
created tension in the Indonesia-UK relationship. More specifically, this book 
portrays the connection between Indonesian officials and the leader of the 
Brunei revolt, Azahari, and also how Indonesia supported the revolt. Despite 
demonstrating the rivalry between the army and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
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book failed to address military involvement during the Brunei revolt. 
In the area of strategic studies, most researchers have applied British 
perspective. Van der Bijl, for instance, explained Konfrontasi as “the 
diametrically opposed differences between conservative traditionalism and 
liberal thought and cultural expression.”111 However, he posited President 
Sukarno engaged in Konfrontasi as part of an effort to achieve his political 
goals. He argued, “Sukarno believed that political success could be achieved 
through diplomatic lobbying accompanied by economic-military threats.”112  
This book described how the British applied a ‘carrot and stick’ policy to respond 
to the Konfrontasi by using Claret operation. The operation was to boost 
Malaysia’s position during the negotiation process with Indonesia.113 The 
absence of any journalists to cover this conflict allowed the British to conduct 
one of the largest clandestine operations in the history of military operations.114 
Generally, the success of this military operation was caused by a joint political 
and military response. However, this study outlined two success factors of the 
British operation. As an internal factor, British troops were highly experienced in 
a jungle setting and had recently defeated communist guerrillas in the Malayan 
emergency. On the other hand, Indonesia had also failed to predict the 
capability of British troops.115 However, this book was absence to give details 
on Indonesian military strategy and operations during the Konfrontasi. This 
book merely focuses on Britain and its allies’ responses. Where, Van der Bijl’s 
work is relevant for this research is in the provision of essential information. He 
clearly provided inside comments about Major General Suharto over the 
Konfrontasi policy that Sukarno had run a fatal course.116 This book also 
indicated the Indonesian army during that time was supported by CIA and 
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British intelligence.117  
Regarding the Claret Operation, Raffi Gregorian explained this operation was a 
“part of a new British strategy designed to stop Indonesian incursion by forcing 
them onto defensive.”118 Parallel with Van der Bijl, Gregorian also mentioned 
that the success of Claret Operation was affected by the British government 
policy to keep its operation secret. Nevertheless, this study recognised that this 
operation was not the mere factor that led Konfrontasi to end. Political dynamics 
within Indonesia also influenced de-escalation. Gregorian elaborated that even 
Claret Operation was a military matter, “the decision to authorise cross border 
raid was made at the highest level of the British Government.”119 
Similarly, James and Shell-Small also examined the Konfrontasi from the British 
side. They argued Britain was successfully gathering local support during the 
Konfrontasi.120 They added the British won the war because “security forces 
had advantage of major military base in the right place (Singapore), had 
complete command of the sea and air and had superb intelligence service.”121 
Meanwhile, Indonesia lost because the Konfrontasi ruined stability and the 
economy,122 and failed to gain full support from local people in Kalimantan.123 
However, this book failed to explain the Konfrontasi from both sides 
comprehensively. This research only covered the conflict intensity in 
Kalimantan Island. None of the chapters explained the infiltrations in Singapore 
and the western part of Malaysia through the Malacca Strait that were done by 
the ABRI.   
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In support of James and Shell-Small, Jackson claimed British operations during 
the Konfrontasi were the most spectacular success of the military campaign.124 
Jackson denoted Indonesia was also supporting the Brunei Revolt, December 
1962.125 This book also explained the political influence of British campaign in 
preserving the independence of Malaysia and preventing the spread of 
communism into Indonesia.126 This book covered air and land war during the 
Konfrontasi. Jackson highlights that the political event during the Konfrontasi 
affected the on-going conflict. He noted that during the military stage of the 
second half of 1965 it was dominated by political events, including Singapore 
split, and Jakarta coup.127 Those events, to some extent, influenced the military 
campaign from both sides. 
Furthermore, British scholar, David Easter examined British policy and strategy 
in the Konfrontasi. This study elucidated the dynamic relationship between 
Britain and its allies during the Konfrontasi including the ambivalence of the US 
position toward the Konfrontasi. The US was worried that Indonesia would 
become closer to communism.128 Easter explained Britain’s reason behind the 
Malaysia federation was to manage global power with cheaper cost.129 This 
book also indicated the involvement of British intelligence in rebel movements in 
Indonesia.130 This action was an effort to dissipate Indonesian forces’ focus in 
the Konfrontasi and also in order to weaken the Indonesian government. This 
support, however, was not aimed at dismembering Indonesia. Easter believed 
neither Indonesia nor Britain were keen to intensify the Konfrontasi. Neither 
party wanted to escalate the conflict into open war.131 However, he argued the 
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successful British operation in the Konfrontasi was not solely due to the factor 
of using a military approach. There were some critical factors such as 
propaganda through international media,132 and also political instability in 
Indonesia that had affected the success of the British operation.  
Meanwhile, Christopher Tuck offered different arguments towards the British 
approach to the Konfrontasi policy. He examined the British counter insurgency 
campaign from two aspects: 1) tactical level means and method, and also 2) 
operational level command and control. In this study, he identified three 
strategic problems over this campaign, as follows: prolongation, negotiation, 
and escalation.133He argued that the Konfrontasi has created “Indonesia 
circumstances conducive both the growth of communist influence and 
Indonesia’s progressive alienation from the west.134 By using concept of war 
termination and British point of view as main focus, the main argument of this 
study is that the “British strategy was neither an exemplary exercise in strategy 
nor was it fundamentally flawed.”135 Tuck denoted British misjudgement 
occurred because, in the beginning, it never predicted that Indonesia would use 
hard power to stop the creation of the Malaysia federation. Britain assumed that 
by supporting Indonesia’s position towards the Konfrontasi against the Dutch 
would prevent the tension over the plan.136 However, the dynamics of 
Indonesian domestic political events shaped British strategy making. British 
policymakers influenced the government to terminate the conflict.137 Although, 
the political and budget constraint put the British government in a dilemma, as 
they should withdraw troops from the Southeast Asia region. On one hand, 
Britain tried to terminate the conflict without losing face. On the other hand, 
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British policymaker avoided any solution that might give advantage to Indonesia 
especially President Sukarno.138     
Further, Brian Farrel gave greater attention to how the British military and its 
allies responded to Indonesian President Soekarno’s policy of Crush 
Malaysia.139 According to Farrel, there are some complexities that had 
fashioned the Konfrontasi. As he argued: 
The volatile political and economic situation in Indonesia, the 
articulation of broad geostrategic objectives for Indonesia and the 
region, the sense of Indonesia as the leader of a bloc of Non-Aligned 
New Emerging Forces having an example to set, the usefulness of 
Confrontation to different interests in domestic politics, the tendency 
to see Confrontation as the most appropriate trajectory for 
Indonesia’s foreign policy in general-these things plus the problem of 
losing face all made the choice after 16 September appear to 
Indonesian leader as one between surrender or escalation.140 
This subsection has already highlighted military operation during the 
Konfrontasi from the western perspective. This is another aspect of this low 
intensity conflict that has not had sufficient analysis. Most of the previous 
publications fail to elaborate the uprising and infiltration in Singapore during that 
time. The consequences of the incidents that were organised by Indonesian 
infiltrators resulted in 130 people killed and wounded.141 In addition, the worst 
explosion was at MacDonald House that caused two deaths and thirty-three 
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were injured.142 This incident also led to two Indonesian Marines being hanged 
three years later, which heightened the tension between Indonesia and 
Singapore for several years. As a part of the Konfrontasi narrative, the 
sabotage cases in West Malaysia and Singapore, of course, is too important to 
be ignored in examining the Konfrontasi. These were part of the ABRI 
operations.  
As the Konfrontasi is multifaceted, there are several seminal works that have 
been written in the area of political science and international relation. Those 
works covered the Indonesian motives,143 Indonesian foreign policy,144 peace 
process post the G30S affair,145 Malayan leaders efforts,146 the role of the PKI 
toward the Konfrontasi,147 the diplomacy of Britain and its allies,148 and the 
dynamics of Indonesia-Malaysia relations.149 Beyond state level, the 
Konfrontasi may be concluded, according to the literature, the great powers – 
US, Soviet Union and China – also coloured the Indonesia-Malaysia dispute. As 
the Konfrontasi happened during the Cold War, major powers attempted to 
maintain their grip and influence in the region. Thus, the Konfrontasi was a sort 
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of ideological battle between the East and the West. Although, those studies did 
not discuss the Dwikora Operation in detail, they still provided insights of how 
the Indonesian Army and the PKI exercised their political influence to President 
Sukarno over the Konfrontasi policy.  
In particular, Hidayat Mukmin examined the involvement of the ABRI in foreign 
affairs in order to end the Konfrontasi.150 He argued the ABRI involvement 
should be interpreted as the form of military participation in the foreign policy 
matters. The involvement, he added, is a common feature as the ABRI was also 
involved in domestic politics.151 Even though, Mukmin’s work did not examine 
the Dwikora Operation, it still strengthened the assumption that there was a 
disunity of command during the Operation.152 This study explained in detail how 
the peace feelers153 from the ABRI conducted their covert operation and denied 
any civilians acted as peace feelers. Mukmin also agreed that the G30S affair 
boosted the peace effort.  
Written documents about Indonesia’s military operations are mostly found in the 
biographies of former military officers. Only three publications, published by the 
Pusjarah TNI, examined the Dwikora Operation. 154 These works described how 
the Dwikora Operation was conducted. These publications divided the military 
operation based on a time basis: 1963-1964 (preliminary), 1964-1965 
(preparation), and 1965-1966 (execution and termination). The establishment 
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and the deployment of volunteers also were explained in detail. Both 
Hadiningrat and Pusjarah TNI argued that the Konfrontasi policy was solely 
influenced by PKI that considered the creation of Malaysia federation as a 
threat. However, these arguments failed to analyse how military operations 
were carried out in the context of a successful operation. These studies also did 
not elaborate on clear military objectives and goals and also ignored any 
sabotage cases in the western Malaysia. 
2.2.2 Indonesian Politicised Military Theme 
Several scholars have examined Indonesian politicised military during Sukarno 
period. The existing literature assessed this topic from various lenses such as 
military intervention, civil-military relation, and military culture. Even though 
there were some disagreement and differences, these publications tended to 
have commonality that politicising the ABRI occurred because of complex 
circumstances. 
Peter Britton, for instance, examined professionalism and its linkage to the root 
of Indonesian military ideology.155 There are many factors that shaped the ABRI 
professionalism. Since the birth of ABRI in 1945, local culture and “foreign 
values”156 have affected ABRI’s ideology and professionalism. The main local 
culture that fashioned ABRI’s ideology and professionalism is the Java culture. 
Since the birth of ABRI, more than half of the troops came from Java.157 Military 
leaders exploited myth, legend stories, and Java’s hero values to increase the 
spirit and morale of the soldiers.158  
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Britton identified three countries that also influenced professionalism and 
ABRI’s ideology as follows: Japan, Holland, and the US. Both Japan and the 
Dutch were spreading their “values” through the establishment of troops during 
their colonialism era in Indonesia. During colonialism in Indonesia, Japan 
established PETA. Japan recruited and trained local people to be soldier. The 
main task was to defend “homeland”. Japan created PETA as part of territorial 
defence strategy.  Beside physical training, Japan also indoctrinated PETA with 
Bushido value. While during her colonialism, Dutch established Koninklijk 
Nederlands Indisch Leger (KNIL/Royal Netherlands East Indies Army) in 
Indonesia. During that time, KNIL has applied military professionalism that 
differentiated civilian and military power.159 Meanwhile, the US value was 
dispersed through military aid (1955-1965). The US was helped the ABRI 
through military assistance program (USMAP). This program included training 
and education. 160  
However, the difference of training background (PETA and KNIL) has created 
unhealthy rivalry within the ABRI since its birth in 1945. This triggered factions 
and grouping within the ABRI. Moreover, Indonesian political system also 
shaped ABRI’s professionalism and ideology. Political turbulence during 1945-
1965 forced the ABRI to involve actively in politics. During this period, the ABRI 
initiated “functional group” that gave the opportunity for military to play a more 
active role in Indonesian politics. 
Another scholar, Ulf Sundhaussen, examined Indonesian military politics more 
comprehensively. This study covered many issues including civil-military 
relations, military autonomy, military intervention, and politicisation of the 
military – both from civilian and inside the ranks of the military itself. 
Sundhaussen argued that factions within ABRI – besides KNIL and PETA 
                                            
159 Britton, Profesionalisme, 37-45.  
160 Britton, Profesionalisme, 75-120. For detail explanation about this cooperation read 
Rudolf Mrazek, The United States and the Indonesian Military, 1945-1965. A Study of an 
Intervention, (Prague: Oriental Institute in Academia, Publishing House of the Czechoslovak 




factions – also are caused by ethnicity. As he explained “ethnic composition 
from officer corps has caused more problems if officers from Java were 
distributed to hold senior positions across Indonesia and especially in the ABRI 
headquarter.”161   
There were many elements that initiated military intervention in the Indonesian 
case. Sundhaussen divided these elements into two groups, internal and 
external. On internal factors, he indicated three interests had boosted military 
intervention: 1) class interest, 2) individual interest, and 3) corporate interest. 
Meanwhile, he also added the failure of the political system created the 
opportunity for the military to intervene politics. To make it worse, civilians were 
later involved on military matters.162 
Harold Crouch denoted the ABRI has never limited itself to a specific role as 
Indonesian defence force.163 The ABRI already had a political culture since its 
birth. He added the boundary between military and political function during 
colonialism was unclear. Indonesian youths who joined the military were not 
intended to chase higher career but more on patriotic motive.164 Parallel to 
Sundhaussen, Crouch also highlighted the impact of culture to the rivalry within 
corps, which also occurred during the Dwikora Operation.165 Prior to the G30S 
affair, the military did not seem to dominate national politics. Consequently, the 
increasing political role of the military has undermined hierarchy. Faction and 
rivalry amongst services have made the ABRI structure uncertain.  
Indonesian military scholar Salim Said also agreed that military involvement in 
politics has emerged since revolution period.166 More specifically, he noted that 
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the ABRI “was not created by the government, or by a political party, neither by 
the colonial administration.”167 Since the ABRI was a self-created military,168 it 
has grown as a more autonomous and independent institution. As Said argued, 
“this self-created military drew its members from various organisations, some of 
them highly politicised, around the days of the proclamation of 
independence.”169 He added “the emergence of a politicised military was the 
result of the reluctance of the government to create a defence force in the early 
days following the declaration of independence.”170 
One of the main arguments of Salim’s book is civil-military relations in Indonesia 
can be elucidated by two factors “the involvement in politics of the Indonesian 
military since its inception and the weakness of civilian institutions.”171 
Furthermore, as a result of incapable civilians in handling politics, the military 
expanded its role – exercising non-military skill. This argument is supported 
since Nasution introduced the “middle way” concept in November 1958.172 Even 
though prior to this year, military officers had occupied some civilian posts. For 
Said, western theories of civil military relations could not completely explain the 
Indonesian case. There was a lack of alternative idea or concept from civilians 
to challenge military rule in Indonesia during that time. He tended to agree with 
the former Indonesian Minister of Defence Juwono Sudarsono's statement “the 
only group that can run Indonesia is ABRI.”173 
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2.3 Politics and the Military: A Review 
This section provided an evaluation of the key literature and debates regarding 
political aspect in the military that are relevant to the present research. It is 
started by looking at the essential works on politicised military, starting with the 
concept of military professionalism, and followed by a discussion of the concept 
of military involvement in politics. It is then proceed to discuss the scholarly 
debates on political behaviour in organisations. The discussion started with the 
concept of power and ends by examining political behaviour in organisation 
discourse. 
2.3.1 Politicised Military 
To understand the substantial matters of politicisation of the military, it is 
important to understand basic features, types, political strength and weakness 
of the armed forces. Elaborating some essential descriptions of military 
organisation will provide comprehensive discussion of politicised military 
literatures. As one of the most organised institution in a country, the military is 
not alienated from politics. As Stepan argued, “political variables are frequently 
far more important for determining the role of the military in society than the 
absolute size of the armed forces.”174 However, the phenomenon of military 
involvement in political affairs does not occur only in new emerging states. 
Professional military175 in democratic countries also has a certain degree of 
influence in politics. Önder added, “even in developed countries, although the 
military is restricted to national defence and obedient to the civil authority, it still 
has significant influence on the governmental policies.”176 
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Regarding military professionalism, many scholars engaged in this field.177 
However, the two classic and influential works remain Samuel Huntington’s The 
Soldier and the State and Morris Janowitz’s The Professional Soldier. 
Generally, scholars have acknowledged two types of military organisation, 
namely professional and praetorian military.178 Huntington argued that 
professionalism in military is to highlight the differences between the old and 
modern soldier. He posited three characteristics of professional military, namely 
expertise that refers to certain skill and knowledge; responsibility that denotes to 
its clients i.e society; and corporateness that acknowledges group 
consciousness and professional competences.179 Alternatively, Janowitz argued 
that that a professional organisation had a special skill, a system of internal 
administration and a sense of group identity.180 As the military can generate 
special environment and influence decision making process, Janowitz argued 
that the military professional should be expert in war-making and in organising 
the using of violence.181   
Moreover, Perlmutter explained, the concept of military professionalism is not a 
monolithic phenomenon. In many countries, professionalism will be varied and 
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affected by cultures, values, norms and the ‘home’ environment. He proposed 
two key variables of military professionalism: ‘control’ means military is 
controlled by internal colleague group and the hierarchy of authority; and ‘skill’ 
that is closely linked to bravery, discipline, management and strategy. He 
added, “the development of the modern military professional is clearly a modern 
bureaucratic phenomenon.”182 In contrast, praetorian military is described as a 
situation when the military class exercises autonomous power by virtue of a 
tangible or threatened use of force.183 Perlmutter pointed out that military 
praetorianism happened in agrarian, transitional or ideologically divided 
societies that military intended to change the constitution and political order.184 
As Nordlinger argued, intervention occurs when officers “threaten or use force 
in order to enter or dominate the political arena.”185  
In the wider context of military involvement in politics, both professional and 
praetorian soldier exercised its influence. Pion-Berlin pointed out, not only 
praetorian military but also professional military has political dimension to the 
military behaviour.186 Nordlinger stressed, “the armed forces of all countries 
exert considerable political influence.”187 So far, focusing on military features, 
both professional and military praetorianism may have many commonalities. 
There are five common military descriptions, namely (a) centralised 
command, (b) hierarchy, (c) discipline, (d) intercommunication, (e) esprit de 
corps and a corresponding isolation and self-sufficiency.188 Finer recognised 
these features as one of the political strengths of the military. Besides 
superiority in organisation, two other assets of military are symbolic status of a 
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country, and monopoly of use weapons.189 As Harries-Jenkins added, “their 
(soldiers) claim to a monopoly of arms gives them a special status which 
enables them to symbolise, as well as make effective, distinctive of the 
state.”190 Meanwhile, the political weaknesses of military over civilian institution 
in a country are shortfall of technical ability regarding wider governmental 
issues such as economics, public health, and finance; and lack of legitimacy 
that refers to right to govern.191  
Military involvement in politics is occured in many forms. It is a broad theme 
with numerous associated theories. Scholars examined this phenomenon with 
various lenses and definitions. For instance, Finer employed term of military 
intervention to explain the military involvement in politics as “armed forces 
constrained substitution of their own policies and/or their persons for those of 
the recognised civil authorities.”192 Another example, Lasswell developed term 
of “garrison state”. He defined garrison state as “the power elites value power 
enough to resort to large-scale coercion when they regard such coercive 
strategies as useful to the maintenance of their ascendancy and the elites 
accept the expectation that the retention of power during at least the immediate 
and middle-range future depends upon capability and willingness to coerce 
external or internal challengers.”193 Likewise, Stepan used the term of “military 
prerogative”. From his point of view, military assumed rights and privileges. The 
privileges included occupy civilian post, control military education and defence 
sector, and dominate intelligence, judiciaries and police.194 When analysing 
military domination in political arena, some scholars applied different lexicon, 
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even though the definition is quite similar. Koonings and Kruijt employed term of 
“political armies”.195 Meanwhile Martinez used “military control of political 
power.”196 In addition, Betts preferred to use the term of “military influence” to 
describe military participation in civilian sphere. He advanced influence as 
“causing decision makers to do something they probably would not have done 
otherwise.”197  
Generally speaking, there are two factors that provide opportunity for the 
military to get involved in politics. First is internal factor, which includes military 
leadership, factions, its political cohesiveness and commitment198 and the 
raising of military reputation199. Second is external factor that includes strength 
of authority to be replaced, opposition groups, ineffective institution and social 
control, inadequate social cohesion, ineffective political parties,200 civilian 
dependency on the military, and domestic circumstances.201 This situation 
denoted that there are some conditions when the military could intervene in 
politics. Finer pointsed out five conditions of military intervention: (a) the rising 
of nationalism and of the nation-state, (b) substitution of popular sovereignty, (c) 
the insurrectionary army, (d) professionalisation of officer corps and (e) the 
emergence of new states.202  
Furthermore, the phenomenon of military involvement in politics often becomes 
characteristic in a new state. Howard asserted “the scope of the military interest 
expanded enormously: expanded both in span of time, now that years of 
                                            
195 Political armies defined as “military institution that considers involvement in - or 
control over - domestic politics and the business of government to be a central part of their 
legitimate function.” Koonings and Kruijt, Political Armies, 1. 
196 Martinez describes military control of political power as “the armed forces simply 
dominate the whole state apparatus.” R Martinez, “Objectives for Democratic Consolidation in 
the Armed Forces,” in Debating Civil-Military Relations in Latin America, ed. DR Mares and R 
Martinez, (Eastbourne, Chicago and Ontario: Sussex Academic Press, 2014), 32 
197 Betts, 5. 
198 Perlmutter and Bennett, The Political, 17 
199 Finer, 80-83 
200 Perlmutter and Bennett, The Political, 17, 203-205 
201 Finer, 72-80 




preparation were necessary if one was to avoid defeat in as many weeks, and 
also laterally through society, leaving virtually no aspect of national life in which 
the military leaders might not be legitimately concerned.”203 When the state 
does not have a high degree of political system and cultural maturity and 
technological advancement, military officers could easily seize power from 
civilians and gain benefits from the power.204 In particular, modernisation and 
technological innovation have shaped the military in underdeveloped countries 
to become modern-type organisation. As Pye posited “the more politically 
conscious officers can hardly avoid being aware of the need for substantial 
changes in their own societies.”205  
Consequently, modern military possibly would occupy any positions in other 
organisations, which operate within the society.206 Furthermore, the 
phenomenon of military involvement in politics often becomes common feature 
in a new state can be illustrated in three reasons, as follows: (1) in search of 
legitimacy; (2) lack of the material precondition for development of civilian 
consensus; and (3) some suffer from the handicap of granting independence at 
the hand of military. Thus, civilian domains in a new state are vulnerable to 
military immersion.207  
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In addition, military involvement in politics in new states derived from various 
motives. Finer distinguished two categories of motive: inhibiting and disposing 
the military to engage in politics. He stressed that three factors constrain the 
military to intervene, namely professionalism and its consequences, principle of 
supremacy and other factors such as military leadership and perception of 
“threats.”208 Within this context, Finer asserted the concept of military 
professionalism as described by Huntington and admits military subordination to 
civilian power. In addition, Finer elaborated four disposing motives for military 
intervention.209 Firstly, the manifest destiny of the soldier. It referred to soldiers’ 
belief that they are saviours of the country. Secondly, factor of national interest 
that military saw the intervention as an action to uphold national interest. For 
Edmonds, term of “national interest” is ambiguous. National interest may be 
clearly written in a constitution. But, both civilian group and military possibly 
have different interpretation or perception of national interest.210 Thirdly, the 
sectional interest included class, regional, corporate and individual self-interest 
that drives military to interfere into civilian sphere. Fourthly, combination of 
those motives above that led military to expand its influence. In this sense, 
Edmonds differentiated self-interest and sectional interest. He argued sectional 
class may be derived from popular, class, group, institutional and even 
government demand. In addition, self-interest covered individual ambition to 
institutional interest.211  More recently, Koonings and Kruijt introduced the idea 
that three factors are behind the formation of political armies, namely (1) 
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“birthright principle” that stresses a myth in state formation,212 (2) “competence 
principle” that refers to the idea “only military are best place to take care of 
national interest,”213 (3) “principle of civil inadequacy” that indicates civilians are 
incapable to manage public affairs.214    
However, a lot of the extant literature does not clearly distinguish between the 
level and method of military involvement in politics.215 These publications 
seemed combining ways, means and degree of military involvement in politics. 
For instance, Betts categorised four level of military involvement in politics. 
First, direct and negative influence, which means military recommends against 
use of force. Second, indirect and negative influence that means military does 
not make explicit recommendations against force but presents a set of options 
against desire of intervention. Third, indirect and positive influence that means 
military only encourages decision for force. Fourth, direct and positive influence, 
which means military recommends the use of force.216  Meanwhile, Ruffa et al. 
pointed out four ways that military personnel could influence politics, as follows: 
(1) military decision is intrinsically political; (2) tactical or operational decisions 
have political implications in the local area; (3) operation may behave in an 
“irregular” way such as torture and killing civilians; and (4) action can have 
political consequences through chain of command.217 Furthermore, Edmonds 
offered wider spectrum of military involvement in civilian affairs from “soft” 
(influence) to “hard” (intervention). It included a form of involvement (direct and 
indirect approach) and method (such as supplant, replace government, 
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obstruction, blackmail and refuse to obey civilian authority).218 Only Finer 
suggested the importance of differentiation of level and method of military 
involvement in public affairs. He proposed four levels of military intervention219 
and six methods of military involvement in public affairs.220 Consequently, 
indirect military rule, direct military rule and “joint civilian-military” regime are 
variety of result regarding military involvement in civilian affairs.221  
Military involvement in politics discourse also highlighted sources and direction 
of politicisation as essential topics. Perlmutter and Bennett, for instance, 
pointed out three sources of politicisation of the military: (1) infiltration of 
“politicised” professional military officers; (2) a new weltanschauung such as 
fascism and socialism; and (3) political event.222 Regarding direction of 
politicised military, Betts suggested two tracks, namely negative (military 
intervention in public affairs opposed government policy); and positive (military 
supports and advocacy of administration policy).223 Thus, to measure the 
existence of military interference in politics, Martinez offered four operational 
indicators.224 First, the existence of regulations regarding military subordination 
to civil authorities. Second, the level of military presence as the coercive organ 
of the state. Third, the level of military presence in decision-making. Last, the 
degree of civilian supremacy.  
This section has already highlighted some essential issues in the politicisation 
of the military. To summarise the explanation above, Figure 2-1 illustrated a 
cluster of military involvement in politics discourse. The extant literature about 
military involvement in politics can be grouped into eight key ideas, namely: 
motives, condition, opportunity, methods, levels, institution, directions and 
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sources. The clusters are defined by common basic insight of the relevant 
theory. These eigth clusters embodied unique aspects of military involvement in 
politics. Items within the clusters provided further insight into discussion over 
the military involvement in politics. Thus, the present study provided a unique 
and comprehensive insight in which political feature in the military may 














2.3.2 Politics in Organisation 
Politics is a common activity in every organisation and representing an 
approach to the understanding of organisational dynamics.225 As Ferris and 
King advocated “politics is what takes place in the space between the perfect 
workings of the rational model (efficiency) and the messiness of human 
interaction.”226 In general, politics is often considered as the darker side of 
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organisation by its members.227 Studies have been conducted regarding politics 
in the workplace. Those studies examined various elements of organisational 
politics.228 However, as Vigoda pointed out, the extant literatures are still 
insufficient due to fully capture this phenomenon.229 Politics, power and 
influence within formal organisation are often perceived as an illegitimate, 
informal and dysfunctional behaviour against the authority. Atinc et al. argued 
self-interest has shaped the characteristic of organisational politics.230  
Scholars employed various definitions of organisational politics. Cropanzano et 
al., for instance, defined organisational politics as "social influence attempts 
directed at those who can provide rewards that will help promote or protect the 
self-interest of the actor".231 Meanwhile, Ferris et al described organisational 
politics as “behaviour not formally sanctioned by the organisation, which 
produces conflict and disharmony in the work environment by pitting individuals 
and/or groups against one another, or against the organisation.”232 Similarly, 
Mayes and Allen suggested organisational politics as “the management of 
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influence to obtain ends not sanctioned by the organisation or to obtain 
sanctioned ends through non-sanctioned influence means.”233 Dhar also 
conceptualised organisational politics as “the exercise of power to negotiate 
different interests among members while maintaining one’s interests in certain 
organisational issues.”234 Further, Allen et al portrayed this term as “acts of 
influence to enhance or protect the self-interest of individuals or groups.”235 
Butcher and Clarke also emphasised the existence of self-interest and personal 
agenda when capturing politics in organisation. They defined it as “those 
deliberate efforts made by individuals and groups in organisations to use power 
in pursuit of their own particular interest.”236 Meanwhile, Kumar and Thibodeaux 
proposed concept of organisation politics is in pragmatic view. They argue the 
existence of organisational politics is considered desirable and associated with 
the organisational development. Thus, they posited organisational politics as 
“an organisational reality, and ensuring success of a change programme may 
occasionally require tactical confrontation with this reality.”237 
However, conceptualising organisational politics is problematic, as 
organisational politics can be seen as the form of exercising the power among 
members.238 Kumar and Ghadially,239 Dhar,240 and Block,241 explained politics 
in organisation is both helpful and harmful for its members. The positive results 
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could be career advancement, recognition and status, enhanced power and 
position, accomplishment of personal goals, control, etc. Meanwhile, the 
negative outcomes could be loss of strategic power, position credibility, hamper 
job performance, etc. 242 Further, Ferris et al perceived politics in organisations 
as “result from the behaviour of supervisors and co-workers, and from 
organisational policies and practices.”243  
Even though, organisational politics may be perceived as negative activities, 
politics still has significant role for the institution.244 Politics can minimise the 
ambiguity in organisation when uncertainty environment occurs. Ammeter et al. 
explained politics could be seen as “a neutral and inherently necessary, 
component of organisational functioning.”245 In addition, Butcher and Clarke 
suggested political mindset will help managers in organisation to develop 
capabilities, because they will acknowledge the value of personal investment.246 
As a consequence, organisational politics entailed some situational and 
personal attributes.247 Following paraghraphs address two issues in 
organisational politics: power and political behaviour in organisation. As 
Madison et al argued power and political behaviour are intimately related in the 
organisational setting.248  
Power in Organisation 
As argued previously, organisational politics is observed as the exercise of 
power, it is essential to understand key assumptions and features of power 
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concept. It is because politics and power are often intertwined. Huczynski and 
Buchanan argue that this tangled has affected members’ behaviour in 
organisations.249 Although, power can be exercised at all level in an 
organisation (individual, group, department and organisation), it is difficult to 
define and measure. French and Raven posited, “the processes of power are 
pervasive, complex and often disguised in our society.”250 Many studies 
proposed their own definition regarding power. Power could be defined as 
capacity to overcome the resistance,251 a force affects behaviour,252 utilised to 
enhance own survival,253 context or relationship specific,254 and consisted of 
supply, information and support.255 Indeed, conceptualising power is 
problematic. However, the present research defined power as the capacity of 
individual or groups to exert their will over others. 
According to Bacharach and Lawler, there are three-dimensional aspects of 
power.256 Firstly is relational aspect. In this dimension, power is seen as a 
notion of interactive setting.257 In order words, examining power should be 
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underlined “the interactional dynamics of power relationship.”258 It means, 
different key actors and group and how they exercise their power within the 
organisation will give different results. Secondly is dependence aspect. Power 
is seen as “a function of dependence.”259 In this dimension, Bacharach and 
Lawler posited that this aspect relies on nature and level of dependence 
between key actors and group in organisation. Therefore, a result-based of this 
aspect is not constant. Lastly is the sanctioning aspect. This aspect is integral 
fragment of interactive activities in organisation. Bacharach and Lawler added 
sanction can be “manipulation of rewards, punishment or both.”260  
In view of the fact that the concept of power has wide-ranging perspectives, 
Buchanan and Badham proposed different lenses for observing power. They 
elaborate three views of power. First, power as a personal property. In this 
sense, power defines as a set of resources, which can be accumulated 
including structural and individual sources of managerial power.261 Second, 
power as a relational property. In this context, power is reflected from 
interpersonal relationship.262 Third, power as an embedded property. It means 
power can be seen as taken for granted things. These can be written and 
unwritten norms.263  
Further, the debate over power theory also happened in identifying bases of 
power. Some scholars proposed different terms and perspectives while 
describing power bases. French and Raven mentioned five bases of power: 
reward power, coercive power, legitimate power, expert power and referent 
power.264 However, this perspective stimulated conceptual discourse. French 
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and Raven’s concept created overlap over source and bases of power that lead 
to perplexity. Bacharach and Lawler argued distinctive definition between bases 
and source of power will avoid ambiguity while examining power. Bacharach 
and Lawler explained “in dealing with the bases of power we are interested in 
what parties control that enables them to manipulate the behaviour of others: in 
referring to the source of power, we are speaking of how parties come to control 
the bases of power.”265 In addition, Bacharach and Lawler offered some 
different terminology. They explained four bases of power: coercive, 
remunerative, knowledge and normative power.266 Mintzberg also posited slight 
different terminology regarding bases of power. He described five bases of 
power: resource, technical skill, knowledge, legal prerogatives and access. 
Another example is Benfari et al. who explained bases of power.267 They 
argued power endure on two levels: as a motive and behaviour. Benfari et al. 
elaborate eight bases of power, as follows: reward, coercion, authority, referent, 
expert, information, affiliation, and group power. 
Political Behaviour in Organisation 
It is noted that there is lack of common definitions for organisational politics and 
political behaviour in organisation. Following paragraphs explored political 
behaviour in organisation discourse. As politics is part of every organisation, 
none are immune from politics. Evidently, political behaviour in organisation is 
the most interesting subject of analysis in management field. Many studies have 
been conducted to capture political climate and political activities in 
organisation.268 Even though, political behaviour in organisation is emerging 
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subject, Ferris et al. suggested the study should be conducted by careful 
examination.269 The systematic inquiry of conceptualising political behaviour in 
organisations is still not fully developed. To understand the substantial matters 
of political behaviour in organisations, it is essential to comprehend two other 
related concepts such as power and organisational politics. These explanations 
provided comprehensive deliberation of political behaviour in organisation 
literature. 
Scholars offered various definitions regarding political behaviour in 
organisation. Farrell and Petersen, for instance, defined political behaviour in 
organisation as “those activities that are not required as part of one’s 
organisational role but that influence, or attempt to influence, the distribution of 
advantages and disadvantages within the organisation.”270 Meanwhile, Latif et 
al. suggested political behaviour in organisation as “facilitating non-rational 
influence on decision making and existing as a “back-stage” doings.”271 Further, 
Buchanan and Badham explained political behaviour as “the practical domain of 
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power in action, worked out through the uses of techniques of influence and 
other (more or less extreme) tactics.”272 They also stated five features of 
political behaviour in organisation, namely influence, self-interest, damage, 
backstage and conflict.273 Jafariani et al. elaborated five differences between 
organisational politics and political behaviour in organisation: origin, duration, 
function, form of appearance, and domain.274 
Predominantly, the extant literature of political behaviour in organisations 
focused on private organisations as the subject of research. Meanwhile, studies 
on political behaviour in military organisations remained part of the civil-military 
relations field. Yet, the application of management and organisational 
perspectives is often lacking in examining military politics phenomenon. This 
study argued political behaviour in organisation theory is potentially useful to 
the study of military organisation. In this sense, the present research attempted 
to cover this gap in the literature and approaches, as mentioned in research aim 
and contribution to knowledge.  
There are three similarities between military and business organisation. First, 
both organisations indicate consistent demand of interconnectivity in coping 
with the dynamics of a changing environment.275 Second, military and business 
organisations also set the essential idea of complex dynamic system.276 Last, 
both military and business organisation deal with political activities in the 
workplace. Military organisation also has political structure, which provide 
opportunities for its members to develop career and express individual motives. 
In this regards, military organisation meets with Dhar proposition that the 
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institution will be as a political entity when it is “composed of people who have 
carried task, career and personal interest.”277 As Janowitz posited “military 
organisations seem particularly vulnerable to rivalries generated by the clash of 
personalities, which in turn may develop into political rivalries.”278     
Furthermore, political behaviour in organisation may be associated with 
personality and situational dimension. Regarding personality dimension, there 
are four personality traits that considered has closed linkage to political 
behaviour.279 First, need for power that can be described as a motive to 
influence, lead and control others.280 Second, machiavellinism that can be 
explained as “(a) the use of guile and deceit in interpersonal relationship, (b) a 
cynical view of other people, and (c) a lack of concern with morality.”281 In this 
context, as Wilson et al. advocates, Machiavellianism defines as “a strategy of 
social conduct that involves manipulating others for personal gain, often against 
the other's self-interest.”282 Third, locus of control that indicates the degree of 
individual confidence can control the result.283 Fourth, risk-seeking propensity 
that refers to the individual as a risk-taker.284  
Regarding situational dimension, as Ferris and Kacmar stated, political 
behaviour in organisation tends to emerge when uncertainty occurs in the 
workplace environment.285 Adapting from Beeman and Sharkey, there are two 
variables that can be categorised in terms of organisation’s political propensity, 
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namely uncertainty environment and competitiveness.286 As seen in Figure 2-2, 
located on the next page, the degree of political behaviour in the organisation is 
high when member of the organisation is highly competitive. Although, the 
organisation is not highly political, this kind of behaviour will likely ensue in 
organisation when the severe rivalry among organisation members in uncertain 
environment occurs.287 As Buchanan and Badham noted: 
… behaviour is defined as political if the motivation is self-serving, 
with regard to the winning power and acquiring resources, in ways 
that are against the interest of the organisation. Such behaviour is 
further characterised by the informal use of power and influence o 
achieve hidden goals. Political behaviour is further encouraged by 
uncertainty, conflict, and resistance, and is therefore likely to be 






Figure 2-2 An Organisation's Political Propensity 
Source: Adapted from Beeman and Sharkey (1987) 
Table 2-1, located on the next page, lists a variety of political behaviour in 
organisation. Farrell and Petersen and Mintzberg are selected because they 
reflect the range of types of political behaviour in organisation. Indeed, such 
behaviour may happen in different types. Farrell and Petersen explained eight 
group-types that are divided into two categories, “legitimate” and 
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“illegitimate”.289 In addition, Farrell and Petersen extended the discussion of 
dimension of political behaviour in organisation. They suggested three 
dimensions. First, the internal-external dimension that emphasises “the focus of 
resources sought by those engaging in political behaviour in organisation.”290 
Second, the vertical-lateral dimension that recognises the difference of 
influence processes among organisation members.291 And third, the legitimate-
illegitimate dimension that concerns the “lawfulness” of political activity. 292 
These eight-types are the outcome of cross-tabulation of the three dimensions 
of political behaviour in organisation.293  
However, Mintzberg proposed four types of political behaviour. First, authority 
game that is defined as resistance attempts between members. This game has 
two types: insurgency and counter insurgency. Second, power base game that 
has three variants: sponsorship, alliance and empire building. This game 
emphasis “the degree and breadth of one’s organisational power.” Third, rivalry 
game that has two variants: line versus staff and rival camps. The purpose of 
this game is weakening the opponent. Fourth, change game – whistle blowing 
and young turks – that has goal to create change or to block it.294      
Table 2-1 Typology of Political Behaviour in Organisation 




• Direct voice 
• Complain to supervisor 
• Bypassing chain of 
command 
• Obstructionism 
Superior and subordinates 





• Exchanging favours 
Any members at the same 
hierarchical level Legitimate 
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Any member (insider) and 




• Talk with counterpart 
organisation 
• Informal contact  
Any member (insider) and 












Any members at the same 
hierarchical level Illegitimate 
VII 
• Whistleblowing 
Any member (insider) and 







Any member (insider) and 
external players to 
organisation (outsider) 
Illegitimate 
Authority games  
n/a 
Mintzberg 




Insurgency Lower level managers 
Counter-insurgency Upper-level managers 
Power base games  
Sponsorship Any subordinate member 
Alliance Line managers 
Empire building Line managers 
Rivalry games  
Line versus staff Line managers and staff personnel 
Rival camps Any group at the same hierarchical level 
Change games  
Whistle blowing Lower level managers 
Young turks Upper-level managers 
Source: Author 
Table 2-1 illustrated that there are various political games in organisation. It 
also confirmed the practice of political tactics are rich and widespread. In this 
regard, Buchanan and Badham offered an ‘A-B-C’ model to provide 
understanding regarding the diversity of political tactics.295 The model consisted 
of three stages: the triggers of political behaviour (antecedents), the nature of 
political actions (behaviours) and the outcomes (consequences). Stage of 
antecedents highlighted individual and contextual factors that generate political 
                                            




behaviour in organisation. Stage of behaviours illustrated political tactics, which 
are used by members of the organisation. And stage of consequences 
explained the ourcomes of political behaviour, positive and negative, and what 
effect does such political tactics have on organisational change? The ‘A-B-C’ 









Figure 2-3 'A-B-C' Model for Assessing Political Behaviour in Organisation 
Source: Adapted from Buchanan and Badham. Power, Politics, Second edition, 
21 
 
Of course, organisations have to be able to cope with uncertainty. Hickson et al. 
suggest definition of uncertainty as “a lack of information about future events, 
so that alternatives and their outcomes are unpredictable.”296 Moreover, Marion 
and Uhl-Bien argued that uncertainty could affect future condition.297 As a 
consequence, organisation will deal with uncertainty in all parts: input, process 
and output. In effect, “all organisations try to survive and to do this they have to 
make a living.”298 In this sense, Mackenzie suggested definition of power as 
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“the control of interdependence uncertainty.”299 Furthermore, Hickson et al. 
proposed strategic contingencies theory that captures power as an ability of 
organisation to deal with uncertainty. As organisation is seen as a system that 
consists of interdependency of roles and activities, this theory associates 
interdependency with three variables: (a) ability of unit to cope uncertainty, (b) 
the degree of linkage activities between units or known as centrality, (c) extent 
to which unit's coping activities are substitutable.300 
2.4 Research Gap 
The literature review revealed two main gaps that should be filled. First, political 
behaviour in military organisation is still underexplored. The literature review 
confirmed that politicised military topic remains occupied by civil-military relation 
studies. The critique has demonstrated that management theory should have 
been significant in examining the phenomenon of politicisation of the military. In 
addition, the study of organisational politics and political behaviour in 
organisation failed to capture the interaction of organisation, political behaviour 
of internal member and outside actors during political uncertainty.301 Also, the 
existing studies failed to consider the phenomenon of friction and rivalry among 
members as a result of political behaviour in organisation.  
In military organisation, friction does not always lead to establishment of 
politicised military. This requires a certain condition such as political coalition 
forming with other members, both internal and external institution, or political 
mobilisation. Stein and Finto argued friction and rivalry may happen when “a 
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gang at work” is established.302 In this regard, the existence of friction and 
rivalry are too important to be neglected while examining political behaviour in 
military organisation during crisis/wartime. 
Theoretically speaking, organisation value, goals, vision and mission should 
bind all members.303 Butcher and Clarke argued, “organisation are supposed to 
be places of corporates unity in which all employees work with consistent 
strategies cascaded down through the various level an processes of the 
organisation.”304 In other words, as Gulick posited, as a way of coordination, 
organisation requires an establish system whereby the implementation 
Programme is a reflection of core organisation objective.305 Thus, “the primary 
function of the organisation is to provide purpose to the cohesive unit in the 
form of goals and objectives.”306 However, Kim advocated cohesion is 
developed by interaction of elites.307 Cohesion comprised of four interdepending 
components: horizontal, vertical, organisational and institutional bonding.308 
Olmsted and Hare suggested, “cohesive groups are better able in to resist 
disruptive forces and, thus, avoid disintegration.”309 This study argued the 
consequences of political behaviour in organisation during political uncertainty 
are a result of path-dependent process. These mean the outcome of political 
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behaviour in organisation is affected by structure, culture and certain 
constellation of political entrepreneur (both internal and external organisation). 
Military organisation often appears as political institution in many countries 
particularly in new states. In a post-authoritarian state, military also may attempt 
to exercise its ‘prerogative’ include participating in the executive’s cabinet.310 As 
Khuri and Obermeyer pointed out, “the military is essentially a political institution 
– it is the sole instrument of force in the country and a crucible in which 
community leaders and national heroes are moulded.”311 Thus far, the extant 
literature advocated that political behaviour in organisation merely bases in 
individual member behaviour in order to achieve self-interest.  
As argued previously, military is not immune from politics. Both in peacetime 
and wartime, military institution may deal with political activities in various 
degrees. Scholars tended to agree that the concept of power, organisational 
politics and political behaviour in organisation are contested. In addition, many 
of these theories have been: (1) generalised from the private organisation 
behaviour; (2) implementing an a priori approach to capture the political 
behaviour phenomenon without adequate attention to more complex 
dependence; (3) locked in the notion of self-interest but put insufficient attention 
to possible rivalry or factions within organisation. Newell argued “military power 
is but one element of national power available to a state or nation to achieve its 
goals and enforce its policies.”312 Consequently, military should translate the 
government decision into priorities.313 As a hierarchical institution, military will 
sustain the national goals with centralised command. Therefore, the need to 
retain control to the military is required.  
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There are many definitions regarding the term of command. Creveld defined 
command as “a function that has to be exercised, more or less continuously, if 
the army is to exist and to operate.”314 Meanwhile, Nye proposed a wider scope 
of command definition. He suggested command should be “more than carry out 
orders and apply rules and regulations to the ebb and flow of military 
administration.”315 Further, Downey argued the essences of command covers 
two elements: personal authority over others and dynamic function of the armed 
forces. Thus, he offered four types of command, namely, full command, 
operational command, operational control and administrative control.316   
However, command cannot be understood in isolation.317 All command systems 
have to cope with the uncertainty condition. 318 During the crisis, military always 
face uncertainty. Thus, friction within military organisation cannot be avoided. 
Even, Newell posited, disagreement always presents during war.319 Indeed, 
cohesion is the essence of military organisation, particularly in military 
operation, as military command requires concentration of power in one 
person.320 Cohesion may be obtained through selection of military personnel.321 
Siebold explained cohesion also “the basis for various manoeuvre tactics to 
overcome or mitigate the threat of mobile armour, which varied over time from 
chariots, to elephants, to knights on horseback, to horse cavalry and so on.”322  
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Second, the extant literature failed to explain the whole development process of 
the politicised military in Indonesia during the Konfrontasi. The literature 
assessed above fails to fully perceive that politicisation of the military during the 
Konfrontasi was complex and legitimised. Considering legitimacy in the process 
of politicised military in the ABRI during the Konfrontasi provided a 
comprehensive understanding of the complexity of the Dwikora Operation. The 
result is a palpable gap in examining politicisation of the military in Indonesia 
during the Konfrontasi. The complexity of politicised military in Indonesia during 
the Konfrontasi needs to be carefully examined taking into account its factions, 
personal and group interest within the ABRI. 
According to Suchman, legitimacy is “a generalised perception or assumption 
that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.”323 
Without legitimacy, influence could not easily be exerted.324 Weber 
acknowledged one source of legitimacy is rational rule that applies rules and 
laws in an objective manner. Specifically, Barnes Jr explained military 
legitimacy is “a derivative of political legitimacy”325 and “relates to the balance 
between might and right.”326 As legitimacy is constructed with social relations, 
how the actor exerts his authority is essential.327Thus, there are four 
components of military legitimacy that would provide standard and set a context 
for decision-making, as follows: values (national and personal), cultural, law and 
public support.328  
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As a new state, Indonesia struggled for modernisation of its political system and 
military capability during the Konfrontasi. Notosusanto admitted the ABRI during 
the Konfrontasi was still developing its professionalism and professional 
tradition but refused to apply “western sense” of professionalism.329 Pauker also 
posited that the ABRI involvement in public affairs was a consequence of 
tumultuous condition in the beginning of Indonesian independence. As a result, 
the tension of civil-military relation was culminating on 17 October 1952 when 
military overtly urged the dissolution of the Parliament.330 Crouch advocated the 
17 October affair was an impact of political struggle among civilian groups.331 
However, it should be noted that military involvement in public affairs had been 
increasing since the 17 October affair. Later, the ABRI gained wider political 
role when President Sukarno through the National Council accepted the military 
as a member of functional group represented by appointment in the 
Parliament.332 
As this research acknowledged the ABRI as political military institution, the 
wider roles of the ABRI in civilian affair during the Konfrontasi boosted the 
process of politicisation of the military. The ABRI involvement in public spheres 
created a sense of shared political purpose, which was countering the PKI’s 
influences. Thus, such elaboration of military involvement in civilian government 
during the Konfrontasi is necessary to be taken into consideration. 
Consequently, career advancement was vulnerable to politicisation. To exert 
military influence, high rank generals might tend to politicise their subordinates 
(lieutenant colonel rank and above). Promotions have not been free of 
politicisation.333 Given this contextual backdrop, this thesis explored in what 
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extent politicisation of the ABRI affected its operations during the Konfrontasi. 
The outcome of the literature review confirmed that no evidence exists to 
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3 THE PRELUDE TO THE DWIKORA OPERATION 
 
Apa sebab kita menentangnya? Oleh karena Malaysia adalah penjelmaan 
daripada neo-kolonialisme. Dan kita tidak mau diadakannya neo-kolonialisme di 
sekeliling kita. Kita mengerti bahwa Malaysia adalah satu pengepungan bagi 
Republik Indonesia. Malaysia adalah suatu hasil daripada brain, daripada 
pikiran, daripada cita-cita, daripada usaha, ikhtiar neo-kolonialisme 
[Why do we oppose Malaysia? Because Malaysia is the embodiment of neo-
colonialism. And we do not want any neo-colonialism to exist around us. We 
consider Malaysia besiege the Republic of Indonesia. Malaysia is the product of 
brain, ideas, ambition and efforts of neo-colonialism] 
Speech of President Sukarno on 13 February 1963334 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter examined the wider setting of the Konfrontasi policy and the outset 
of the Dwikora Operation. This chapter was essential as it gives a 
comprehensive view about the wider context of the Konfrontasi. This segment 
as well as Chapter Four aimed to provide comprehensive discussion regarding 
the effect of politicisation of the ABRI on its military operation. Specifically, this 
chapter aimed to achive the third enabling objective of the dissertation (p.14), to 
discuss the implementation of the Indonesian military operations during the 
Konfrontasi. Although the Konfrontasi was a dispute between neighbouring 
states, it is necessary to elaborate the broader environment beyond state level. 
As Leifer argued, the competition of external power in Southeast Asia has been 
the consequence of intra-regional conflict to strategic perspective.335 
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This chapter will start by illustrating the historical overview of Indonesian 
political and security landscape since 1945. This attempted to elucidate some of 
internal dynamics that should be taken into consideration. The chapter then 
explained the setting of the Cold War and its implication for the Southeast Asia 
and particularly Indonesia. This explanation provided wide-ranging 
understanding regarding global and regional setting during the Konfrontasi. 
Later, the origins of the Indonesia-Malaysia Konfrontasi and covert operation 
that was conducted prior to the Dwikora Operation are illustrated. The chapter 
concluded with an analysis of key actors’ informal network toward the policy. In 
addition, this chapter employs term of ‘Malaya’ and ‘Malaysia’ to distinguish a 
specific period.336 
There are six sections in this chapter. The first section introduced the chapter. 
The second section assessed the situational context of the Konfrontasi based 
on the existing literature. Various Indonesian key actors’ motivations toward the 
Konfrontasi is illustrated in the third section. Furthermore, the implementation of 
covert operation called Operation A is discussed in the fourth section. Then the 
fifth section highlighted informal key actors’ network in the context of 
Konfrontasi. Finally, the sixth section provided the summary of this chapter. 
3.2 Overview of Indonesian Political and Security Landscape 
Since 1945 
This section attempted to briefly overview the development of Indonesian 
political and security landscape since 1945. Arguably, the ABRI has become 
key actor in national politics since Indonesia gained her independence in 1945. 
Thus, this section would be divided into three periods: the revolutionary period 
(1945-9), parliamentary democracy period (1949-1959) and guided democracy 
period (1959-1965). The discussion also elaborated background information of 
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several individual key military actors who played significant roles during the 
Konfrontasi. 
3.2.1 Revolutionary Period (1945-9) 
On 17 August 1945, following the Japanese surrender, Sukarno and 
Muhammad Hatta declared Indonesia’s independence. They had been leading 
the prewar Indonesian nationalist movement for years. Shortly after the 
proclamation, the Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence 
(Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia/ PPKI) had approved and 
promulgated the constitution of 1945 and elected Sukarno President and Hatta 
Vice President.337   
Sukarno, a charismatic and flamboyant leader, was born 6 June 1901 in 
Surabaya, East Java. He, the most important figure of the Indonesia’s 
nationalist movement during the Dutch colonial period, had studied civil 
engineering. In 1928, he helped the creation of the Indonesian Nationalist Party 
(Partai Nasionalis Indonesia/PNI), which had him jailed by the Dutch. 
Meanwhile, Hatta, born on 12 August 1902 in Bukittinggi, West Sumatra, 
studied intensively of economics at Rotterdam School of Commerce. He was 
the chairman of the Perhimpunan Indonesia, the prominent Indonesian 
nationalist movement in Holland. Like Sukarno, the Dutch arrested him due to 
his activities as Indonesian delegate to the League Against Imperialism in 
1927.338 Following the proclamation, joint national leadership of Sukarno and 
Hatta was knowingly as the dwitunggal (dual unity). 
The Indonesian military was a self-created military. The government did not 
create it since the Sukarno-Hatta political leadership did not have any intention 
to established armed forces immediately. The Dwitunggal preferred to defend 
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independence peacefully.339 This stance could be seen when the government 
created the People Security Body (Badan Keamanan Rakyat/BKR) on 20 
August. The BKR was only responsible for local security. PETA and Heiho (an 
auxiliary force within the Japanese Army) troops dominated the BKR.340 Thus, 
many-armed group challenged this decision and formed independent fighting 
group and militia (laskar) i.e the Angkatan Pemuda Indonesia (Indonesia Young 
Generation), the Laskar Hizbullah (armed Moslem young men), the Barisan 
Pemberontakan Rakyat Indonesia (Revolutionary Legion of 
the Indonesian People), the Laskar Rakyat (home guard People's Army) and 
the Tentara Pelajar (student army).341 
The government then transformed the BKR into the People's Security Military 
(Tentara Keamanan Rakyat/TKR) following the issuance of the Maklumat 
Pemerintah (Government Statement) Number 6 on 5 October.342 This was a 
result of security situation that country was not able to survive without national 
military.343 Besides appointing Supriyadi344 as People’s Security Minister, 
Sukarno also assigned Lieut Gen Urip Sumoharjo, former KNIL, as chief of 
general staff and who was responsible to unify the various armed groups.345 On 
9 October, government also encouraged youth, former KNIL, PETA and any 
fighting groups to voluntarily join the TKR. Due to overenthusiasm of 
Indonesians in responding the government call for volunteerism, Urip 
established 10 divisions of the TKR in Java and 6 divisions in Sumatra.346 Soon 
after the formation, the TKR clashed with the Allied Forces, British Gurkha and 
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the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (NICA) troops, which landed in 
Surabaya.347   
The TKR officers consisted of three groups. First, group of less well trained 
former PETA officers. Yani, and Suharto were parts of this group. Second, 
group of former soldiers of the KNIL. Although, it was small in numbers, around 
30 officers, this group was very influential in the TKR due to better educational 
qualifications than PETA. Nasution and Air Force Chief of Staff Air Commodore 
Suryadarma were associated with this group. Last, officers, which were from 
independent fighting groups and the laskar.348  
It was evident that cohesion was main problem of the TKR. Tensions arose 
between former PETA-Laskar and ex-KNIL officers. Many former PETA officers, 
particularly in Central and East Java were resistant to Sumoharjo’s leadership. 
Former PETA officers demanded a vote on who should occupy the top post of 
the TKR. Thus, on 12 November, Sumoharjo held a conference in Yogyakarta 
in order to resolve the problem. As a result, Colonel Sudirman, former PETA 
and charismatic battalion commander in Banyumas, Central Java, was elected 
as Grand Commander (Panglima Besar).349 The conference also proposed 
Sultan Hamengku Bowono IX, the Sultan of Yogyakarta, be appointed Defence 
Minister.350 
Another problem was delicate relationship with civilian leaders. Indeed, Sukarno 
accepted the election of Sudirman as Panglima Besar and promoted to the rank 
of general.351 However, in fact, Sukarno administration did not show the 
intention to build good cooperation with military. Following the collapse of 
presidential cabinet, on 10 November, Sukarno asked Sutan Sjahrir, a socialist 
and educated in Holland, to form a cabinet. The new cabinet hesitancy 
accepted the proposal for appointing Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX as Defence 
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Minister. On 14 November, Sjahrir introduced Amir Syarifuddin, a leftist 
socialist, as Defence Minister.352 Later, Syarifuddin proposed the creation of 
people’s army including the laskar and armed youth groups operated together 
with regular military. He formed the Indonesian Socialist Youth (Pemuda 
Sosialis Indonesia/Pesindo), the largest youth group associated with the left. 
Later, in 1948, the Pesindo was involved in triggering an uprising in Madiun, 
East Jawa, which was known as Madiun Affair.353        
Madiun affair occurred following the issuance of policies of restructuring and 
rationalising (Restrukturisasi dan Rasionalisasi/Rera) the military by the new 
cabinet, headed by Hatta. Since the Renville Agreement with the Dutch on 17 
January 1948, the leftist influence in the Cabinet was reduced. Syarifuddin, who 
then Prime Minister and Defence Minister, was resigned due to disagreement 
toward the Renville Agreement. As a consequence, Sukarno asked Hatta to 
form new Cabinet, which was supported by the Masyumi Party, the largest 
Islamic party.  
It should be noted that Sukarno had approved the Rera policies before the 
establishment of Hatta’s administration. On 2 January 1948, Sukarno signed 
the Penetapan Presiden (Presidential Order) No 1/1948 that restructured the 
Indonesian military organisation. The order stated Defence Minister was 
responsible for all defence matters. To assist the Defence Minister tasks, 
government created Fighting Forces General Staff (Staf Umum Angkatan 
Perang), which led by Air Commodore Suryadharma. Although Sukarno 
dissolved the leadership of the Indonesian military, he still assigned Sudirman 
as Panglima Besar Mobile Fighting Forces (Angkatan Perang Mobil).354 
Sudirman became less powerful since the Order put Mobile Fighting Forces 
structure under Defence Minister. In February 1948, Sukarno also appointed 
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Nasution as deputy of Panglima Besar.355 Later, Sukarno withdrew the Order 
following several protests from the military including Urip dan Sudirman.356    
Based on the Rera policies, the size of military would be reduced significantly. 
Hatta argued the Rera policies help Indonesia on improving economy. The less-
equipped and less-trained troops would be dissolved. At least there were 
350,000 personnel of regular military in Java, excluding around 470,000 of the 
laskar troops.357 The government targeted the new size of military would be 
only 57,000 of regular troops. In this regards, Nasution supported the resizing of 
military.358  
Nasution, a devout Muslim from North Sumatra, was born on 3 December 1918. 
He got military training from the Corps Olpleidingi Reserve Officieren (Reserve 
Officer Training Corps/CORO) in Bandung during the Dutch colonialism. 
Nasution admitted Clausewitz influenced his thought on military strategy.359 
Althought was knowingly as pro-Western and anti-Communist, later Nasution 
developed the concept of ‘dual function (dwi fungsi) that asserted the right for 
military playing active role in political life. 
Of course, the Rera policies had significant impact to independent fighting 
groups and the laskar. In February 1948, the Socialist Party, the Pesindo, the 
PKI, the Labour Party and labour group opposed the Rera policies. They then 
formed the People Democracy Front (Front Demokrasi Rakyat/FDR). 
Syarifuddin joined the movement. And under Musso leadership, the veteran 
communist figure, the FDR merged with the PKI. They launched a takeover of 
Madiun local government on 18 September 1948. The insurgents also killed 
teachers, religious leaders and officials who were associated with the Masyumi 
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Party.360 Due to poor preparation of Madiun revolt, the pro-Republican troops 
reoccupied the city by the end of September. Madiun was surrender without a 
fight.361 
In addition, Sukarno and Sudirman had different strategy toward the political 
struggle against the Dutch. Revolutionary period was marked as armed conflict 
and political struggle in upholding Indonesia’s independence. After the Madiun 
Affair, the Dutch had started again to launch military aggression in Indonesia on 
19 December.362 The Dutch attacked the capital Yogyakarta and captured the 
President Sukarno, Vice President Hatta and other senior officials.363 Regarding 
the aggression, Sukarno preferred to surrender than launched military action 
against the Dutch. Meanwhile, Sudirman, who contracted severe tuberculosis, 
refused to surrender and insisted to apply guerrilla campaign in facing the 
Dutch. The surrender caused disrespect among military officers about civilian 
leadership in general.364  
It was noted that the general attack (serangan umum) of 1 March 1949 against 
Dutch-occupied Yogyakarta has provided momentum for Suharto to boost his 
military profile. At that time, Yogyakarta was considered as the 
military target of guerrilla war. Although the role of Suharto in the attack is 
subject to controversy,365 Suharto ‘successfully’ led an attack that involved 
2,000-3,000 troops.366 According to Nasution, Sudirman was satisfied with the 
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attack result and admitted Suharto as key figure.367 In response to increasing 
international pressure, Dutch agreed to a cease-fire and continue negotiation 
with Indonesia. Following the Dutch-Indonesian Round Table Conference, on 
27 December 1949 Dutch agreed to transferred of the Sovereignty for Republic 
of the United States of Indonesia. 
Suharto, former KNIL and PETA, was born on 8 June 1921 in Yogyakarta. 
Although, he was not part of intellectuals of the Dutch educated-elite, Suharto 
still could gain the position of military commander. During the general attack of 
1 March 1949, Suharto was commander of X Brigade. He with his troops we 
involved in a number of operations to supress rebellions.   In 1957, Suharto was 
promoted to be commander of Central Java. While commanding the post, he 
was supported by a group loyal subordinates, that later help him in 
consolidating his power during the Konfrontasi.  
During the revolutionary period, the Indonesian military has changed its name 
and structure few times. On 24 January 1946, government issued a 
Governmental Order (Penetapan Pemerintah) No 4/SD 1946 to change the 
name of TKR to the Tentara Republik Indonesia (Military of the Republic of 
Indonesia). The changing was aiming at improving the basis and structure of 
the military in accordance with international standard.368 Later, government 
changed the TRI to the TNI in order to merge laskar with the regular military on 
7 June 1947. Sukarno also established top management team of the TNI that 
led by Sudirman.369 
3.2.2 Parliamentary Democracy Period (1949-1959) 
It should be noted that military rivalry, the Rera policies and negotiations with 
the Dutch had stirred disagreements among military officers. Thus, a number of 
insurgencies were occurred in many parts of Indonesia during this period. Since 
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1948, Sukarno was facing economic problems as consequences of several 
insurrections. Most of the state budgets were allocated to defence and security. 
Since Indonesia applied parliamentary democracy, this period also was marked 
as political instability period due to a frequent cabinet changes. 
Darul Islam (House of Islam) movement, for instance, was occurred following 
the negotiation between Indonesia and Dutch. In March 1948, a group of 
battallions of the Muslim laskar, Hizbullah form the Darul Islam (DI), an 
autonomous group with its own military, the Islamic Military of Indonesia 
(Tentara Islam Indonesia/TII) following the withdrawal of TNI troops in West 
Java in compliance with the Renville Agreement with the Dutch.370 On 7 August 
1949, DI’s leader, Sekarmaji Marijan Kartosuwiryo proclaimed the 
establishment of Islamic State of Indonesia (Negara Islam Indonesia/NII). The 
following years saw a successful extension of the movement throughout 
Indonesia such as in Aceh, South Kalimantan and South Sulawesi.371Thus, the 
TNI engaged its unit in a number of battles against the rebels in various regions 
of Indonesia.372      
The 17 October army-organised affair was the one of political events that could 
potray the complexity of civil-military relation in Indonesia during this period.373 
The affair was a result of deepening political crisis and several background 
factors including internal factionalisation within the Army and economic 
situation. In the affair, the army pointed tanks and some of cannons at the 
Presidential Palace. They demanded Sukarno dissolved the Parliament and 
parliamentary election be held soon. But the event failed to provide an effective 
pressure to Sukarno. Later, Sukarno suspended Nasution from active service 
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and appointed Colonel Bambang Sugeng, inactive commander of the East Java 
as Acting Army Chief of Staff. The Army then deeply divided since the affair. 
The army leadership was unable to exercise central control. From November 
1952, four regional commands were controlled by ‘pro-17 October group’, and 
the other three by ‘anti-17 October group’.374 McVey explained intra-army coups 
began take place in several commands.375  
Since inactive from service, Nasution still exercised his political interest. On 20 
May 1954, he formed the League of Upholders of Indonesian Independence 
(Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia/IPKI). Although, several military 
regional commands was helping the IPKI by mobilising supports, the party only 
gained small voters in the 1955 Election, around 1.4 per cent of its total vote. In 
the election, the PKI obtained 16.4 per cent of its total vote and became the 
smallest of the four major parties.376However, Nasution’s political activities 
during the 1955 election has led him to get re-appointment as Army Chief of 
Staff. The IPKI’s manifesto, which was calling the need for a return to the 
original 1945 Constitution, had influenced Sukarno to consider re-appointment 
of Nasution. On 27 October 1955, the cabinet decided to assign Nasution to the 
post.377 
It should be noted that the main task of Nasution in his early term of re-
appointment as Army Chief of Staff was establishing military discipline and 
uniting the Army. In February 1958, leading regional commander and politicians 
proclaimed the establishment of PRRI. The insurgency occurred as result of 
poor central management and ‘java-centric’ political orientation conducted by 
Sukarno. The PRRI revolt aimed to overthrow Sukarno administration.378 
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However, Sukarno accused the US and also UK covertly involved in this revolt 
through Singapore, Malaya and Philippines. Feith and Lev explained the US 
government supplied the rebellion with various American weapons. Although 
the US did not recognise the PRRI as a state, the official statements still 
showed their support for the rebel government.379 The capture of twin-engined 
B-26 bomber pilot, Allen L Pope on 18 May 1958 exposed the covert assistance 
the Eisenhower Administration was providing to the dissidents.380 
On 13 April, Ahmad Yani, who just returned from Fort Leavenworth, US, was 
assigned to command the Operasi 17 Agustus (Operation 17 August) against 
the centre of PRRI strength in West Sumatra. The operation involved troops 
from the East and Central Java Divisions, together with paratroop units, and air 
and navy forces.  Less than a day, Yani had succeeded in occupying Padang, 
capital city of West Sumatra.381 Yani, former PETA, was born on 19 June 1922 
in Central Java. In 1955, he had received infantry and staff training in the United 
States. Returning in 1956, Yani was transferred to the Army Headquarter where 
he became an assistant to Nasution. After led military operation to defeat PRRI 
revolt in West Sumatra successfully, Yani got promotion to be Second deputy to 
Nasution on 1 September 1958.   
The great victory against the rebel forces in 1958, notably, lifted the military 
status. The defeat of the rebellions and the disruptive threat from the outside 
has improved the Indonesian unity and nationalism.382 As the only institution 
that has monopoly of arms, the victory has made the military stronger and more 
prestigious than it was. Nasution explained the nature of the ABRI was a 
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People’s army, a freedom army, a national army and an army of partisan.383 As 
the unity of the people and the military was vital, he added, the ABRI had two 
roles: as a tool of the state for defence and as a functional group.384 And 
recognition of the unity with the people justified the military to create the 
Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management.  
It was evident that relationship between Sukarno and Nasution had improved 
significantly since re-appointment of Nasution. Both of them found similarities in 
term of political view toward democracy. Nasution, for instance, openly 
disseminated the idea of return to the 1945 Constitution. Sukarno saw Nasution 
expressed the same idea. On 21 February 1957, Sukarno proposed an idea to 
change the form of government. Sukarno argued western concept of 
parliamentary democracy was unsuitable for Indonesia. The system had caused 
crises and ineffective government due to the weakness of authority. Thus, he 
suggested the cabinet ‘gotong royong’ (literally mutual cooperation) reflected a 
representation of all political parties in the parliament. Also, he proposed the 
creation National Advisory Council that represented groups in society such as 
labour, women, youth, entrepreneur and religious group.385 Many parties 
opposed the proposal including Hatta.  
Nasution was even more aggressive in politics. He urged Parliament and the 
Cabinet to engage army personnel in political decision-making. On 13 
November 1958, Nasution introduced the Middle Way (Jalan Tengah) concept. 
He argued this policy had been implemented by the Supreme Commander, 
government as well as military leaders. Through this concept, military personnel 
have opportunity to contribute actively in non-military sphere.386 He also 
launched the idea of abandoning the European parliamentary system model, 
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which was favoured by Sukarno.387 Nasution and the military could achieve the 
significant political victory when the Parliament and the Cabinet accepted the 
ABRI as a functional group.388 Later, the Middle Way served as a basis of dual 
function doctrine that was explaining two roles of Indonesian Armed Forces: 
defence role and socio-political role. Thus, Sukarno-Nasution ‘cooperation’ 
created a major change in the national constellation of power.  
It should be noted that the Navy also faced internal problem due to 
implementation of the Rera policies. Special treatment and promotion for 
officers, who were former Koninklijk Marine (the Dutch Navy), worsen factional 
rivalry within the navy. In 1959, several officers demanded Sukarno to remove 
Vice Admiral R Subiyakto as navy Chief of Staff. They argued that Subiyakto 
was not well performed. And later Sukarno agreed to replace Subiyakto with 
Admiral Martadinata.389Martadinata was chosen because he did not involve in 
the movement that was widely known as the Gerakan 1959 (1959 
Movement).390 Martadinata, founder of Indonesian Navy School, was born on 
20 March 1921 in Bandung, West Java. In 1953, he was attending US Naval 
Postgraduate School.   
3.2.3 Guided Democracy Period (1959-1965) 
Indeed, since the declaration of state of emergency status on 14 March 1957, 
the TNI came controlled the public life. As the martial law put military in a 
position of considerable power, it could restrict activities of political party, the 
press and the national economy.391 The army leaders perceived parties were 
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corrupt and contributing to an inefficient government.392 Taking advantage of 
this situation, the Indonesian government became dominated by Sukarno and 
the army. Many officers, especially from the army, occupied civilian posts such 
as in the Parliament, the People Consultative Assembly (Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat/MPR), and the Supreme Advisory Council (Dewan 
Pertimbangan Agung/DPA). Number of officers who were appointed as 
governors and district heads also increased significantly.393  
In late December 1958, Sukarno persuaded the military leaders to concentrate 
their efforts on the restoration of internal security and to leave the civilian 
affairs.394 To balance the power of the Army and reduce his dependence, 
Sukarno established alliance with the Army’s strongest rival, the PKI. Certainly, 
the PKI was the most important source of mass support for Sukarno.395 Still, 
Sukarno engaged the army in the policy of domesticating the parties, especially 
the PKI.396 Later, the 1959 Dekrit Presiden formalised the domination of military 
in political sphere.397 On 5 July 1959, Sukarno dissolved the Constituent 
Assembly and reintroduced the 1945 Constitution by issuing Presidential 
Decree (Dekrit Presiden). This decision was adapting Nasution’s proposal in 
overcoming the deadlock over the process of drafting new constitution.398 
Clearly, the army expanded its structure and socio-political role significantly in 
the period of Guided Democracy as Nasution along with Sukarno were the 
principal power in government.399 Regarding the army structure, Nasution 
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reinforced territorial management by establishing military commands paralleling 
civilian bureaucracy across the country, from province to the civilian 
government in village level.400 Meanwhile, in socio-political role, the army 
expanded its activities into the economic and political matters. 
Although the army provided the main institutional support for his regime, 
Sukarno was aware of the potential danger of excessive dependence to the 
army.401 Thus, he exploited the intra and interservice rivalries as a 
counterweight to Nasution. When Sukarno introduced the First Working Cabinet 
(Kabinet Kerja I) on 9 July 1959, he attached all chiefs of staff into his Cabinet 
as ex officio members. At least, seven officers were part of the cabinet.402  
Ambassador Jones noted that even though the army was unified and powerful, 
there would have been division when it came to taking on Sukarno.403 But 
Sukarno failed to weaken Nasution’s domination over the army. Nasution still 
served as Minister of Defence and Security as well as Army Chief of Staff until 
mid-1962.404 
The friction between Yani and Nasution had started prior to the Konfrontasi. 
Yani had been widely known as Nasution’s man. Soon after the appointment as 
Commander in chief of the Indonesian Army on 25 June 1962, Yani 
consolidated the institution by removed a number of strategic positions 
including regional commanders who were known as Nasution’s aides.405 Yani 
replaced Nasution’s aides who overtly stood up to Sukarno on communist 
issue. Some of them are the commanders of South Sumatra, South Kalimantan 
and East Java who had banned communist activities in their region. Subandrio 
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discovered that Sukarno had assigned Yani special mission to limit Nasution 
political manoeuvres.406 In this regard, Yani seemed to be neutralising the anti-
PKI elements by removing the well-known anti-PKI officers from key positions 
and replacing with the officers who were less likely to resist the PKI.407  
The friction between the navy and air force also occurred due to the Battle of 
Arafura Sea on 15 January 1962. The battle was happened during the Operasi 
Trikora. At that time, the Navy attempted to infiltrate 150 troops in Kaimana, 
Papua. The troops had to deliver sabotage and to incite local people against the 
Dutch. But, Dutch destroyers intercepted the mission and sunk the Indonesian 
Navy ship, KRI Macan Tutul, commanded by Commodore Yos Sudarso,408 
Deputy Chief of Staff of Navy.409 The attack resulted in the death of Sudarso. 
Following the incident, the navy and the army blamed the air force did not 
provide sufficient air support during the infiltration. But Suryadharma rejected 
the accusation. He argued the air force was not provided any details regarding 
the clandestine mission.410 On 19 January, Sukarno appointed Omar Dani as 
Commander of the Air Force replaced Suryadharma. Dani was born on 23 
January 1924 in Solo, Central Java. In 1950, he was a graduate of TALOA 
Academy of Aeronautic, US. He was known as Sukarno loyalist. Next section 
explained broader context of the Indonesia-Malaysia Konfrontasi.    
3.3 Situational Context of the Konfrontasi 
The aim of this subsection is to provide a broad overview of external 
environment of Indonesia prior to the Konfrontasi. It is necessary to discuss the 
situational context of the Konfrontasi for two reasons. First, Southeast Asia was 
main battlespace of the Cold War. Reinhardt explained the political and cultural 
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diversity of the region reflected centuries of contact with exogenous influences 
that entered the area along the trade routes from India to China.411 The 
situation was further complicated as the region was subject to a deep rivalry 
between great powers – the US, the Soviet Union and China – involvement 
from the 1950s onwards. The regional order in Southeast Asia, Acharya 
explained, was determined by the two Cold Wars: the East-West (Soviet-
American) and the East-East (Sino-Soviet) rivalries.412 Second, there was an 
obvious link between domestic and foreign policies in Indonesia. Yahuda 
argued the implementation of ‘independent and active’ foreign policy doctrine 
was a part of government effort to maintain national mood.413 Not only the spirit 
of struggle for independence shaped the Indonesian foreign policy, but also the 
doctrine was a way to sustain domestic priorities in overcoming economic and 
social problems.    
In the mid-1950s, Sukarno applied a neutralism in foreign relation.414 Feith and 
Castles explained the central posture of Indonesian foreign relations at that time 
was independent and active foreign policy.415 The actions of the policy were 
either isolationist in character, or involved the balancing of contacts with one 
Cold War bloc by similar contacts with the other.416 Hatta argued that by 
applying independent and active principles, Indonesia aimed at seeking 
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friendship with all nations upon a mutual respect.417 Rather than involving itself 
in the big powers’ quarrels, Sukarno’s government preferred fighting against 
colonialism and contributing to a lessening world tension. Reinhardt asserted 
the conception was greatly influence by its anti colonial confrontation.418Thus, 
during this period, Indonesia was actively hosting international conferences, 
particularly related to Asian-African, and new state issues.  
Although, Indonesia refused to become part of either the US or the Soviet 
power bloc, she maintained her relationship with the Communist Bloc in 
cordiality. Soviet-Indonesian relations entered a golden age in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s. For the Soviet Union, Southeast Asia was important to be 
influenced as the region might cripple the recovery of Western Europe post 
World War II.419 In particular, Indonesia was the primary areas for Soviet 
expansion.420 As a result, in 1961, Sukarno secured from the Soviet Union arms 
and used them to put pressure on the US.421 The Soviet Union committed to 
provide military assistance valued at USD1.3 billion.422 Until 1962, Pauker 
added, credits for economic and military purposes from the Eastern Bloc to 
Indonesia exceeded USD1.5 billion.423 From 1959-65, Indonesia was the 
largest the Soviet aid recipient, receiving around 21 per cent of the total amount 
provided by the Soviet Union to all non-socialist developing countries.424 
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Although, Indonesia was greatly in debt to the Soviet Union, Indonesian leaders 
seemed to resist Moscow’s political influence.425 Hirtzel noted the comparative 
amounts during 1954-1964 excluding military aid were USD538 million from the 
US and USD369 million from the Soviet Union. The Soviet aid spiked when 
Indonesia-US relations broke down due to the Konfrontasi.426 Clearly, the 
Soviet Union hoped Indonesia would pursue a policy oriented towards the 
socialist camp.427 But, Indonesia looked to the West as often as she did to the 
Communist Bloc for overcoming the economic crisis, while the Soviet Union 
loaned millions of dollars to Indonesia with little prospect of repayment.428 Still, 
Indonesia also reaffirmed her neutralism. Van Der Kroef explained that 
Indonesia opposed nine resolutions of the Soviet Union relating to the Korean 
conflict and preferred pushing any efforts to create peace in the Far East. 429 
The Russians only could count on few committed friends within the army and 
government.  
The failure of the Soviet Union in increasing her influence in Indonesia could be 
explained, at least, in two reasons.430 First, the Soviet Union failed to attract 
military officers to attend training in her country. The majority of army officers 
who received overseas training were going to the US. Meanwhile, some air 
force and navy officers who had training in the Soviet Union found their life 
there unappealing. Second, the Soviet Union was unsuccessfully expanding her 
allies in Indonesian domestic politics. The Soviets only appealed to Murba Party 
leaders, especially Adam Malik who was served as Ambassador to Moscow. 
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Meanwhile, Murba Party had less extensive influence in the Sukarno 
administration.431 
It is notable that Indonesian-US relations were quite close when Indonesia 
gained her independence. Many Indonesians portrayed the US as a country 
that had a revolutionary tradition in breaking the colonial rule and liberated 
Indonesia from Japanese occupation.432 But, US foreign policy placed limited 
attention on Indonesia.433 However, in the 1950s, Indonesia and the US had a 
difficult and bitter relationship. In 1952, for instance, the Sukiman cabinet 
resigned amid sharp criticism over the signing of an agreement accepting the 
US Mutual Security Agency’s (MSA) aid.434 The cabinet was accused of 
violating the foreign policy doctrine as the agreement might bring Indonesia into 
the US sphere of influence.  
One of notable examples is the PRRI revolt. The PRRI case has marked a new 
chapter for Indonesia - US relationship. Following the revolt, on 22 May 1958, 
the US and Indonesia signed an agreement that the US would provide 
Indonesia with 35,000 tons of rice, worth approximately USD5.5 million.435 Also, 
the insurgency imprinted a dramatic turn-around in American policy toward the 
Indonesian Army. The US viewed the army as the main bulwark against the PKI 
takeover of the Indonesian government. In a letter to Under Secretary of State 
Herter, Chief of Naval Operations Arleigh Burke explained a conversation with 
the Standard-Vacuum Oil Company (STANVAC) representative in Indonesia, 
Colonel Berlin. Following the meeting with Nasution, Berlin argued the only 
element in the Sukarno administration, which would prevent the government 
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from becoming communist, was the army.436 The US Ambassador in Indonesia, 
Howard P Jones, also shared a similar view regarding the Indonesian Army. He 
considered the army as a major anti-communist power in Indonesia. Jones 
suggested the American policy toward the army should be, as follows: (a) the 
US government honour longstanding request for military equipment; (b) 
Pentagon extend invites to Nasution and his officers; (c) the US offer the army 
officers to the Command and Staff School at Leavenworth and additional 
trainings for officers and noncommissioned officers; (d) revocation of the 
suspension of export license and providing the Indonesian Army parachutes; 
and (5) switching of cotton for rice.437 In other words, the American was keen to 
improve the army’s strength.  
In general, the total amount of American support to the ABRI was less than the 
Soviet Union. During 1960-1963, for instance, the US government provided 
weapons to the ABRI of an annual value of approximately USD20 million.438 
The US government, according to Pauker, was not very keen to modernise the 
ABRI with Western equipment, although Indonesia sought to buy military 
equipment from the US and other Western countries in 1956-57.439 At end of 
1961, the Eisenhower administration rejected Nasution’s plea for the army to 
receive heavy arms.440 
In 1963, the US government added the civic action programme for the 
Indonesian Army. Through this programme, the army could involve in any public 
construction works. As the US concerned with the effectiveness of anti-guerrilla 
operations and internal security, Mrazek explained this programme helped the 
army to deal with the PKI.441 The US aid provided significant impact to change 
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the ABRI. It was because the army primarily enjoyed the US assistance as the 
civic mission improved the army’s image and strengthened its territorial 
management capability. As the army remained the dominant element in the 
ABRI, the Soviet influence in the military institution was less substantial. Since 
then, the army became the only US ‘local friends’ in Indonesia.442 In the 
American view, the Indonesian military establishment changed into a strong and 
anti-communist friend of the US.443  
The US interest toward Indonesia was clear. They interested in keeping 
Indonesia out of the control of the Communist Bloc.444 In 1964, the US 
government developed a programme of political action as a response to the 
increasing of PKI’s influence. The purpose of the programme was to curtail the 
PKI’s power and China’s influence. Also, the programme, which was 
coordinated by the Department of State, was aimed at supporting non-
communist elements in Indonesia.445  
On the contrary, Soviet support was more beneficial to the air force and the 
navy. Even though, Nasution signed the arms purchase agreement totaling 
USD450 million in January 1961, in fact the navy and the air force that received 
the highly sophisticated warships and fighters.446 Since the times of the 
Indonesian Revolution until 1962, the air force power had grown seven times 
and the navy ten times, meanwhile the army had not increased significantly.447  
Indonesian foreign policy gradually shifted in 1960s. The doctrine of 
‘independent and active’ was abandoned and replaced by the ‘New Emerging 
Forces’ foreign policy.448 Sukarno divided the world configuration into two blocs, 
the Old Established Forces of imperialism, exploitation and oppression and the 
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New Emerging Forces (NEFO) of justice and freedom. Sukarno included the 
new nations and socialist countries into the NEFO Bloc. He argued the 
NECOLIM (neo-colonialism, colonialism, and imperialism)449 was a greater 
danger in Southeast Asia than communism.450  
Furthermore, the Sino-Soviet rivalry created difficulty for Indonesia as she could 
not rely on both Soviet and Chinese assistance.451 Since 1956, the Sino-Soviet 
alliance was weakening as differences of interest emerged. Yahuda explained 
both countries, Soviet and China had different view in diffusing tensions with 
US. The Soviet Union under Nikita Khruschev tried to reach an understanding 
with the US in order to reduce risks associated with nuclear weapons and the 
high costs of maintaining a military confrontation with the West. Meanwhile, 
China sought to disperse the tension with the Americans so that she could 
concentrate on her economic development.452 The critical moment was the 
refusal of the Soviet Union to supply China with a sample atomic bomb in 1959. 
Tension between the Soviet Union and China reached a high pitch in 1963 
when the Soviet Union and the US signed the Test Ban Treaty. The signing was 
evidence that the two super powers tried to restrain China in developing her 
own nuclear weapons. Later, in 1964-1965, the Sino-Soviet rivalry heated up 
and several states became their battle space for political influence. Those 
states were main potential allies of the Soviet Union against China.453 
As Indonesia was closer to China, the Konfrontasi policy gained little symphaty 
from the Soviet Union.454 Following the end of West Irian campaign, the Soviet 
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Union thought that Sukarno should be more focused on economic recovery 
than continuing heavy spending on military.455 According to Leifer, Sukarno did 
not reject the priority of economic stabilisation as he introduced policies to meet 
preconditions for the receipt of foreign credits in May 1963.456 But, the Soviet 
Union feared that the Konfrontasi would lead to military clashes between 
Indonesia and the UK.457 The next section discusses various Indonesian key 
actors’ motivations toward the Konfrontasi and, subsequently, the covert 
Operation A that was launched prior to the Dwikora Operation.  
3.4 The Indonesian Main Actors Motivations 
Britain established the idea of the Malaysian Federation years before Malaysia 
achieved her independence in 1957. In 1948, Britain proposed the idea of the 
Malaysia Federation that comprised the nine Malay states and two settlements 
of Penang and Malacca. At that time, Britain excluded Singapore from the 
Malaysia Federation proposal.458 Singapore had been promised a constitutional 
review in 1963.459 For Britain, the proposal of creating the Malaysia Federation 
was part of the decolonisation scheme in the Southeast Asia region, which 
could help in reducing the British budget. Although Britain exercised the 
decolonisation programme, she still kept her strategic defence interest in the 
region by retaining Singapore as a key military base.460  
One year after gaining its independence, the new Malaya Prime Minister Tunku 
Abdul Rahman showed his interest to implement the Federation proposal. 
Rahman argued that creating the Federation would prevent the potential loss of 
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the North Kalimantan colonies due to possible claim by Indonesia and the 
Philippines. Malaysia also would gain economic benefit when she would merge 
with Singapore. As Malays political elite, Rahman was aware of the delicate 
issue of racial balance. If the Federation only embraced Malaya and Singapore, 
the Chinese would outnumber the Malays because over a third of Malayan 
population was Chinese. Thus by enlarging the Federation to comprise the 
North Kalimantan colonies, Rahman would not upset the delicate racial balance 
in Malaysia.461 On 27 May 1961, he overtly affirmed his intention to establish 
the Federation in front of the Foreign Correspondent’s Association of South 
East Asia in London.462 
When the Malaysia Federation plan was announced in 1961, the Indonesian 
government was not very concerned about it. Subandrio said Indonesia would 
not object to the idea if the people of the British colonies agreed.463 He assured 
Malaysia issue was strictly the affair of the peoples of those countries 
concerned.464 Only the PKI strongly criticised the Federation’s proposal. The 
PKI called the Malaysia Federation a form of “neo-colonialism” that might harm 
democracy.465 The Indonesian government changed its position over the 
Federation idea shortly after the Brunei revolt led by AM Azahari466 on 8 
December 1962. Both Sukarno and Subandrio showed their support to the 
Azahari movement. On 10 December, Sukarno declared he was on the side of 
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the ‘independence struggle’ of the Brunei people.467 And by January 1963, he 
re-employed the word of Konfrontasi in his political jargon.468  
Subandrio, a long-standing rival of Yani, was born on 5 September 1914 in East 
Java. He was knowingly as a committed and militant nationalist.469 In 1950-4, 
he was appointed as Indonesian ambassador to the UK. Subandrio then was 
appointed as Indonesian ambassador to the Soviet in 1954-7. Following the 
proclamation, Subandrio joined the Socialist Party. But, during his post in 
Moscow, he joined the PNI, Sukarno’s old party. This change was perceived as 
opportunism, as it was believed as stepping-stone to becoming Foreign 
Minister.470 
Scholars have tried to analyse the Indonesian motives toward the Konfrontasi 
against Malaysia.471 The Indonesian motives of the Konfrontasi were (a) 
expansionism, (b) diversion from domestic problems, and (c) anti-colonialism 
spirit. Malaysian government also acknowledged Sukarno’s action as an 
expansionist effort to “absorb Singapore and Malaysia into Greater 
Indonesia.”472 In general, these three motives could explain the background of 
the Konfrontasi. However, those arguments fail to explain fully the diverse point 
of view of the main actors within Indonesia who were involved in the 
Konfrontasi. Hindley denoted that there was a complex motive behind the policy 
of Konfrontasi.473 The main actors evidently involved in the Konfrontasi were 
Sukarno, Subandrio, the PKI, and the ABRI. Although the ABRI has had its own 
reason regarding the creation of the Malaysia Federation, different factions 
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within the institution did not come with a single motivation. The view of the ABRI 
would be categorised into six parts: (1) the ABRI as institution, (2) the army, (3) 
Yani faction, (4) Suharto, (5) Nasution faction, and (6) views of the air force and 
the navy.474   
Sukarno did not start the policy of Konfrontasi when he desired to crush the 
Malaysia Federation. The policy of Konfrontasi started in 1958, when Sukarno 
preferred to take ‘another way’ regarding the liberation of the West Irian475 as 
he had tried to annex the West Irian through negotiations with the Dutch for 
seven years. For Sukarno the Dutch still insisted not to transfer the authority 
over the West Irian to the Indonesian government.476 Thus, Konfrontasi against 
the Dutch was part of a three-main government programme.477 Further, on 14 
December 1961, Sukarno established a Supreme Operation Command for the 
liberation of West Irian (Komando Operasi Tertinggi Pembebasan Irian 
Barat/KOTI Permibar).478 Later he decreed the establishment of the People’s 
Threefold Command (Tri Komando Rakyat/Trikora) in order to annex the West 
Irian against the Dutch and launched a military campaign, known as the Trikora 
Operation.479 The military campaign ended after the signing of the Indonesian-
Dutch agreement on 15 August 1962. 
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However, the Trikora Operation has brought severe damage to the Indonesian 
state budget. Sukarno clearly claimed that more than 70 per cent of national 
activities were intended for security matters and for delivering the Trikora 
Operation. During 1961-1964, the economy suffered from permanent 
hyperinflation, around 100 per cent per annum.480 In that period, the 
government also faced the deficits around 8-19.5 per cent.481Government 
programmes on providing an adequate supply of food and clothing was far from 
satisfactory.482 As Sukarno did not provide any good solution to cut the deficits, 
he needed the Crush Malaysia programme to justify the incapacity of 
government in dealing with domestic problems. In 1960, the deficit reached 8 
per cent. And it was double in 1961 that the deficit touched 19 percent. 
Although, in 1962, the deficit was decreased to 12.8 per cent, the gap was still 
higher than in 1960. He provided an economic solution, called as Deklarasi 
Ekonomi (Economic Declaration), on 28 March 1963, but it was not effective as 
deficit hiked to 19.5 per cent. 483 So, the Crush Malaysia programme could be 
interpreted as an effort to distract the people from domestic problems. 
Sukarno’s consistency was noticeable in denying the accusation of 
expansionism behind the policy of Konfrontasi. Sukarno saw the creation of the 
Malaysia Federation as a potential threat to Indonesian unity. Following the 
PRRI revolt, the Malayan government gave its sympathy and aid to the 
rebellion.484 The Malayan government even denied to extradite several people 
who allegedly involved with the PRRI,485 As the Malayan economy was better 
than the Indonesian and because of the geographical position of Sumatra, the 
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Malaysia Federation might attract Sumatrans to consider joining the Federation. 
486 Within this notion, Pluvier elucidated the Konfrontasi policy could be seen as 
an effort to harm Malaysia’s economic position.487  
In addition, Sukarno admitted being fully aware with the allegation of an 
expansionist ambition. He reiterated the Konfrontasi did not indicate a claim 
upon North Kalimantan colonies.488 He expressed the Konfrontasi was not a 
policy aggression and much less a policy of territorial expansion as the aim of 
the policy was to oppose the neo-colonialist policy of non-Asian country.489 
However, Bunnel explained there was insufficient evidence to charge Sukarno 
over his envisioned role for Kalimantan territories. There was no propaganda 
preparation for the occupation of the area.490 The army even perceived the 
accusation of expansion was part of British propanda.491 In his speech delivered 
during the celebration of the Armed Forces day on 5 October 1963, Sukarno 
said  
Kita tidak mau merampas daerah orang lain, kita bukan ekspansionis, 
kita tidak mau berperang dengan orang lain, tetapi jikalau kita 
dihantam, kita akan melawan, Saudara-saudara, Angkatan Perang 
R.I., Angkatan Bersendjata R.I. akan melawan mati-matian  
[We do not want to seize other people’s territory, we are not 
expansionist, we do not want to stage war with other people. But, if we 
are attacked, we will fight. Brothers and sisters, the Indonesian 
Fighting Forces, the Indonesian Armed Forces will fight till the end] 
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Moreover, another explanation of why Sukarno was eager to confront the 
Federation was because he felt the British threatened him through the 
establishment of Malaysia Federation.492 It was conceivable as British believed 
Sukarno aimed at getting British forces out of Kalimantan and Singapore 
territories.493 At that time, the British portrayed Sukarno as an unpredictable 
leader with the potential to create serious problem for the West. In 1955, along 
with leaders from Sri Lanka, India, Burma and Pakistan, Sukarno established 
the Asian-African Conference that met in Bandung. In the name of Asian-
African unity, leaders of communist and anti-communist government sought to 
create their own separate international agenda. The conference introduced the 
development of the non-aligned movement. According to Yahuda, the forum 
also served the occasion for China to establish Third World credentials.494 In 
addition, during the Cold War period, Sukarno faced several assassination 
attempts.495 He alleged the West’s involvement in these attempts, as he 
succeeded in building an alternative view in the midst of East-West rivalry. On 
30 November 1957, for instance, there was an attempt to kill Sukarno when 
hand grenades were thrown at him.496 He was convinced the CIA was behind 
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the Cikini affair.497 Later, testimony of former CIA Deputy Director for Plans, 
Richard Bissell before the US Senate’s Select Committee on Intelligence 
corroborated Sukarno’s allegation. The CIA Report on 30 May 1975 stated:  
There was discussion within the Agency of the possibility of an attempt 
on the life of President Sukarno of Indonesia which “progressed as far 
as the identification of an asset who it was felt might be recruited for 
this purpose. The plan was never reached, was never perfected to the 
point where it seemed feasible.”498 
The last interpretation of Sukarno’s reasons in the Konfrontasi was personal 
matter with Rahman. It was apparent reason that Rahman’s statement and 
attitude irritated Sukarno. Besides overtly supporting the PRRI and offering the 
idea of why Sumatra should join Malaya, Rahman was seen as intentionally 
disrespectful.499 He appeared applying hostile attitude toward Indonesia as one 
of basic principles of his policy. On 11 December 1962, he accused publicly that 
Indonesia had trained the TNKU on Indonesian territory. He also claimed that 
Azahary planned to bring North Kalimantan colonies under Indonesian rule.500 
Rahman accused the policy of Konfrontasi against Malaysia part of Indonesia of 
territorial expansionism plan.501 Further, on 9 July 1963, Rahman signed an 
agreement with UK in London that stated the Federation would be declared on 
31 August. 502  
Sukarno was unhappy with Rahman’s decision. He felt insulted and humiliated 
over the establishment of Malaysia Federation before the UN team had finished 
the mission.503 Bunnell noted Rahman had violated diplomatic convention by 
charging Indonesia publicly, while Sukarno and his ministers did not 
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immediately endorse the Brunei revolt.504 Sukarno then accused Rahman of 
cheating and abandoning the Manila Declaration.505 Instead of discussing 
frankly the creation of the Federation, Rahman alleged Indonesian government 
had interfered in her neighbour’s internal problem by supporting the TNKU. 
Rahman further accussed Sukarno of being controlled by the PKI.506 He 
considered Sukarno as an ‘untrustworthy’ communist.507 The accusation forced 
Sukarno to launch a war of words.  
It is inevitable that there might be a personal rivalry between Sukarno and 
Rahman for prominence in the Malay world.508 Both Sukarno and Rahman 
seemed to be competing against each other  in developing their own 
reputations. Ricklefs explained many Indonesian leaders were jealous of the 
economic successes of Malaya.509 As the creation of Malaysia enhanced 
Rahman’s prestige, Sukarno might have felt unhappy with the situation. 
Although, according to Lee Kuan Yew, Sukarno would easily defeat Rahman 
and win the rivalry for the leadership of the Malays.510  
Prior to the Dwikora Operation, military leaders did not show any resistance to 
the policy of Konfrontasi.511 All elites shared their support to the policy with 
different motivations. As an institution, the ABRI considered objecting to the 
idea of the creation of the Malaysia Federation.512 There were three arguments 
why the ABRI rejected this idea. First, the formation of Malaysia Federation was 
not considering the voice of the people.513 Second, the establishment of the 
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British military bases in Malaysia might harm the safety of Indonesia.514 Third, 
ABRI envisaged the creation of Federation was to contain Indonesian 
influence.515 However, the ABRI did not fully commit their best in the 
Konfrontasi. Only the air force, the navy and the police agreed to support the 
policy of Konfrontasi. British considered the navy as the most committed service 
in upholding the Konfrontasi policy.516 Meanwhile, the army was split into two 
groups: support for the Konfrontasi and doubt as to the effectiveness of the 
policy.517 Consequently, the army did not deploy its best units in considerable 
numbers in Kalimantan.518   
Sutter explained the Indonesian Army leadership shared common view 
regarding Konfrontasi. The army opposed the idea of Malaysia Federation 
because of the China issue. Even the army’s attitude regarding the overseas 
Chinese was antagonistic.519 Since 1959, army intelligence officers had 
emphasised China as a potential danger to Indonesia because of four 
considerations: the expansionist policy, military superiority, big producer of 
goods and aggressively spreading ideology.520 Regarding the Konfrontasi, the 
army still appeared to be obsessed with the Chinese threat.521 The leaders 
were concerned that China would control the Federation later.522  
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It is evidence that the army was very cautious with China. Indeed, many 
Sarawakian Chinese, who were member of the Clandestine Communist 
Organisation (CCO), involved in several covert mission in Kalimantan. But the 
army leaders mistrusted the Chinese. So, they never allowed the CCO to 
conduct independent covert operation. Brackman explained the officers openly 
resisted the Communist and feared the CCO would take control over the 
mission.523 
The fear coincided with former Indonesian Vice President, Muhammad Hatta’s 
view regarding the Federation. Hatta perceived the Malaysia Federation would 
inevitably become a second China, dominated both politically and economically 
by the Chinese.524 By 1961, the Malaysia Federation would comprise 42 per 
cent Chinese, 39 per cent Malays, 9 per cent Indians and 10 per cent 
indigenous Kalimantan peoples.525 He argued the Chinese in Indonesia and 
Malaya were completely different. Compared to Indonesia, the Chinese in 
Malay maintained a strong bond of kindship with their mainland. Thus, the 
Federation would probably become a communist country. And Hatta ensured 
the Sukarno administration had no intention to claim the North Kalimantan 
territory.526 
On the other hand, the situation in the North Kalimantan colonies was 
uncertain. The PKI was not considered the area as its operation, even though 
the CCO in Sarawak was almost exclusively from the Chinese community. The 
ABRI provided much training for the CCO men for infiltration and sabotage 
mission.527 The CCO, indeed, cast doubt over their future, whether being a 
separate state under China mainland influence or annexation with Indonesia.528 
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In this regard, the CCO was very cautiously considering the facts that there 
were mistreatment of Chinese in Indonesia in 1959-1960 and 1963, and the PKI 
alone had defended the minority.529 
Friction within the army over the Konfrontasi issue was unavoidable. 
Sundhaussen elucidated that there were three factions within the army prior to 
1965. First was the anti-communist hardliner faction, which blatantly offended 
the PKI. Nasution led this faction. He irrefutably was a hardcore anti-communist. 
As Nasution has been leading the army for many years, he already experienced 
in dealing with the PKI. Second was the anti-communist group but still believed 
Sukarno could handle the PKI. Majority of the army headquarters officers led by 
Yani were linked to this faction. Third was the faction that was less resistant to 
the PKI. This group was also known as the pro-Sukarno group. Maj Gen 
Pranoto Reksosamudra, who later became interim Army Commander, was part 
of this group. 530 According to Sundhaussen and Subandrio, Suharto was part of 
Nasution faction.531 But, Harry Tjan Silalahi532 and Ricklefs disagreed with this 
notion. Silalahi argued Suharto was not hard-liner as well as Nasution. Suharto 
was quite 'populist socialism' (sosialisme kerakyatan)533 in nature.534 Ricklefs 
added Suharto was among the senior officers who worked to prevent Nasution 
and Yani faction becoming openly antagonistic.535  
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Sundhaussen’s categorisation of the army, however, was inadequate in 
discussing the fluidity of elite coalitions during the Konfrontasi. He did not 
elaborate further regarding the pro-Sukarno group. Not all pro-Sukarno officers 
were less worried to the PKI. Maj Gen Ibrahim Ajie, Regional Military 
Commander of West Java, for instance, was pro-Sukarno and also known as an 
anti-PKI hardliner.   
In the beginning of the Konfrontasi, Yani clearly supported the policy. Hindley 
depicted Yani as Army Chief who was making the most militant anti-British and 
anti-Malaysia Federation.536 He considered the dispute with Malaysia was a 
chance to develop mobile striking segment of the army. Consequently, the 
development of mobile striking segment might change the military doctrine of 
territorial warfare. Yani argued Nasution’s doctrine of territorial warfare was 
obsolete and needed to be improved.537 Thus, in 1963, Yani was one of the 
most outspoken elites supporting the policy. 
It was noticeable that Yani and Suharto used the Konfrontasi as an entry point 
to develop the offensive element in the army. Following the settlement of West 
Irian case, on 15 August 1963, Yani established new mobile striking structure 
within the army, the KOSTRAD, which composed of three elite brigades. He 
assigned Suharto to lead the KOSTRAD.538 Indeed, the result of West Irian 
dispute had boosted Suharto’s confidence that the existence of striking unit in 
the Trikora Operation has contributed significantly.539 Mrazek explained, 
Suharto was very keen to involve in an airborne-units game.540 On 2 October, 
Suharto argued the presence of military force such the KOSTRAD was needed 
to bolster Indonesian diplomacy over the Konfrontasi. He said diplomatic effort 
would be effective if it was backed up by the military. Suharto claimed some of 
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his troops had been deployed in West Kalimantan to support the policy.541 
The domination of the PKI in the Crush Malaysia policy led the fragmentation 
within the military over the Konfrontasi. The army was concerned that the PKI 
would gain more public sympathies during the Konfrontasi. So, the army was 
half-hearted in supporting the Konfrontasi and avoided in-depth involvement in 
this policy. As Yani knew the opponent was superior in military capability, he 
was reluctant to face the British in warfare.542 For him, a peaceful approach to 
end the dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia was the best solution. On 6 
April, he said, “a peaceful solution is always welcome. To us, it is always the 
best solution. The possibility is still there.”543 
The hesistation in backing the Konfrontasi did not restrict the ABRI to providing 
moral support to the TNKU. All key military actors showed similar sympathy 
over the revolt. Nasution, for instance, expressed his public endorsement and 
sympathy for the TNKU. In addition, Yani demonstrated his moral support to the 
Brunei people who were struggling for independence.544 In his Daily Orders on 
5 October 1963, he clearly articulated the purpose of Konfrontasi was to 
overcome the danger to Indonesia. As he stated 
Sekarang kita sedang menghadapi konfrontasi terhadap kolonisme 
dalam bentuk baru di sekeliling tanah air kita, yang merupakan 
bahaya dan tantangan bagi kelangsungan hidup Revolusi Indonesia. 
Tantangan ini wajib kita hadapi, karena ia ditujukan minimal untuk 
merongrong dan maksimal untuk menggagalkan Revolusi kita.  
[Now, we are facing the confrontation against neo-colonialism 
surrounding our homeland, which is a threat and challenge to the 
survival of the Indonesian revolution. We must face such a challenge, 
because it is meant to subvert, at the very least, and to thwart our 
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Revolution, at worst]545 
Furthermore, Nasution expressed his disappointment over the military budget 
reduction by supporting the Konfrontasi policy. He argued that the policy would 
help the military avoid budget cuts.546 After the settlement of the West Irian 
dispute, Sukarno proposed a reduction of the military budget plan. In 1962, the 
military budget reached 53 per cent of the national budget. As the emergency 
status in Indonesia would be revoked, the government allocated military budget 
in 1963 and 1964 only 22.1 per cent and 22.8 per cent respectively of the 
national budget.547 
Nasution insisted the budget cuts would threaten the army unity. So, according 
to Nasution, the Malaysia Federation issue could maintain the army’s political 
role in Indonesia.548 George Gomory of St Anthony College Oxford explained 
during the West Irian campaign, the army had enjoyed all the benefits of 
national budget and became the most powerful political force in Indonesia. As 
the number of the army personnel was increased, the termination of martial law 
status might lead to the mass of unemployed veterans.549 Thus, the 
involvement in the Konfrontasi permitted the ABRI to maintain its national roles 
and justified in resisting a 58 per cent military budget reduction.550   
It was noted that Nasution often echoed Sukarno’s message over the policy of 
Konfrontasi. He also portrayed the Malaysia Federation as a neocolonialist 
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project. On 4 April 1963, he said the Malaysia Federation would always 
maintain western domination in social, political economy and military sector in 
the region.551 Nasution rejected the accusation that Indonesia had a claim on 
the Malayan territory. As he stated 
Kita tidak punya klaim territorial di luar wilayah Republik Indonesia … 
proyek ini bukan saja dilanjutkan sebagai benteng kolonialisme dan 
feodalisme, yang merupakan musuh-musuh revolusi kita, tapi juga 
pangkalan-pangkalan militer dan ekonomi di daerah tersebut telah 
tradisionil menjadi pangkalan dominasi asing di Asia Tenggara ini 
We do not have any territorial claim outside the territory of the 
Republic of Indonesia … this project is not only served as the bastion 
of colonialism and feudalism, which is enemies of our revolution, but 
also military and economic bases in that area have traditionally turn 
into bases of foreign domination in Southeast Asia]552        
Both Nasution and Yani gave his support to the Brunei rebellions. Nasution 
overtly asked people who lived near the border with Sarawak, Kalimantan, to 
support the struggle of Azahari’s group. He also offered military training to anti-
Malaysia Federation rebels.553 His visit to the West Kalimantan in July 1963 
provided a threatening image to the Malaysia supporter by encouraging local 
people including the Chinese descent to prepare for general mobilisation 
against Malaysia.554  
To show his commitment to the Konfrontasi, Nasution did a maneuvre by 
dispatching troops into East Kalimantan.555 Yani was furious following Nasution 
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bypassed the army’s chain of command. Yani argued Nasution had no authority 
to deploy troops since held new post as KSAB.556 But Nasution defended the 
deployment of troops, especially for intelligence purposes, would 
counterbalance the PKI and Subandrio’s movements toward the Malaysia 
issue.557  
Furthermore, as time went on, Yani and Suharto changed their expression 
concerning the Konfrontasi with different reasons.558 As mentioned in Chapter 1 
Section 1.1, Yani and Suharto were part of the group who supported the 
Konfrontasi half-heartedly. They curtailed their support toward the policy 
following the appointment of Air Force Commander in Chief, Air Marshall Omar 
Dani as the Alert Command (Komando Siaga/KOGA) commander. Yani 
perceived Dani’s assignment might escalate the Indonesia-Malaysia tension 
quickly. Meanwhile Yani preferred to keep the conflict within manageable level, 
as he refused to deploy the Army Special Forces (Resimen Pasukan Komando 
Angkatan Darat/RPKAD). Other than that, the appointment also increased the 
interservice rivalry, as the air force leadership was closer to Sukarno than the 
army.559 Moreover, Suharto changed his mind over the Konfrontasi due to 
personal matter. He was disappointed with Sukarno’s decision to appoint Dani 
as the KOGA commander. Suharto felt he deserved the commander job, as he 
had an experience in leading the Trikora Operation. From then on, he was 
resistent to Dani’s leadership.560 
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Although intraservice rivalry also happened in the air force and the navy, those 
internal dynamics did not affect the implementation of the Konfrontasi policy 
significantly. Both the air force and the navy still sent their Special Forces troops 
to take part in the intelligence operation, called Operation A.561 Dani who later 
became the Commander of the Dwikora Operation said his troops were ready to 
uphold the Konfrontasi mission.562 Navy Commander in Chief, Vice Admiral RE 
Martadinata also shared similar stance. In his speech in the XVIII Armed Forces 
Day on 5 October 1963, Martadinata said 
Kita tentang proyek ini (Federasi Malaysia) karena ia merupakan 
bahaya langsung bagi negara kita. Karena ia merupakan ancaman 
langsung bagi sendi-sendi penghidupan bangsa kita di segala bidang. 
Kita lakukan konfrontasi total. Konfrontasi terhadap benteng 
kolonialisme dan imperialisme. Inilah tugas utama kita dewasa ini.   
[We reject this project (the Malaysia Federation), because it is an 
direct threat to our country. It is a direct threat to all sectors of our 
nations’ livelihoods. We advocate a total confrontation. A confrontation 
against the bastions of colonialism and imperialism. This is our main 
task at present].563    
Subandrio had own reflection regarding the Malaysia Federation issue. He 
appeared to see the Malaysia Federation issue in a contradictory manner. On 
one occasion, he considered opposing the Federation plan because the 
creation of the Malaysia Federation would boost China’s influence in the region. 
As the Chinese minority dominated the Indonesian economy, the Malaysia 
Federation would create the opportunity for China to expand her influence.564 
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For his stance toward China, in July 1960, the PKI criticised the Cabinet, 
especially Subandrio.565 According to Arto, Subandrio viewed China as a major 
potential enemy to Indonesia in 1961. China would target Indonesia because of 
the unexploited natural resources that Indonesia had.566 By her superiority, both 
in number of people and armed forces capability, China would easily dominate 
the Southeast Asia region.567 At that time, Subandrio did not overtly object the 
Malaysia Federation proposal. He posited that Indonesia had payed little 
attention to it.568 According to Van Der Kroef, the initial response of Subandrio 
regarding the Federation proposal was to acknowledge it as a “matter entirely 
for the people concern”.569 On 6 April 1964, Subandrio reiterated the reason of 
Chinese when he told the London Times that Britain and Indonesia shared 
similar a aim in Southeast Asia, the containment of the Chinese.570  
However, on a separate occasion, Subandrio came up with a different view 
regarding the Federation idea. He denoted that the establishment of the 
Federation was aimed to contain Indonesia. Although Rahman gave the shelter 
and protection to the West Sumatra rebels, Subandrio argued Indonesia never 
intend to show hostile attitude toward Malaysia.571 Like Sukarno, Subandrio 
also underlined the Konfrontasi would not lead into open war against Malaysia. 
The policy was a form of response to the Malaysian hostile attitude.572 He 
stated 
Bukanlah bahwa Indonesia atau Revolusi Indonesia takut pada 
pembentukan ‘Malaysia’ yang mempunyai penduduk 10 juta, akan 
tetapi yang harus kita tentang demi keselamatan kita sendiri ialah 
negara Malaysia sebagai alat imperial untuk membendung dan 
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mengepung kita  
[It is not that Indonesia or Indonesian Revolution is afraid of the 
creation of “Malaysia”, which has ten million people, but the thing that 
we should reject was Malaysia state as an imperialist tool to contain 
and encircle us]573   
Undoubtedly, the Konfrontasi was the key event for the PKI’s rejuvenation. The 
Party was expecting political benefit from the hostility policy. The PKI exploited 
the anti-Malaysia campaign for three aims: (a) to inculcate a racial mood in 
Indonesia, (b) to strengthen its position in domestic politics574 and (c) to attach 
the PKI programme with Sukarno’s anti-colonial policy.575 Mortimer added the 
PKI perceived the Federation as the threat of renewed American influence in 
Indonesia, as the Soviet Union had helped to shift the orientation of Indonesia’s 
foreign policy away from the West.576 Although, according to Bunnell, in late 
1962, the PKI found itself in jeopardy as it was vulnerable to the army’s 
harassment and denied access to a substantive share of government power.577 
The PKI had begun its anti-Malaysia campaign in 1961. At that time, Indonesia 
still had a problem with the Dutch over West Irian and put little concern to the 
Federation issue. After the Irian dispute was resolved, Aidit tried to influence 
Sukarno to push another anti-western campaign.578 The PKI perceived the 
Federation as ‘a new concentration of colonial forces on the very frontiers of 
Indonesia.’579 By the end of 1961, the PKI condemned the Federation idea as ‘a 
form of colonialism’, and attempted to surpress democracy in Malaysia.580  They 
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urged the Indonesian people and government to increase vigilance against the 
creation of Malaysia Federation.581 
Malaysian observed the PKI was behind of the hostilities and aggressive 
behaviours toward them.582 Tunku has been under pressure from the opposition 
following the announcement of the Federation plan. The Party Rakyat (the 
Marxist Socialist Front) and Barisan Sosialis (Socialist Front) Party in Malaya 
started opposing the Malaysia concept. To put more political pressure, the anti-
Malaysia opposition counted on the PKI as a source of support.583 The PKI was 
the largest or second largest communist party outside the East Bloc with 1.5 to 
1.8 million members.584 Thus, Rahman considered the core problem for his 
country was the communist threat to the region.585 
At that time, Indonesia was more likely inclined to the Communist Bloc due to 
the massive influence of the PKI.586 Rahman’s sentiment toward Sukarno as a 
Communist-inspired Indonesian therefore was unavoidable. Sukarno needed 
the PKI support to remain in power and to offset the army’s pressure. In 
addition, he also desired to use the communist global network to boost his 
profile.587 So, it is not suprising that Sukarno then overtly admitted the support 
for the TNKU was Aidit’s idea. Sukarno stated  
Kita bersimpati pada perjuangan rakyat Kalimantan Utara… Segala 
perbuatan kita untuk bersimpati, memberi bantuan pada perjuangan 
daripada rakyat yang ingin merdeka, segala hal ini Bung Aidit punya 
buatan  
[We are sympathetic to the struggle of the people of North 
Kalimantan… All of our actions to sympathise give support to people 
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who seek independence, are developed by Aidit]588    
 
Promotion of the Konfrontasi policy by key actors was understandable in terms 
of maintaining close relationships with Sukarno. As Sukarno remained the 
prime source of legitimation of the Guided Democracy, all actors had no choice 
but to perform an echo function.589 Whilst the move from liberal to guided 
democracy meant a change to a one-man administration, Sukarno was the only 
one source of Indonesian political norms.590 He successfully consolidated his 
authority and power, which was accompanied by declining of the influence of 
other governmental agencies.591 So, all key actors would not go far beyond the 
President in supporting his programmes. The next section elaborated the covert 
military operation, called Operation A following the increasing tensions with 
Malaysia. 
3.5 Operation A 
This section assesses the process of conflict escalation prior to the Dwikora 
Operation. The illustration adapts three stages process of escalation proposed 
by Mackie as follows: Stage I (December 1962 – April 1963), Stage II (April – 
September 1963) and Stage III (September 1963 – Mei 1964). 592 The 
discussion covers several overt and covert military operations, peace process 
attempts and two organisational changes that affected the ABRI. Some key 
issues that emphasised in this part are: (a) restructuring of ABRI, (b) bypass 
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chain of command case, (c) organisational overlaps due to the establishment of 
the KOTI, and (d) major covert military operation, codename Operation A.  
Tensions in the border of Kalimantan Island had increased since January 1963. 
But, Indonesia’s concern over Malaysia had started years before the period of 
Konfrontasi. Prior to 1958, Malaysia noted that the Indonesian intelligence 
activities in Malaysia and Singapore were poor in coordination and 
preparation.593 But, those problems were sorted since Maj Gen Gusti Pangeran 
Haryo Jatikusumo led the Consul-General in Singapore on 13 November 
1958.594 Indonesia through Consul-General in Singapore intensified her 
intelligence activities in the Malayan Peninsula. Indonesian government argued 
that all the intelligence activities were increased in Singapore because this city 
was believed to be a central-hub for foreign intelligence network in the region 
and was involved in some insurrections in Indonesia. Later Sukarno officially 
assigned Jatikusumo to uphold the ‘Crush Malaysia’ mission. In his speech 
during the inauguration of Jatikusumo as an Ambassador for Malaya on 11 April 
1963, Sukarno stated 
Dan saya minta saudara nanti sebagai Dutabesar Luar Biasa dan 
Berkuasa Penuh di Kuala Lumpur pun menyelenggarakan sama-
sama-sama dengan kita berjuang yang hebat ini agar supaya kita 
nanti benar-benar hidup di dalam satu dunia tanpa penjajahan, tanpa 
kolonialisme, tanpa neo-kolonialisme, agar supaya kerangka yang 
nomor tiga daripada Revolusi Indonesia benar-benar terlaksana.  
[And I ask you as the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary 
in Kuala Lumpur to fight together with us, so we could live in a world 
without occupation, colonialism, neo-colonialism, so that the third 
framework of the Indonesian Revolution could be implemented.]595   
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Following the increasing dispute, British troops were deployed in Kalimantan in 
order to defend the Malaysia Federation. British, Malaysians, Australian and 
New Zealander troops were involved in the battles in Kalimantan.596 Since mid-
1963, the US position was also clear. The US supported the Malaysia 
Federation. However, Americans refused to lead the hostility against Indonesia 
and preferred Britain, Australia and New Zealand to take the lead.597  
The Indonesian government noted that British airplanes violated airspace two 
times in January 1963.598 Gurkha troops also had crossed the border of 
Indonesia almost one kilometre for the first time on 28 January. As a reaction to 
those violations, Subandrio said “jika Malaya tetap melanjutkan sikap 
permusuhannya, maka bentrokan-bentrokan tidak dapat dicegah lebih lama lagi 
[if Malaya continue its hostilities, then clashes are unavoidable any longer].”599   
It is also noteworthy that the government had improved the structure of the 
Indonesian Fighting Forces Organisation (Angkatan Perang Republik 
Indonesia/APRI).600 The government merged all services and the police under a 
single institution, the ABRI, since 21 June 1962.601 The new structure, as 
depicted in Figure 3-1, located on the next page, was led directly by Sukarno as 
Supreme Commander of the ABRI. Regarding the administrative affairs of the 
ABRI, the Supreme commander was assisted by the Armed Forces Staff (Staf 
Angkatan Bersenjata/SAB) Office. This office was led by the KSAB. Sukarno 
appointed Nasution to lead the SAB as this position should be held by senior 
officer. In delivering his tasks on daily basis, the KSAB was helped by three 
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deputies, namely Deputy for Operations, Deputy for Management and Special 
Deputy. The Deputy for Operations was responsible for intelligence and 
operations affair. Meanwhile, Deputy for Management was dealing with 
materials, logistics, manpower, finance and personnel. The Special Deputy 
dealt with any affairs that were not covered by the other deputies.602  
Although all military services and the Police were merged under the new 
structure, Nasution did not have the authority to make any command. Sukarno 
curtailed Nasution’s influence in the military. Under the new structure, Nasution 
only had limited authority for military management. He also could not interfere 
with the operations.603 Meanwhile, Sukarno boosted his position by putting all 










Figure 3-1 Structure of the ABRI 
Source: Keputusan Presiden [Presidential Decree] No 225/Plt/1962 dated 21 
June 1962. 
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The idea of the restructuring of the APRI was discussed years before Sukarno 
issued the Presidential Decree in 1962. In 1958, First Minister Juanda started to 
implement this idea through establishing a committee led by the Deputy 
Minister for National Security, Lieut Gen Hidayat. This committee consisted of 
all military chief of staffs and Chief of National Police.604 As a result, this 
committee proposed a new structure of the Armed Forces. The new structure 
would be led by the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. However, 
Sukarno rejected this idea, as he preferred controlling the Armed Forces 
directly.605 Meanwhile, the KSAB only had authority in administrative affairs.606 
Feith explained the army’s role in political affairs had decreased since the 
creation of ABRI. The army was being less anti-communist and inclined to 
pursue policies different from the President.607 Many officers involved in 
administrative, political and managerial tasks. In this regard, Sukarno received 
two political advantages from the establishment of the ABRI. First, Sukarno 
could reduce Nasution’s monopoly in the army. Since 1959, Sukarno worried 
about the domination of the Nasution faction in the ABRI.608 Nasution was 
considered as anti-communist prominent leader. Hence, the establishment of 
the ABRI and appointment of Yani boosted Sukarno’s position in military 
institution. Feith added that although army officers were still having power in 
many fields, their influence has been fragmented.609 Second, the new structure 
secured Sukarno-dominated polity by enabling him to embrace any military 
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service to support his policy.610 This was the result of the new position of 
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, which all services were lined up 
behind Sukarno. But, intra and interservice rivalry were more intense after the 
new structure was imposed. The following paragraphs will provide the evidence 
of military rivalry. 
According to Mackie, the pre-Dwikora Operation period might be divided into 
three stages.611 Stage I (December 1962-April 1963), the Konfrontasi as ‘war of 
words’. In this stage, there were propaganda wars between Indonesia and 
Malaysia following the Brunei Revolt. The Indonesian government gave overt 
support to the revolt as the implementation of anti-colonial sentiment. The 
Malaysia Federation was seen as neocolonialist and imperialist project.612 
There was no direct military involvement in this stage. During this period, the air 
force delivered four operations to perform low-level show of force.613 First, 
Operasi Terang Bulan I (Operation 1st Moonlight) on 27-28 December 1962. In 
Singapore, Malaya and Kalimantan border, several strategic bombers TU-16 
performed show of force in response to the expanding British military in those 
areas. Second, Operasi Terang Bulan II (Operation 2nd Moonlight) on 11-22 
January 1963. For this operation, several TU-16 flew over the West Kalimantan. 
Third, Operasi Saputangan (Operation Handkerchief) on 18 February. This 
operation employed several TU-16 KS, Hercules and Albatros. Fourth, Operasi 
Waspada (Operation Alert) on 19 February. In this operation, the air force flew 
several TU-16 to conduct show of force. The ABRI report also identified that the 
British had violated Indonesian airspace and land border territory eight times 
during January-March 1963.614 Meanwhile, Malaysia accused the ABRI was 
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helping the revolt by providing TNKU troops training at Malinau, North 
Kalimantan.615  
As stated previously in this chapter, the Konfrontasi had created a high degree 
of political friction between Nasution and Yani. Although, Yani explicitly 
supported the TNKU, he remained cautious about the involvement of the troops 
in helping the struggle for independence in North Kalimantan. He argued the 
army was waiting for the orders. Even when two divisions of volunteers in West 
Kalimantan were ready to help the TNKU, he still asserted, “we must be careful 
and wait for orders.”616  
It is notable that Nasution bypassed the army chain of command during this 
stage. According to the new ABRI structure, Nasution did not have any authority 
to command any troops. But, he did a manoeuvre by commanding the Inter-
regional commander for Kalimantan, Brig Gen Hassan Basry, to deploy his 
troops into the Indonesian-Malaysian border in East Kalimantan shortly after the 
Brunei Revolt. Basry then assigned one company, known as the Kompi 
(Company) T, led by First Lieut Hamdi Silam from the Battalion 600R to help the 
TNKU gain independence.617 Battalion 600R was a reserve battalion for the 
Inter-regional command for Kalimantan. The Kompi T consisted of 95 personnel 
and accompanied by small group from East Kalimantan, led by Major Mulyono, 
as local guide. On 23 January 1963, this company departed from Banjarmasin, 
South Kalimantan, to Puruk Cahu by using a motorboat KM Barito I. Basry also 
accompanied the Kompi T to Puruk Cahu. On 2 February, the Kompi T 
dispatched from Puruk Cahu to Long Nawang by using a motorboat.  
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Yani tried to stop the deployment by sending a radiogram No 0304/S/1963 to 
Basry on 13 February. Yani stated the deployment was not under his 
authorisation. However, Basry disobeyed Yani by not passing the instruction to 
the Kompi T. As Basri ignored the command, Yani then tried to intercept the 
deployment by ordering the Battalion 600R commander, Major Sasmita to 
approach Silam. The Army Headquarter also attempted to withdraw the Kompi 
T through military communication line and state owned radio station (Radio 
Republik Indonesia/RRI). Still, Silam disobeyed Yani’s order and presumed the 
order was inciting statement.  
Indeed, Yani’s efforts affected the soldiers’ morale and unity. On 5 May, while in 
transit in Penyungkat, East Kalimantan, cohesion of the Kompi T was 
significantly weakened. At least, 35 soldiers preferred to follow Yani’s 
command, go back to the military base in Banjarmasin. Meanwhile, the rest of 
the Kompi T members still continued the journey to Long Nawang, near the 
Indonesian-Malaysian border. Again, in the middle of the journey, several 
members decided to go back to the base. When they arrived at Long Nawang, 
the total members of the Kompi T were 52 personnel. All of them were 
committed to help the rebellion and never abort the mission. They only would 
obey a command from Basry or Sukarno.618 British noted the Kompi T had held 
several guerrilla trainings for locals including six Bruneis. Two of them were 
Azahari bin Jais and Abdul Samad who in June crossed into Sawarak with 
instructions to contact local TNKU rebels and gave military training. 619 On 13 
May, the Kompi T left Long Nawang and went to Sabah territory. Since that day, 
the army command lost contact with the Kompi T.620 The main transits of the 
Kompi T in Kalimantan are represented in Figure 3-2. 
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Figure 3-2 Maps of Kalimantan Island 
Source: Google Maps and www.drodd.com 
 
 
It is inevitable that the diplomatic tension was heightened during this period. 
British government indicted Indonesian government encouraging anti-Malaysia 
activities in North Kalimantan. Also, the Indonesian Consular officials in 
Jesselton, North Kalimantan, Major Munarjo and Bambang Sumali, were 
accused that they conducted improper activities such as provided assistance to 
prepare anti-Malaysia movement and offered military training to the North 
Kalimantan citizens.621 The Indonesian Consulate at Jesselton opened on 29 
June 1961 and employed six Indonesian.622 Later, British complained the 
activites and urged the Indonesian government to withdraw Munarjo and 
Sumali.623 But, Subandrio rejected the accusation and insisted the government 
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was not involved in any secret activities in Kalimantan. As a consequence, 
Indonesian government refused to withdraw Munarjo and Sumali.624 On 12 July, 
British government officially declared Munarjo and Sumali persona non grata.625 
As a preventive action, British police also arrested at least 26 Indonesians who 
were living in North Kalimantan.626 Following the escalation, British government 
also rejected the appointment of Muhammad Jen as Vice Consul in North 
Borneo.627 The Indonesian government then retaliated by also declaring the 
British Vice-Consuls in Medan and in Surabaya persona non grata on 26 
July.628  
As the problem of West Irian was resolved, Sukarno lifted the emergency ‘state 
of danger’ status on 1 May 1963. He then dissolved the KOTI Permibar on 19 
July. But, following the rising tension with the Malaya, Sukarno established the 
‘new’ Supreme Operational Command (Komando Operasi Tertinggi/KOTI).629 
As illustrated in Figure 3-3, the main task of the KOTI was to ensure the 
implementation of government programme, especially the Konfrontasi against 
any counter revolutionary elements.630 This command was led directly by 
Sukarno as Supreme Commander of the KOTI. For daily business, Sukarno 
was assisted by the Joint Staffs. The Joint Staffs consisted of several units and 
was led by the Chief of Staff. And he assigned Yani to hold the position of the 
Chief of Staff. Thus, from then on, Yani occupied two strategic posts, the KOTI 
Chief of Staff and Army Commander in Chief. 
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Figure 3-3 Structure of the KOTI 
Source: Keputusan Presiden [Presidential Decree] No 142/1963 dated 19 July 
1963 
 
The overlapping institution is unavoidable. Sukarno failed to create clear 
division of the scope of work between the cabinet and the KOTI. As mentioned 
earlier, the KOTI has main task to ensure government programmes. The 
complication was inescapable when Sukarno also assigned the main function of 
the KOTI as to evaluate, plan, control and oversee government programmes by 
coordinating all national resources.631 Several cabinet members held strategic 
positions of the KOTI.632 Ideally, separation of decision and risk-bearing 
functions in large corporations like government is an effective approach to 
controlling the institutional problems.633 In this regard, member of the KOTI was 
playing central role in ensuring better exercise of monitoring government 
program. So, the over centralisation of power in executive position was an 
evident that the KOTI was not an effective instrument for decision control. The 
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combining of the KOTI and cabinet roles reduced monitoring abilities of the 
KOTI. In other words, role duality promoted poor performance and increased 
organisational problems. The overlapping scope of institutions work is 










Figure 3-4 Overlaps among Different Instutions 
Source: Author 
 
As stated previously, there were several meetings to solve the dispute between 
Indonesia and Malaya. The Foreign Ministerial Meeting at Manila on 7-11 July 
agreed to produce the first tripartite634 document, the Manila Accord. According 
to the Accord, both Indonesia and the Philippines agreed to welcome the 
Malaysia Federation and supported the presence of the Secretary General of 
the United Nations representatives in the North Kalimantan territory to oversee 
self-determination.635 The parties also agreed to maintain the stability and 
security of the area from any form of subversion.636 However, against the spirit 
of this accord, Britain and Malaysia insisted to establish the Federation on 31 
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August. They assured that the self-determination would reiterate the 
establishment of Malaysia Federation. On 9 July, a Malaysia agreement was 
signed at London between Malaya and the United Kingdom on behalf of 
Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak.637 Sukarno was infuriated with the London 
Agreement. In view of Indonesia’s refusal to the Malaysia Federation, Sukarno 
insisted that stance was an implementation of “good morality of good 
neighbourly right.”638 
The highest achievement of political negotiation was a signing of the Manila 
Declaration on 3 August. This was a result of the Manila Summit Meeting 
between the Indonesian, Malayan and Philippines Head of State (30 July-5 
August). This summit meeting also produced the Manila Accord and the Joint 
Statement.639 The three nations agreed “to take initial steps towards the 
establishment of Mapilindo by holding frequent and regular consultations at all 
levels to be known as Mushawarah Mapilindo.”640 Within this context, the Joint 
Statement agreed “the responsibility for the preservation of the national 
independence of the three countries and of the peace and security in their 
region lies primarily in the hands of the governments and the peoples of the 
countries concerned.”641 Not only that, the parties also agreed to not allow the 
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operating of foreign bases, directly and indirectly, to subvert the national 
independence of any of the three countries.642  
Clearly, the Manila Declaration failed to reduce the tension between Indonesia 
and Malaya. The ABRI noted during August 1963, the British military had 
increased its strength in North Kalimantan.643 Nasution also interpreted the 
Manila Declaration by proposing the need of importing military weapons. This 
was a consequence of ‘new responsibility’ for maintaining security and stability 
of the Southeast Asia.644 Thus on 17 August Sukarno stated 
Pendek kata, seluruh pangkalan asing di sekitar Indonesia dipakai 
sebagai pangkalan-pangkalan subversi terhadap Indonesia. Apakah, 
dengan fakta-fakta yang demikian itu, tidak beralasan, jika kita 
waspada terhadap penggabungan-penggabungan beberapa negeri 
sekeliling kita, apalagi jika kita tahu bahwa itu adalah proyek asing… 
[In brief, all the foreign bases around Indonesia are utilised as bases 
of subversion against Indonesia. Bearing in mind those facts, could it 
be baseless, if we are vigilant to mergers of several countries around 
us, particular if we know that these are are foreign projects…]645 
 
Furthermore, Stage III (September 1963-May 1964) consisted of diplomatic, 
propaganda, economic and military pressures. In this stage, Sukarno 
administration showed more aggressive in attitudes toward the Konfrontasi. 
Those actions were a response to the Malayan government decision on 26 
August, that the Federation would be proclaimed on 16 September. Both 
Indonesia and the Philippines filed official protests to the Malayan government. 
The decision was disrespecting the Manila Agreement.646 One day before the 
proclamation, on 15 September, Indonesia overtly stated that it would not 
recognise the Federation. But, the Malayan government still insisted to 
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announce the establishment of the Federation. And mobs attacked the Malayan 
and British embassies in Jakarta following the declaration of Malaysia 
Federation.647 On 17 September, the Indonesian government cut all trade 
relations with Malaysia and Singapore. Sukarno administration also prohibited 
all airlines, both cargo and passenger, from Indonesia to offer flights to 
Malaysia destinations on 27 September.648 Later, the Crush Malaysia was 
officially part of three government programmes.649 In addition, on 2 April 1964, 
Sukarno administration ordered the freeze of accounts tied to Malaysia.650   
To put more pressure, Sukarno banned Indonesians to listen to Malayan radio 
and television programme.651 For those who disobeyed this decision, they might 
be sent to jail for a maximum of one year. Government also prepared sets of 
propaganda instructions regarding the Konfrontasi against Malaysia. 652 Deputy 
First Minister for Information, Ruslan Abdulgani, created tactical operational 
guidance for propaganda. The guidance also covered military, political and 
economic issues. 653 To spread the messages, government utilised the state 
owned radio broadcast network (Radio Republik Indonesia/RRI). 654 As this 
radio propaganda aimed to win the heart of Malayan and North Kalimantan 
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dated 1 October 1963; Deputy First Minister for Information Instruction No 03/INSTR/M/1963 
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people, it would be delivered in various languages, namely Indonesian, Tamil, 
Malay, English, Chinese, Acehnese and Arabic. 
Until December 1963, government was emphasising more the implementation 
of Crush Malaysia programme on economic matters such as cutting off trade 
relations with Malaysia and Singapore.655 Therefore the KOTI prepared a plan 
to deliver the Crush Malaysia programme with military approach. Although, the 
emergency ‘state of danger’ status had ended on 1 May, the KOTI considered 
establishing joint operations in the eastern part of Indonesia.656 This action was 
part of maintaining security and public order. As a consequence, the KOTI 
would appoint operation commanders that had broad authority to control the 
public.657  
By the end of 1963, Britain also acknowledged capability of the ABRI in 
delivering infiltration up to company size by sea, land and air. As demonstrated 
in the Trikora Operation in West Irian, the ABRI has shown its ability such 
operation. However, several limitations such as budget cut, poor maintainance 
of equipments, and lack of trainings would limit the effectiveness of the 
infiltration. Shortage of the logistics system, staffs and operational experience 
were also considered as constraints in delivering proper infiltration.658 British 
noted from 23 April-21 August 1963, at least 16 major incursions were made 
into Sarawak that involving the ABRI personnel. 659 
At Stage III, regular troops began to be deployed in Sumatra and Kalimantan. 
Due to increased tension between Indonesia and Malaysia, the KOTI 
coordinated an intelligence operation, called as Operation A, shortly after it was 
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659 TNA, DEFE 7/2389, “Recent Developments in Anglo-Indonesian Relations including 




established on 19 July. Brig Gen Magenda660 led this operation. The activities of 
this operation included intelligence, counter-intelligence, psywar, sabotage, 
demolition, and reception committee in the enemy line.661 Prior to the creation 
of KOTI, the covert operation was conducted by the ABRI since June 1963. It 
was a joint operation between the navy and the army.662 This notion has been 
affirmed by British intelligence that the ABRI had resources and ability to carry 
out covert activities including propaganda and sabotage within Kalimantan 
territories.663   
For the navy, implementation of Operation A was divided into two bases: Base 
VI in East Kalimantan to target Sabah and Base II in Riau to target the Malayan 
Peninsula and Singapore.664 As Malayan Peninsula and Singapore were main 
targets of the operation, the KKO divided Base II/KOTI into five sub-baseis with 
different specific target, namely: (a) Sub Base X and its target was Singapore; 
(b) Sub Base Y and its target was western part of Johor; (c) Sub Base T and its 
targets were Negeri Sembilan, Selangor, Malaka and Kuala Lumpur; (d) Sub 
Base V and its target was Johor; and (e) Sub Base Z and its target was eastern 
part of Johor. The main tasks of the Base II/KOTI were creating military 
enclave, training Singaporean and Malayan to be insurgent, infiltration and 
attempting to separate Singapore and Malaysia. In the Operation A, the KKO 
employed 162 soldiers for the Base II/KOTI that comprised three teams: First 
Brahma Team (45), Second Brahma Team (50), Third Brahma Team (45), and 
Fifth Brahma Team (22). Meanwhile, for the Base VI/KOTI, the KKO deployed 
142 soldiers, consisted two teams: Forth Brahma Team (107), and the X 
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663 TNA, AIR 23/8645, Annex to JIC (FE) (62) 207 (Final), 24 December 1962. 
















Figure 3-5 Map of Target Areas of Base II/KOTI in Malayan Peninsula 
Source: Bagian Sejarah KKO AL, 327 
 
Nevertheless, there was no detail explanation regarding how the army 
implemented the Operation A. The Army Headquarter assigned several regional 
military commands (Komando Daerah/Kodam) to strengthen border control in 
Kalimantan.666 The Army Central Command also deployed troops from Java to 
Kalimantan, for instance, the RPKAD, the 327 Airborne Battalion from West 
Java and the 438 Infantry Battalion from Central Java.667 But, none of military 
archives provide an explanation regarding the involvement of the army in the 
Operation A in 1963. 
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666 They were Kodam IX/Mulawarman in East Kalimantan, Kodam X/Lambung 
Mangkurat in South Kalimantan, Kodam XI/Tanjung Bungai in Central Kalimantan, Kodam 
XII/Tanjung Pura in West Kalimantan. Pusat Sejarah Markas Besar TNI, Operasi Dwikora, 39-
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667 Pusat Sejarah Markas Besar TNI, Operasi Dwikora, 39-40; Conboy mentioned the 
assignment of the 328 Raider Battalion in Kalimantan. This battalion conducted military 
incursion into Sarawak in November 1963. Ken Conboy, Kopassus Inside Indonesia’s Special 




In parallel with the manoeuvre of the KOTI, the Navy’s Command Corps (Korps 
Komando/KKO) also assigned an operational task force that consisted of 530 
personnel to East Kalimantan on 27 September 1963.668 The task force, led by 
Major Sumari P, has four main tasks, namely (a) to secure border area, (b) to 
protect insurgent who infiltrated the enemy zone, (c) to protect Indonesian who 
was expelled from enemy territory, and (d) to conduct civic mission.669 The 
group arrived at the Navy Station Command (Komando Stasiun Angkatan 
Laut/Kosional) in Tarakan, East Kalimantan, on 2 October. Later, it was 
splintered into several small units and spread into seven locations.670 This task 
force also has an intelligence group, known as the X Platoon. In this area, the 
task force implemented a military tactic of active defence671. By employing this 
tactic, hopefully the task force could minimise military surprise.672 In the 
beginning of deployment, this task force was under the Kosional in Tarakan, 
East Kalimantan. But, since October 1963, the task force officially was attached 
to the Base VI/KOTI. This action was aimed to avoid the unexpected outcome 
of infiltration that might harm government strategy over the Konfrontasi.673    
The task force started its mission with lack of detailed data on enemy strength 
and the battlefield. As a result, the X Platoon Commander, Lieut Sutanto was 
killed while he led the team to identify enemy position at Matandak, Sabah. On 
17 October, Sutanto with five marines and one volunteer went to Matandak to 
observe enemy strength. As this was covert operation, they were not wearing 
military uniform. The group was only equipped with two squad automatic 
weapons, one pistol and ten hand grenades.674 After cross the Indonesia-
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Malaysia border, enemy ambushed the group. Sutanto lost his life in this 
incident.675 Up to January 1964, British highlighted the ABRI had launched at 
least 350 attacks under covert operation against Sabah and Sarawak. The 
British assumed the mission involved approximately 2,000 personnel.676 
As the tension was heightened, the KKO also deployed one-light company 
troops (130 personnel), led by Lieut Sukarno, to Riau on 3 December 1963.677 
This troop had different tasks with operation in Kalimantan. The tasks were (a) 
to protect sea border from trespasser, (b) to conduct counter intelligence, and 
(c) to eradicate illegal smuggling in the Malacca Strait.678 However, the most 
notable KKO incursion during this stage was Kalabakan raid on 30 December 
1963. The KKO attacked the Malaysian military post in Kalabakan, Sabah. The 
raid involved the X Platoon, the Para Amphibious Reconnaissance Commando 
(Komando Intai Para Amfibi/Kipam) and volunteers.679 As a result, eight 
Malayan soldiers had lost their lives and 38 personnel were injured in this 
attack. Meanwhile, British claimed only 19 members of security forces were 
wounded.680 The KKO admitted has lost one soldier due to the incident.681  
Following the Kalabakan raid, the Indonesian government intensified the covert 
operations. On 27 January 1964, Sukarno assigned the KOTI to fully control the 
implementation of Operation A.682 The First Joint Chief for Intelligence of the 
KOTI, Subandrio, was appointed to lead the operation. As the military 
incursions in Kalimantan continued, Sukarno assigned Yani as person in charge 
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of all military operations in North Kalimantan area.683 The KOTI also was 
authorised to mobilise all resources including the military forces.684   
Several diplomatic initiatives were undertaken in order to reduce the tension in 
the region. The US President, Lyndon B Johnson, was quite active to solve the 
dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia.685  In this context, President Johnson 
asked US Attorney General, Robert F Kennedy to go to Asia (17-26 January) to 
seek a peaceful way to end the conflict. Kennedy met Sukarno in Tokyo (17-18 
January) and Jakarta (22-23 January). Soon after the meeting, Sukarno 
announced his intention to cease-fire.686 On 5-10 February 1964, the US 
government also arranged a foreign ministers meeting in Bangkok.687 The 
Thailand Foreign Minister Thanay Khoman hosted this meeting.688 However, 
the ministers – Subandrio of Indonesia, Tunku Abdul Razak of Malaysia and 
Salvador Lopez of the Philippines failed to reach an agreement on the status of 
the Indonesian based guerrillas in Sabah and Sarawak.689 Indonesia only would 
withdraw the volunteers from Sabah and Sarawak territory if Malaysia would 
return to the Manila Agreement.690 Again, the ministers met in Bangkok on 3-5 
March. But, it also unsuccessful to reach a settlement, as Subandrio rejected 
the demand to withdraw the volunteers from Malaysian territory.691 
As the level of British military manoeuvres increased, the KOTI demanded all 
military services to increase the number of troops for Operation A. The ABRI 
noted at least 14 incidents of Indonesian airspace violation that were conducted 
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by the British military during March and April 1964.692 In addition, the KOTI also 
requested the services to employ highly skilled soldiers. Thus the KKO 
assigned 300 personnel to be involved in the Operation A.693 As this was a 
covert mission, those troops would be regarded as volunteers, known as 
Sukarelawan Kampret (Kampret694 Volunteers). Prior to departure for mission, 
they attended special training for one month at Training Centre in Cisarua, West 
Java. The training covered intelligence, counter intelligence, sabotage, 
demolition, jungle warfare, guerrilla warfare etc.695 Soon after the training, the 
troops were deployed into the Base VI/KOTI in Kalimantan and the Base 
II/KOTI in Riau. 
Sukarno was more aggressive to deliver the Konfrontasi policy. In many 
occasions, he often repeated in various speeches the ‘message’ of the danger 
of Malaysia Federation and the reason of why Indonesia had to oppose the 
Federation. He utilised this message to mobilise public support for the 
Konfrontasi. On 16 March, Sukarno started to campaign the anti-Malaysia 
volunteers movement. Sukarno claimed 21 million volunteers were ready to 
mobilise for the Konfrontasi mission.696 Indeed, number of volunteers has 
increased rapidly. Besides the PKI mobilised people to become volunteers, 
another reason of why people joined the voluntary mission was a hope of 
obtaining free food and clothing.697  Regarding the volunteers issue, Sukarno 
seemed to exploit the mass support and attach them to the Crush Malaysia 
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campaign. In 1964, Sukarno issued several decrees and enacted new Law on 
the Indonesian Volunteers Movement.698 According to Mackie, Sukarno also 
repeated threaten to escalate the level of violence if Malaysia disobeyed the 
Manila Declaration.699 
At this stage, the Indonesian government deployed volunteers to involve in 
several military incursions. The majority of them were local residents from 
Sabah and Serawak that felt threatened by the British military.700 Even though, 
British accused some regular army and the KKO appeared as volunteers and 
used for infiltration across the border.701 Prior to involvement, the civilian 
volunteers got short military training from the ABRI.702 However, the basic 
military training was insufficient to create skilful volunteers. Thus volunteer 
groups were easy to be captured or defeated by Malaysian and British military. 
To overcome this challenge, the ABRI attached limited personnel to volunteer 
groups to infiltrate the Malaysian territory.703 This action was also aimed to deter 
enemy’s movement along border area.704 
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3.6 Informal Main Actors Network 
As explained previously, several main actors had indicated their position to the 
policy of Konfrontasi. During this period, all main actors in the ABRI showed 
their commitment over the Konfrontasi policy. Although, Omar Dani did not 
assign his troops yet in 1963 to the Konfrontasi mission, he exposed his 
commitment to advocate the operation.705 Meanwhile, both Nasution and 
Martadinata had overtly supported the Konfrontasi by authorising the troops to 
Kalimantan.706 To demonstrate his commitment, Nasution had done a cross 
command while he did not have any authority to deploy army’s troops. 
Consequently, Yani irritated with Nasution and their relationship was not good 
due to this incident.707  
Indeed, Yani, who was known as Sukarno loyalist, supported the TNKU 
rebellion. However, Yani did not consider utilising full hard power to solve the 
dispute. He preferred to maximise diplomacy rather than military approach in 
confronting the Malaysia Federation.708 Compare to Martadinata’s action toward 
the Konfrontasi, Yani did not show his high enthusiasm to uphold the policy. He 
prevented the excess of the KKO operations in Kalimantan by attaching them 
into KOTI’s operation. 709 Certainly, he has been dragging his feet in bringing up 
the Konfrontasi policy. However, his determination to maintain the conflict as 
low as possible could be interpreted as an effort to ensure that the conflict 
would not lead to open war. This expression was similar to Sukarno. Although 
Sukarno overtly showed his intention to support the TNKU, he avoided the 
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conflict lead to open war.710 He was careful to avoid all –out military 
engagement that would pose greater risks to Indonesia.711 
There are various degrees of relationship between main military actors and the 
PKI. Both Yani and Nasution were known as anti-communist. However, Yani 
adopted softer ‘tactics’ than Nasution toward the PKI. Yani replaced several 
regional commanders who were widely known as anti-communist hardliners.712 
Meanwhile, both Dani and Martadinata had positive relationship with the PKI. 
They were less resistant to the PKI. On 5 April 1963, Dani was inviting the PKI’s 
leader, DN Aidit to give speech in the Air Force Department.713 In addition, 
Martadinata did not liquidate the Navy’s Non-commission association (Ikatan 
Bintara Angkatan Laut/IBAL) that allegedly was linked to the PKI.714   
Furthermore, regarding the main actors from non-military, both Subandrio and 
the PKI were fully supporting the policy of Konfrontasi. Subandrio was directly 
involved in some political negotiations to solve the Indonesia-Malaysia dispute. 
He also took several communist political leaders from North Kalimantan to 
Bogor for political and paramilitary training.715 Meanwhile, the PKI, as admitted 
by Sukarno, was having major influence toward the policy of Konfrontasi. The 
PKI’s leader, Aidit, was ‘architect’ of this policy.716 The informal relationship 
among main actors is represented in Figure 3-6, located on the next page.  
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This chapter set out to consider the relationship between the Konfrontasi policy 
and regional order within Southeast Asia during Cold War period. Political 
polarisation during Cold War has shaped the Indonesian foreign policy and 
influenced Sukarno. To this end, the chapter discusses the wider setting of the 
policy and the outset of the Dwikora Operation. This serves as the pretext for 
evaluating the detail account of the Dwikora Operation that will be discussed in 
Chapter Five. 
When Sukarno introduced the Konfrontasi, Southeast Asia was an important 
frontier in the political and ideological struggle between the West and the East. 
Although, Sukarno applied the ‘independent and active’ foreign policy, in fact, 
Indonesia was closer to the Communist Bloc than the US. The Indonesian 




significantly over the last decade. And Indonesia was a major recipient of Soviet 
development assistance in the region. But, the Soviet Union failed to influence 
Indonesian policy. And following the rising tension of Sino-Soviet rivalry, 
Indonesia preferred closer relations to China than the Soviet Union. Thus, 
Moscow did not support the policy of Konfrontasi.    
In the beginning of the Indonesia-Malaysia dispute, Indonesian key actors had a 
wide-ranging motivation over the policy. This situation clearly indicated that 
there was ongoing rivalry among main actors. They tried to show their 
commitment to supporting the government programme. By repeating and 
articulating Sukarno’s idea over the Konfrontasi in many occassions, each key 
actor seemed to compete for securing Sukarno’s attention. In particular, new 
structure of the ABRI had increased the level of intra and interservice rivalry. As 
Sukarno applied coercive diplomacy in dealing with Malaysia, the ABRI 
launched covert operation, called as Operation A. So, the tension between 
Indonesia and Malaysia was significantly heightened. 
As will be presented in the following chapter, Sukarno would make a serious 
attempt to implement the Konfrontasi policy by launching military operation, 
called the Dwikora Operation. But this effort was curtailed by the deep-seated 
rivalries, both intra and interservice. Before turning to trace the failure of military 





4 DWIKORA OPERATION AND ITS AFTERMATH 
 
Hai rakyat Indonesia, hai seluruh sukarelawan, bantulah perjuangan rakyat 
Malaya, Singapura, Serawak, Brunei, Sabah untuk membubarkan “Malaysia” 
ini. Hanya satu jangan lupa, “Malaysia” ini membahayakan bukan saja kepada 
Republik Indonesia khususnya, tetapi membahayakan kepada Revolusi 
Indonesia, Revolusimu! 
[Hey Indonesian people, hey all volunteers, please support the struggle of 
people of Malaya, Singapore, Serawak, and Sabah in dissolving this so-called 
“Malaysia”. Do not forget one thing, this so-called “Malaysia” is not only 
dangerous for the Republic of Indonesia, but also endangering Indonesian 
Revolution, your Revolution!] 
Speech of President Sukarno for the launching the Dwikora Command717 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter examined the Dwikora Operation. This chapter discussed in detail 
the causes and reasons of changing of the Dwikora Operation. It also 
highlighted and examined why the friction and rivalry of the Generals within the 
Indonesian military matter regarding the operation. By illustrating a detail 
account of the Dwikora Operation, this chapter aimed at providing the chronicle 
of how the politicisation of the Indonesian armed forces affected the entire 
operation. Thus, this part provided a comprehensive narrative of the Dwikora 
Operation. As well as Chapter Four, the purpose of this chapter was to achieve 
the third enabling objective (p.14), to discuss the implementation of the 
Indonesian military operations during the Konfrontasi. 
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This chapter starts by illustrating the initial stage of the Dwikora Operation. This 
part highlighted the uneasy relationship between Omar Dani and Ahmad Yani. 
The chapter then explained how the G30S affair affects the operation. It was 
during the second year of operation that the G30S affair shook Sukarno 
administration and gave Suharto momentum to capitalise his power. The 
chapter concluded with an illustration of how Suharto normalised the 
Indonesia-Malaysia tension. 
This chapter is structured into five sections. The first section presented 
introduction of the chapter. The second section reviewed the implementation of 
the Dwikora Operation in its first year of operation. The explanation outlined 
several key issues including intra-service clash and Suharto’s Opsus, which 
was evidence of disunity of command during the Konfrontasi. The effect of the 
G30S affair on the Dwikora Operation is assessed in the third section. This part 
illustrated how Suharto challenged Omar Dani leadership and took full control 
of the Dwikora Operation. Moreover, the deepening peace process during the 
third year of the Dwikora Operation is discussed in the penultimate section. 
The fifth section provided the summary of the chapter.    
4.2 First Year of the Dwikora Operation (1964-1965): Problems 
of Unified Command  
This part examined the first year of implementation of the Dwikora Operation. 
This section highlighted some problems that emerged during the period and 
their effects on the Dwikora Operation. The intense rivalries have caused 
several problems such as the frequency-change of military operation structure, 
intra service clash, and Suharto’s covert mission. Consequently, the KOGA 
failed to achive certain targets and to deliver some military missions. Although, 
Operation A accomplished some sabotage actions in Singapore. In this regard, 
a rich array of illustrations from this period reflected the notion of complexity 





4.2.1 Frequency-change Organisational Structure 
On 3 May, Sukarno officially declared the Dwikora comprised: (1) Strengthening 
the defence of the Revolution; (2) Supporting the revolutionary struggle of the 
people of Malaya, Singapore and Borneo to dissolve the puppet state of 
Malaysia.718 Sukarno argued this decision was chosen because the Malaysian 
government refused to solve the dispute by referring to the Manila Agreement. 
He, in agreement with President Macapagal of the Philippines, affirmed that 
Asian problems should be solved by Asians themselves in Asian way.719 As a 
consequence, the interference from non-Asian countries in Asian conflict 
resolution should be avoided.720  
Following the declaration, Sukarno established the KOGA on 16 May.721 The 
KOGA was a unified military command that had two aims, namely (a) to develop 
and conduct military operation to defend territory and help people of Malaya, 
Singapore, Sarawak, Brunei and Sabah in dissolving the Malaysia; (b) to lead 
and employ all armed forces and volunteers to uphold the mission. Sukarno 
then appointed Air Force Commander in Chief as Commander of the KOGA.722  
Furthermore, during the first year of the Dwikora Operation, the structure of 
military operation command changed four times. In the beginning of the 
Dwikora Operation, the structure of the KOGA was directed by a commander, 
assisted by two deputies and the Joint Staff. As represented in Figure 4-1, 
located on the next page, the Joint Staff was divided into four units: intelligence, 
                                            
718 Departemen Penerangan, Dwi Komando, 27 
719 The Asian way was also knowingly as the Sukarno-Macapagal doctrine. This was a 
result of bilateral meeting between Sukarno and Macapagal in Manila on 11 January 1964. Biro 
Research Umum Departemen Luar Negeri, “Confrontation Documents,” 43-45.  
720 Yani illustrated Asian way as the settlement of conflict between two Asian countries 
without interference from outside, non-Asian countries. TNA, FO 371/180316, Letter Jakarta to 
Foreign Office, 14 September 1965 
721 Keputusan Presiden [Presidential Decree] No 23/KOTI/1964 dated 16 May 1964 
722 However, on 16 May 1964, Sukarno did not overtly state Omar Dani as Commander 
of the Koga. Keputusan Presiden [Presidential Decree] No 23/KOTI/1964 only mentioned the 
official position name, Air Force Commander in Chief served as Commander of the KOGA. On 2 
June, Sukarno officially appointed Air Marshall Omar Dani as Commander of the KOGA. See 




operations, administrative and logistics. Below that, there were six main 
commands under direct control of the KOGA commander. They were: Air 
Defence Command, Strategic Command, Airborne Command, Amphibious 
Command, Tactical Command and Logistics Command.723 Each command 
consisted of a mixture of all branches. In addition, the KOGA commander was 
responsible to the President as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. It 
seemed that Sukarno did not have appropriate assessment in delivering 
Dwikora Operation. There was no further explanation regarding this structure. 
Sukarno only assigned the detail job description and would be provided later by 
Yani as Chief of Staff of the KOTI. Consequently, this situation posed complex 
challenges, which will be discussed further in this chapter, for the ABRI to 









Figure 4-1 Structure of the Alert Command 
Source: Keputusan Presiden [Presidential Decree] No 28/KOTI/1964 dated 19 
May 1964 
 
It is notable that Sukarno administration did not have full intention to deliver 
open war with Malaysia and her allies. After less than a month, the main task of 
the KOGA was amended. On 2 June, Sukarno set the new main task of the 
                                            
723 Keputusan Presiden [Presidential Decree] No 28/KOTI/1964 dated 19 May 1964, 




KOGA that was only to prepare and deliver retaliation operation in enemy 
territory.724 The reason behind the change was referring to the current 
development of the Konfrontasi that might lead to open war.725  
In conjunction with the new task, Sukarno improved the structure of the KOGA 
illustrated in Figure 4-2, located on the next page. According to the new decree, 
the Joint Staff was expanded into six units: intelligence, operations and training, 
personnel, logistics, territorial and communication. 726 However, the new 
structure reduced Dani’s authority as the KOGA commander. He could not 
command any combat elements directly. Although, the KOGA was still joint 
command, the new structure changed the approach of jointness.727 Unlike the 
old structure, Dani would direct several components that based on the 
capability of the services. Each component, which was led by a commander, 
had responsibility for operations of all deployed forces. If needed, Dani might 
establish the task forces.  
In this sense, Sukarno might have political consideration while appointed Dani 
as Commander of the KOGA. By assigning Dani, Sukarno tried to reduce the 
domination over the operation. He seemed to control the implementation of 
military operation. It could be seen when Sukarno did not intend to launch air 
strike or escalate the conflict. Sukarno also prohibited Yani to infiltrate the army 
troops to Malayan Peninsula, but through Kalimantan.  
It seemed that the new structure was a result of rivalry between Dani and Yani. 
Following the appointment of Dani, the intensity of rivalry between the army and 
the air force significantly increased. Yani noticed Dani’s assignment might 
challenge its domination over the ABRI and disrupt his plan to expand the army 
                                            
724 Keputusan Presiden [Presidential Decree]  No 32/KOTI/1964 dated 2 June 1964 
725 Pusat Sejarah Markas Besar TNI, Operasi Dwikora, 48-49 
726 Keputusan Presiden [Presidential Decree] No 33/KOTI/1964 dated 2 June 1964, 
signed by the Chief of Staff of the KOTI, Ahmad Yani, on behalf of President Sukarno. 
727 Mukherjee defined jointness as the ability of the army, the air force and the navy, to 
plan and operate in a mutually reinforcing manner. Anit Mukherjee, “Fighting Separately: 
Jointness and Civil-Military Relations in India,” Journal of Strategic Studies, 40,1-2 (2017): 6, 




strength. As explained in Chapter 3, Section 4.2, even though Yani committed 
to avoid open war he perceived the Konfrontasi as an occasion to build-up the 
army offensive capabilities However, Dani brought extremely offensive 
professional doctrine when he led the KOGA. Mrazek explained, in 1963 Dani 
was rumoured to favour bombing missions against Malaysian territory, while the 












Figure 4-2 Structure of the Alert Command  
Source: Keputusan Presiden [Presidential Decree] No 33/KOTI/1964 dated 2 
June 1964 
 
As the ABRI remained under operational command of the Chief of Staff of KOTI 
and staffed largely with army officers,729 Yani, of course, could easily impede 
any of Dani’s plans. And the new structure of the KOGA was evidence that Yani 
resisted Dani’s leadership. The new decree, which was signed by Yani on 
behalf of President Sukarno, likely intended to ensure the continued army 
domination. The new decree possibly adapted the Army’s Doctrine of Territorial 
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Warfare.730 By applying component system, the central command should 
decentralise its authority. It means the implementation of the military operations 
would be decentralised to the components, while the military strategy was still 
centralised under the central command.731  
Indeed, rivalry between the army and the air force was already deep before the 
Konfrontasi. In July 1959, Air Force Chief of Staff, Air Marshall Suryadarma 
opposed Nasution command to be under control of Department of Security and 
Defence. Suryadarma argued the air force did not want to be directed by any 
army officer.732 And following the significant air force and navy power build-up, 
officers from both services demanded a greater role in all fields and 
improvement of military policy and doctrine. However, those calls were often 
neglected by the central military command, which was dominated by the army. 
Deputy Commander of the Air Force, Air Commodore Sri Mulyono Herlambang 
argued his service was the best component to uphold any modern and 
offensive warfare. Meanwhile, the ABRI doctrine remained determined by the 
territorial spirit with the Land Forces as the primary actor.733 
Furthermore, Dani faced, at least, five major problems to execute the 
Konfrontasi mission during his first quarter at the job. First, the Armed Forces 
still had to deliver counter insurgency operations in several provinces.734 Thus, 
the number of troops that were available and ready to deploy for Dwikora 
                                            
730 Keputusan Presiden [Presidential Decree] No 33/KOTI/1964 dated 2 June 1964, 
731 Detail explanation regarding the Doctrine of Territorial Warfare see Biro Research 
Departemen Luar Negeri [Research Bureau of Department of Foreign Affairs], Perang Wilayah 
[Territorial Warfare], (Jakarta: Biro Research Departemen Luar Negeri, 1962); Guy J Pauker, 
The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management, (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND Corporation, Memorandum RM- 3312-PR, November 1963) 
732 At that time, Nasution was holding position as Security and Defence Minister/Army 
Chief of Staff. Humaidi, “Politik Militer AURI Dalam Pemerintahan Sukarno 1962-1966 [Military 
Politics of the Indonesian Air Force under Sukarno Administration 1962-1966],” (Master Thesis, 
Universitas Indonesia, 2008), 23.  
733 Mrazek, 135-136 
734 During 1949-1960s, military conducted some domestic operations to overcome 
insurgencies such as the Darul Islam (House of Islam) rebellions in Aceh, West Java, South 
Sulawesi, and South Kalimantan. Details regarding counter insurgency operations see Pusat 




Operation was insufficient. In this regard, the army leaders criticised Dani for 
being unaware of internal security problem.735 Second, the establishment of 
KOGA was not well planned. Prior to the formation of KOGA, it did not have any 
essential documents and guideline to assist the Commander of the KOGA such 
as Strategic Directives (Bimbingan Strategis), Intelligence Assessment, 
Planning Directives (Bimbingan Perencanaan), Situation Awareness, and Battle 
Staff Guide.736 The KOTI did not provide any document to assist the KOGA. 
Consequently, the KOGA should prepare the Intelligence Awareness during its 
early phase.737  
Third, supporting staff of the KOGA were inadequate. On 14 August, Sukarno 
held the KOTI meeting and asked the KOGA to execute military operation. This 
meeting was a response of the increase of British military presence in the 
Southeast Asia.738 Then, Sukarno appointed Rear Admiral Mulyadi of the Navy 
to be the First Deputy Commander for Operations, while the Second Deputy for 
Supporting was held by Brig Gen Achmad Wiranatakusumah of the 
KOSTRAD.739 Although, some strategic jobs such as Joint Chief of Staff and 
several Joint Staff Head positions were filled, the KOGA still did not have any 
supporting staff. Several the KOGA tasks could not be completed due to lack of 
staff.740 To overcome this problem, Dani utilised the Air Force facility at the 
Halim Perdanakusuma Air Force base as the KOGA Headquarter. But it was 
insufficient. Lack of staff resulted in poor the KOGA performance. 
                                            
735 Mrazek, 137 
736 Komando Mandala Siaga, Peran Komando Mandala, 11 
737 Dokumen Sejarah Dwikora SP-002/D/2014 Peranan KOLAGA dan Kodam XII/TJPR 
dalam Konfrontasi terhadap Malaysia [Roles of the KOLAGA and the XII/TJPR Regional 
Command in the Konfrontasi against Malaysia]  
738 Komando Mandala Siaga, Peran Komando Mandala, 11-12 
739 Keputusan Presiden [Presidential Decree] No 47/KOTI/1964 dated 2 September 
1964 
740 For instance, the KOGA could not enforce internal disciplinary system. There were 
insufficient staffs to handle several cases related to military discipline such as friendly fire, 
military discipline, and traffic offences cases. Laporan Komando Bidang Staf Gabungan III 




Fourth, the derivatives of regulation regarding the Dwikora Operation were 
incomplete. The only existing decree was the establishment of the KOGA. To 
deal with the problems, on 25 August, the KOGA submitted the Tasks 
Assessment of the KOGA (Penelaahan Tugas Komando Siaga) and Logistics 
System Assessment to the KOTI for gaining approval. Those assessments 
demanded an integrative approach to deliver the Konfrontasi.741 On 1 
September, the KOGA also issued the Planning Directives.742 The document 
identified several weaknesses of the ABRI in delivering the Konfrontasi, namely 
(a) imbalance of military capabilities and (b) inadequate strategic and tactical 
mobility. Consequently, the KOGA preferred to use the navy and air force in 
military campaign in Malayan Peninsula and North Kalimantan. This campaign 
was aimed to gain political impact. Meanwhile, the army campaign only focused 
occupying several strategic areas in North Kalimantan. But, the document was 
contradicted with the reports to the President that were prepared by the KOTI. 
Thus, the KOTI delayed the discussion of the document.743 Later, on 19 
September, the KOTI decided all operations regarding the Konfrontasi should 
be attached and under coordination of the KOGA.744 
The last major problem of the KOGA was dualism in command. After Sukarno 
established the KOGA, the KOTI still delivered its operations such as the 
Operation A. Thus, there was a ‘dualism in command’ in upholding the 
Konfrontasi mission. In other words, both the KOGA and the KOTI were 
delivering military operation at the same time.745 Evidently, the KOTI had been 
reluctant to hand over the Operation A to the KOGA. The head of Operation A, 
Subandrio, rejected to disclosure any detail regarding the implementation of 
operation. He argued the operation was classified as ‘Top Secret’ material. 
Meanwhile, the KOGA sometime had to encounter the impact of Operation A 
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742 Gagasan Strategi Komandan [Strategic ideas of Commander], dated 1 September 
1964, signed by Commander of the KOGA Air Marshall Omar Dani.  
743 Komando Mandala Siaga, Peran Komando Mandala, 13-14 
744 Komando Mandala Siaga, Peran Komando Mandala, 15 




when delivering operations in the field.746 Consequently, Dani could not produce 
a proper Intelligence Assessment for supporting the Dwikora Operation.  
Dani challenged Yani’s decision regarding the new structure of the KOGA. 
Dani, unilaterally, imposed the new KOGA structure. On 30 September, he 
issued a decree to restructure the combat elements within the KOGA and 
neglect previous presidential decree. Under the new decree, Dani was still the 
commander of the KOGA. As represented in Figure 4-3, Dani led four joint 
commands and two battle commands, namely Alert Patrol Joint Command, 
Alert Strategic Joint Command, First Joint Battle Command, and Second Joint 
Battle Command. Comparing to the previous decrees, Dani’s decree provided 
clearer explanation regarding the KOGA. It overtly stated that the KOGA was a 
functional command not theatre command. As a consequence, the KOGA 
would not conduct any operations that aimed to managing the territory 
(pembinaan wilayah). Dani also strengthened his authorities. Under the new 
decree, he had authority to fully control all KOGA’s operations and coordinate 
all administrative and logistics supports. 747 Dani bolstered his authority to 
change the forces structure in the KOGA. He demanded all military services to 






                                            
746 One of the impacts was British military deployed its military vessels into Indonesian 
water territory as a response of some infiltrations in the Malayan Peninsula. Komando Mandala 
Siaga, Peran Komando Mandala, 13; Dokumen Sejarah Dwikora SP-002/D/2014 
747 This decree seemed contradiction with the army’s doctrine of territorial warfare that 
the authority of implementation of military operation was decentralised. This meant the military 













Figure 4-3 Structure of the Alert Command 
Source: Surat Keputusan [Decree] No 01/1964 dated 30 September 1964 
 
There were many evidences that Yani tried to hamper the implementation of the 
Dwikora Operation. On 2 October, Sukarno issued a disposition letter to the, 
Yani, as Chief of Staff of the KOTI, to grant the KOGA Commander a wider 
authority in delivering military operation. Sukarno also approved the Strategic 
Directives that prepared by the KOGA.748 Sukarno then asked the KOTI to 
provide military weapons based on the KOGA’s requirement list.749 However, 
Yani did not follow up the President’s letter. Also, he did not provide military 
                                            
748 President Sukarno’s disposition letter to the Chief of Staff of the KOTI on 2 October 
1964, signed by President Sukarno. 
749 This list used to be given to Nasution, who during that time was in Moscow, Soviet 
Union. Sukarno assigned Nasution for overseas trips in order to buy military weapons. 
Keputusan Presiden [Presidential Decree] No 252/ 1964 dated 24 September 1964, signed by 
Subandrio as Acting President on behalf of President Sukarno. ANRI, Daftar Arsip Statis 
Sekretariat Negara RI: Seri Produk Hukum Tahun 1949-2005 (Keputusan Presiden – 




weapons based on the KOGA’s needs.750 Yani only granted the KOGA’s 
commander proposal to establish the task forces.751    
Indeed, until end of December 1964, process of relocating the troops into the 
Indonesia-Malaysia border areas did not go as plan.752 On 31 December, the 
KOTI decided to expand the KOGA from the functional command into the 
theatre command. Of course, this idea would also affect the KOGA structure 
significantly.753 The KOGA then suggested the new structure should ensure the 
presence of unified command and eliminate the duality of command.754  
On 28 February 1965, Sukarno transformed the KOGA into the Vigilance 
Command (Komando Mandala Siaga/KOLAGA).755 This policy indicated that 
Sukarno intended to boost the operation. He then amended the main task of 
military operation command. Sukarno set the core mission of KOLAGA was to 
plan, prepare, execute, develop and supervise all military operations relating to 
the Konfrontasi.756 To uphold the new mission, Sukarno restructured the military 
operation command. As depicted in Figure 4-4, located on the next page, the 
KOLAGA Commander directed nine elements, namely: Vigilance Air Defence 
Command, Vigilance Strategic Command, Vigilance Armada Command, First 
Theatre Command, Second Theatre Command, Vigilance Logistics Command, 
First Battle Command in Sumatra Island, Second Battle Command in 
                                            
750 Komando Mandala Siaga, Peran Komando Mandala, 16 
751 Keputusan Presiden [Presidential Decree] No 77/KOTI/1964 dated 31 December 
1964, signed by Yani on behalf of President Sukarno 
752 Details of implementation of Dwikora Operation will elaborate later in this chapter. 
753 Penelaahan Staf mengenai Struktur Organisasi, serta Komando dan Perhubungan 
Komando Siaga [Staff Assessment on Organisational Structure, Command and Control of the 
Alert Command], dated 4 January 1965, signed by Air Marshall Omar Dani. 
754 The KOGA offered three options for the structure of KOLAGA. Details regarding 
those options see Penelaahan Staf mengenai Struktur Organisasi, serta Komando dan 
Perhubungan Komando Siaga [Staff Assessment on Organisational Structure, Command and 
Control of the Alert Command], dated 4 January 1965, signed by Air Marshall Omar Dani. 
755 Keputusan Presiden [Presidential Decree] No 9/KOTI/1965 dated 28 February 1965 




Kalimantan Island and Special Task Command.757 The new structure 
distinguished the function of each element. Vigilance Air Defence Command, 
First Theatre Command and Second Theatre Command were designed to 
deliver defensive combat purpose. Meanwhile, Vigilance Strategic Command, 
Vigilance Armada Command, First Battle Command, Second Battle Command 
and Special Task Command would uphold the offensive mission. And three 
elements played supporting roles: First Theatre Command, Second Theatre 













Figure 4-4 Structure of the Vigilance Command 
Source: Keputusan Presiden [Presidential Decree] No 10/KOTI/1965 dated 1 
March 1965 
 
Following the new structure, on 13 March, Sukarno still assigned Omar Dani to 
lead the KOLAGA.758 But, the KOTI reshuffled several strategic posts. Major 
                                            
757 Keputusan Presiden [Presidential Decree] No 10/KOTI/1965 dated 1 March 1965; 
Details of main tasks of each element see Bimbingan Perencanaan Komando Mandala Siaga 
[Planning Directives of the Vigilance Command], dated 3 March 1965, signed by Omar Dani. 




General Suharto of the KOSTRAD was appointed to be First Deputy Vigilance 
Commander for Operations. Suharto replaced his colleague from the 
KOSTRAD, Brig Gen Wiranatakusumah.759 Meanwhile Second Deputy 
Vigilance Commander for Supporting was held by Rear Admiral Mulyadi of the 
navy. Prior to reshuffle, Mulyadi was First Deputy Vigilance Commander for 
Operations. Posts of First Theatre Command, Second Theatre Command, 
Vigilance Logistics Command, First Battle Command in Sumatra Island, Second 
Battle Command in Kalimantan Island and Special Task Command respectively 
were held by Brig Gen AJ Mokoginta of the army, Brig Gen M Panggabean of 
the army, Brig Gen Kemal Idris of the KOSTRAD, Brig Gen Suparjo of the 
KOSTRAD, and Colonel Kusnaniwoto of the marines.760 
In addition, Sukarno also ordered the Operation A tactically to be attached to 
the KOLAGA.761 Sukarno assigned the First Joint Staff of the KOTI was only 
responsible for strategic intelligences activities, while all military activities should 
be under the KOLAGA responsibility.762 Again, Subandrio refused to hand over 
the Operation A to the KOLAGA. Beside this action would disrupt the rest of 
covert operation, transfer of responsibility of the Operation A could be time 
consuming.763 
Indeed, Subandrio’s resistence over intelligence sharing to the KOGA/KOLAGA 
can be recognised as a residual effect for retaining dual positions. Subandrio’s 
action can be perceived as a violation of his responsibility as leader of the BPI. 
                                            
759 In KOSTRAD, Wiranatakusumah was the KOSTRAD Chief of Staff, while Suharto 
was the KOSTRAD Commander in Chief. Dinas Sejarah TNI Angkatan Darat [History Section of 
the Indonesian Army], Kostrad, Sejarah dan Pengabdiannya [Kostrad, History and its 
Dedication], (Bandung: Dinas Sejarah TNI Angkatan Darat, 2014), 30-31 
760 Pusat Sejarah Markas Besar TNI, Operasi Dwikora, 52-54; Kemal Idris had been a 
long-time opponent of Sukarno. According to Crouch, Supardjo was probably a concession to 
Dani and Sukarno, as he was known as Sukarnoist. Crouch, Militer dan Politik, 78; Roosa, 
Pretext for Mass Murder, 133 
761 Presidential Instruction [Instruksi Presiden/Inpres] No 9/KOTI/1965 dated 24 April 
1965, signed by Yani on behalf of President Sukarno 
762 Presidential Instruction No 9/KOTI/1965 dated 24 April 1965, signed by Yani on 
behalf of President Sukarno 




As head of the BPI, Subandrio was responsible to submit intelligence 
information on the armed forces to the respective branch of the forces.764 On 
the other hand, there is another possible justification for Subandrio’s stance. He 
might argue that he controlled the Operation as the First Joint Chief for 
Intelligence of the KOTI. And his responsible was only assisting KOTI Chief of 
staff. Also, referring to the KOTI structure in Figure 3-3 (p.136), there was no 
direct link between Subandrio and Dani. Even though, this argument seems to 
be weak, as Sukarno has instructed the Operation A should be attached to the 
KOLAGA.765      
Furthermore, the appointment of Suharto sparked protest from Omar Dani. 
Indeed, they had experience working together as a team in the past. In 1962, 
Dani was Suharto’s Deputy of the Trikora Vigilance Command, while Suharto 
held position as the Trikora Vigilance Commander.766 However, relating to the 
Dwikora Operation, Dani claimed he was already comfortable working with 
Wiranatakusumah.767 Apparently, Yani still committed to the KOTI decision. 
Yani admitted that Suharto wanted the role as the First Deputy Commander. As 
Yani said “Ya pancen Harto! Iki pancen urusan intern AD. Ini memang 
problemku [Yes, indeed this position was Suharto’s request! This was the 
matter of internal army. This was my problem].”768  
As stated in Chapter 3 Section 3.4, Suharto was upset due to the appointment 
of Dani as the KOGA Commander, as he was more experienced and senior to 
Dani.769 Then, he sent a resignation letter to Nasution. But, Suharto’s 
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765 Presidential Instruction [Instruksi Presiden/Inpres] No 9/KOTI/1965 dated 24 April 
1965, signed by Yani on behalf of President Sukarno 
766 Keputusan Presiden [Presidential Decree] No 2/1962 dated 11 January 1962 
767 Benedicta A Surodjo and JMV Soeparno, Tuhan, Pergunakanlah Hati, Pikiran dan 
Tanganku: Pledoi Omar Dani, (Jakarta: ISAI, 1999), 46-47. 
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subordinate, Sujono Humardani,770 intercepted the letter before reaching 
Nasution. Regarding Suharto’s retirement plan, Wiranatakusumah claimed he 
knew Suharto was planning to leave the Army. Wiranatakusumah explained 
Suharto strongly wanted to be part of the KOLAGA. If he could not get the job, 
Suharto preferred to quit from military service and become a farmer. In a 
meeting with Dani in November 1964, Wiranatakusumah demanded Dani to 
accept the proposal of Suharto’s appointment.771 And less than a year, Suharto 
was assigned as First Deputy Commander of the KOLAGA.  
The friction between Dani and Suharto continued shortly after they started 
working together as a team. Suharto advocated an idea to restructure the 
KOLAGA.772 He preferred to decentralise the KOLAGA’s authority. Suharto 
suggested the structure of combat elements consisted of components of all 
services.773 But, Dani rejected the idea as he favoured the organisation of 
KOLAGA was small and only served as the functional command.  
The rivalry between Dani and Suharto quickly reached its peak. Following the 
disagreement, Suharto again submitted a letter to the President that he wanted 
to step down from current position as First Deputy Commander of the 
KOLAGA.774 Suharto argued that Dani was unsuitable for the commander 
job.775 Sukarno then responded to Suharto’s letter by instructing Nasution to 
solve the conflict in the KOLAGA. After conducting joint consultations, the 
Generals agreed to build division of labour in top management, namely: (a) the 
KOLAGA Commander was responsible for all activities; (b) First Deputy 
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771 A Taram, RH Sastranegara and ID Yahya, Letjen TNI (Purn.) Achmad 
Wiranatakusumah: Komandan Siluman Merah, (Jakarta: Penerbit Buku Kompas, 2019),11 
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Commander authorised to control the operations and all related activities; (c) 
Second Deputy Commander authorised to manage all-related administrative 
activities; (d) Chief of Staff was assigned to control air operations; € Deputy 
Chief of Staff authorised to intensify operations planning; and (f) top 
management meeting would held periodically.776  
This agreement, of course, indicated that Suharto had defeated Dani. Division 
of labour reduced Dani’s authority significantly. Meanwhile Suharto gained 
power to fully control the Dwikora Operation. The agreement was also a 
marking that the army ruled the KOLAGA. As a result, Dani’s complaint over the 
lack of forces in the field was never responded to by his subordinate in the 
KOLAGA. The Army seemed to be delaying the realisation of the Dwikora 
Operation by abandoning the Instruksi Operasi No INSOP-05/1964. Until the 
end of 1964, the KOGA was still struggling to deploy the troops into border 
areas. This condition continued in 1965, as Mokoginta and Panggabean were 
overtly reluctant to supply the KOLAGA with the army troops.777 And Dani could 
do nothing to push the army deployed its troops.         
4.2.2 Suharto’s Opsus 
As explained previously in this chapter, Yani did not support the policy of 
Konfrontasi wholeheartedly. In a meeting with Suharto at the KOSTRAD 
Headquarter in 1964, Yani raised concerns about insufficient troops to guard 
Java, as many troops were sent to the Indonesian-Malaysian borders, both in 
Sumatra and Kalimantan.778 He claimed that he was in a dilemma. In one hand, 
if he sent many troops for the Konfontasi, so he would have enough troops to 
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guard Java against the PKI if it launched revolt.779 On the other hand, if the 
army were less active, so the PKI might spread the accusation that the army 
was disloyal to Sukarno.780 Ali Murtopo, the KOSTRAD Intelligence Assistant 
who attended the meeting, proposed an idea to settle the dispute.781 Then Yani 
allowed Suharto to establish the Opsus within the KOSTRAD to normalise the 
tension between Indonesia and Malaysia.782 Suharto team consisted of LB 
Murdani, Aloysius Sugiyanto, Jerry Sumendap, Sugeng Djarot and AR 
Ramly.783 Later, in February 1965, Suharto recalled Yoga Sugomo, military 
attaché in Yugoslavia.784 Suharto then promoted Yoga as First Assistance of 
the KOSTRAD and attached him to the team. 
However, Wiranatakusumah illustrated different story toward the establishment 
of Opsus. While being First Deputy Commander of the KOLAGA, he claimed 
always reported all ideas for operations (Gagasan Operasi) to Suharto. Suharto 
then suggested delivering a clandestine operation. Later, Wiranatakusumah 
established the Opsus, as Suharto’s demand.785  
Essentially, in January 1964 Malaysia started initiating a peace talk. Malaysia 
Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Tan Sri Muhammad Ghazali bin Shafie 
persuaded Yani in Hongkong to consider a secret peace talk. He demanded 
Yani initiating a way to end the dispute, as the army was half-hearted in 
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supporting the Konfrontasi, compared to the navy and the air force.786 Yani 
responded to Ghazali’s demand by saying “Yes, but I have to report the 
demand to Bung Karno.”787 However, Yani never reported his meeting with 
Ghazali to Sukarno.788 Indeed, Yani was willing to stop the hostilities with 
neigbouring nations.789 But, as he did not know Ghazali personally, Yani 
probably prevented any accusation that he had made contact with Malaysian 
without Sukarno’s permission.  
In August-September 1964, Suharto team started establishing contact with 
Malaysia. During this period, the team started to contact several Indonesian 
who were associated with the failed revolt of PRRI such as Des Alwi and 
prominent economist, Sumitro Djojohadikusumo. Those persons were believed 
to have good links with key Malaysian figures such as Tunku Abdul Razak and 
Tan Sri Muhammad Ghazali.790 The purposes of the Opsus in this period were 
to show good intention to not make a conflict worse and to start peace 
dialogue.791 In November, Murtopo also conducted a secret meeting with 
Malaysian officials to ensure the conflict did not escalate.792  
After officially appointed as First Deputy Commander of the KOLAGA, Suharto 
was more confident to pursue negotiation process. He argued that the military 
approach should be stopped, as several military intrusions overtly failed to 
uphold the mission.793 In mid-July 1965, Murtopo and Ghazali officially met in 
Bangkok to discuss the possibility of ending the conflict. Regarding the Opsus, 
Yani never reported this covert operation to Sukarno. Yani probably was 
comfortable working with Suharto, as they shared similar view regarding Dani’s 
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leadership and the need to manage the conflict. Yani also probably might feel 
Suharto and his team would not betray him and report the covert mission to 
Sukarno.  
Suharto group did not exclusively do the secret peace attempt. Efforts to settle 
the dispute were done by several persons. Yani and Sukarno also had tried to 
find a solution to end the Konfrontasi without loss of face. Different with 
Suharto, Yani preferred to approach Britain rather than Malaysia regarding the 
peace attempt because Britain was in charge in the Konfrontasi. Thus he 
believed the peace process would run smoothly if Britain were involved.794 In 
1964, Yani assigned Army’s Chief of Intelligence, Brig Gen S Parman as peace 
feeler to establish contact with UK Defence Ministry in London.795 On 9 October 
1964, Parman met British Military Attaché in Paris, Col Berger. In the meeting, 
Parman suggested British to withdraw the troops and close her military bases in 
Singapore. Parman guaranteed if the Britain approved the plan so the army 
would persuade Sukarno to end the Konfrontasi.796 As the UK rejected the 
proposal, Parman’s mission was unsuccessful.797  
In addition, Ibnu Sutowo, Minister of State and President Director of the state oil 
company Permina also established contact with Malaysia in 1964.798 It was 
unclear who assigned Sutowo for peace mission.799 He met a Malaysian 
businessman in Singapore. In the meeting, he explored the possibility of conflict 
termination. He explained Indonesian would terminate the Konfrontasi if 
Malaysia agreed to organise an election in Sabah and Sarawak within five 
years. Again, this mission was failed. 
                                            
794 Pour, Benny, 147 
795 Parman was former military attaché in London.  
796 Mahmud, 159-160. 
797 Parman was one of the Generals that had killed on 30 September 1965. 
798 Mahmud, 158-159. 
799 According to Challis, Sutowo was one of Suharto’s oldest, closest friends and 




Sukarno attempted to end the Konfrontasi by assigning Ambasador for Burma, 
Soegih Arto, to contact British Foreign Office in London, in 1965.800 Arto used 
his friend Felice Leon Soh as intermediary.801 But, Arto’s effort in London was 
ineffective because Britain disagreed with the condition for the peace talk. 
Sukarno demanded the peace talk initiative should come from the British.802 
According to Crouch, Sukarno also appointed Brig Gen Sukendro to explore the 
possibility of peace talk in Malaysia.803 In early May 1965, Sukendro claimed 
that he had secured the approval of Sukarno to make a contact with Malaysia. 
However, the idea had been destroyed in a day by Aidit, Subandrio and Chairul 
Saleh.804 
There were civilians also acted as peace feelers prior to the G30S affair, 
namely: Third Deputy Prime Miniser Chaerul Saleh and Minister of Trade Adam 
Malik.805 In October 1964, Saleh started making secret approaches to the 
British. This was recognised as a progress because Saleh was seen as a 
potential successor to Sukarno and rival to Subandrio.806 He persuaded the 
British willing to have a direct peace talk with Indonesia. This effort should be 
parrarel to secret Indonesia-Malaysia talks. However, this effort was abortive 
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following the landing of 55 fully armed Indonesians in Johor in end of 
October.807      
Malik, however, used a special envoy Mohammad Mustaza to meet Malaysian 
counterpart. It was unclear whether Malik had granted Sukarno’s permission. 
Later Mustaza met Malaysian Ambassador in Tokyo Dato Syed Sheh and 
asked him to arrange meeting with Rahman in Kuala Lumpur. Mustaza claimed 
he had to deliver Malik’s letter to Rahman. However, Rahman refused to meet 
Mustaza as he was involved in anti-Malaysia movement in Indonesia.808 The 
UK also recognised the ‘peace feelers’ were purely tactical manoeuvre.809 Only 
Suharto’s effort was successful to end the conflict, while Yani and Sukarno’s 
secret missions were abortive.810 And following the G30S affair, Malik joined 
Suharto’s team to settle the dispute.  
It is noted that the PKI had actively opposed the negotiation attempts. The party 
seemed applying all measures to thwart any peace attempts. Since 1964, the 
Party had pressured the government for no longer in a position to reverse the 
hostility policy.811 The refusal of all negotiation had became the PKI’s demands. 
And this aggressive attitude successfully influenced Sukarno and Subandrio 
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4.2.3 Internal Navy ‘Clash’ 
As alluded previously, it is notable that the major problem of the military in 
upholding the Konfrontasi mission was the friction within the armed forces. 
Frictions occurred in all services with different degrees. The army, for instance, 
interpersonal friction between Nasution and Yani was deep and often affecting 
performance of the organisation. Moreover, internal clash also occurred in the 
Navy during period of the Konfrontasi.  
In 8 February 1965, three young officers of the Progressive Revolutionary 
Officers’ Movement (Gerakan Perwira Progresif Revolusioner/GPPR) in the 
Navy met President Sukarno at the Palace.813 They reported that the readiness 
of the navy was poor in delivering the Konfrontasi against Malaysia.814 The 
navy’s combat readiness was shortfall after the Trikora Operation. The 
maintenance of warships was very poor.815 Many navy weapons, including the 
submarines, were under repair and maintenance at the Surabaya naval 
dockyard.816 However, the top management of the navy did not report the real 
condition. In this regard, the GPPR requested Sukarno to reshuffle the navy’s 
senior management.817 Nevertheless, Sukarno refused the idea to reshuffle the 
navy. Sukarno felt it was not the right time to reshuffle the navy top positions.818 
Thus, he instructed Admiral Martadinata to solve the ‘clash’.819  
The conflict between young officers and admirals was deepening and widening 
when the IBAL was involved. The IBAL members captured many officers in 
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Jakarta and Surabaya. Those officers then were detained in several locations. 
The admirals were accused behind the incident.820 Again, Sukarno assigned 
Nasution to facilitate and solve the conflict. As a result, 150 officers were 
discharge honourably.821  
There was a speculation that the PKI was behind the GPPR. The Operational 
Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (Komando Operasi 
Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban/Koopslihkamtib) overtly stated that the 
GPPR was sponsored by the PKI. In its official publication, the Koopslihkamtib 
argued that the navy political stance was similar with the army, against the PKI. 
822 At that time, the navy command was closer to the Sukarnoist and leftist 
groups of the Indonesian politics than the army.823 In June, Martadinata became 
the first service head to pay a formal visit to Aidit at the PKI headquarters. 
Martadinata also endorsed the proposal of the establishment of fifth force, 
peasants and workers, and he described it as “a positive question in 
revolutionary development.824 
Indeed, the navy treated Officers, NCO and Enlisted differently.825 The 
Koopslihkamtib accused the PKI exploited the ‘differences’ and promoted 
disharmony relationship between officers and NCO/Enlisted. In this sense, PKI 
tried to infiltrate the IBAL. The PKI were working hard at infiltrating of lower 
ranks of the navy.826 As the PKI and Subandrio did not favour with Martadinata 
leadership, they sponsored a movement within the navy to shake up the senior 
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management.827 Later, following the G30S affair, the IBAL also supported the 
movement.828   
However, this speculation appears to be inaccurate. Indeed, following the affair, 
hundreds of officers were discharged honourably. However, the government still 
concerned with the officers fate. On 22 June, Sukarno issued a policy to rehire 
terminated officers and asked ministries to hire them.829 The assumption that 
the officers were the PKI supporter is also unjustifiable. If the officers were part 
of the PKI, they would not have any promotion or better career under Suharto 
administration, which was knownly as anti-communist government.830  
4.2.4 Complications of Rivalry 
The previous section has discussed the rivalry among key actors, which caused 
complication in implementing the Dwikora Operation. Following paraghraps 
elaborate the substantial effects of the problem on the execution of military 
operation. The temporary results of the Dwikora Operation during first-year 
implementation included the failure of hitting target and ill-fated military 
missions. 
Missed the Target 
As explained in Chapter 3, Section 3.5, several formal peace processes failed 
to resolve the dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia. Tensions were rising in 
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the region quickly. As the dispute intensified, both countries were reinforcing 
their military. In mid-1964, Sukarno formed the KOGA as a tool to deliver the 
policy of Konfrontasi against Malaysia. The areas of operations for the KOGA 
covered Sumatra, Java and Kalimantan. In the beginning of his leadership, Dani 
proposed the structure of the KOGA to be small and only to function as a 
retaliation force.831 However, Sukarno rejected the idea and preferred the 
structure was as large as the Trikora Vigilance Command.832 Sukarno believed 
by having naval and air superiority, he could push Malaysia government toward 
the negotiating table. 
As illustrated in the previous section, it is noteworthy that the KOGA faced 
several challenges since it established. And the KOTI did not fully assist the 
KOGA to overcome those challenges. The KOTI restricted the KOGA to use 
navy and air force while making Intelligence Assessment to prevent open 
clash.833 But, in September 1964, the KOTI asked the KOGA to handle the 
British manoeuvres at the Sunda Strait, while at that time the KOGA did not 
develop the combat elements properly.834Worse, the KOGA did not have any 
assigned forces yet.835  
On 27 August 1964, the British aircraft carrier HMS Victorious had sailed from 
Singapore to Australia through the Sunda Strait between Java and Sumatra. 
London refused to issue a formal notice or request for Indonesian permission 
prior to the sailing. British argued the Strait was not Indonesian territorial 
waters. Of course, the Indonesian military alerted the passage as present 
danger, as the Strait was around 100 kilometres from Jakarta and it was the first 
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time British used her aircraft carrier for the Konfrontasi.836Indonesian 
government assumed the Britain performed show of force.837  
Following the incident, Sukarno called the ABRI to increase their alertness.838 
Deputy Foreign Minister Suwito then complained to the British and refused 
passage of Victorious through the Sunda Straits on her return to Singapore.839 
HMS Victorious was scheduled to return to Singapore on 12 September.840 As 
the tension has increased, British delayed the return passage of Victorious until 
16 September.841 In dealing with the Sunda Strait Crisis, the KOGA then 
prepared an operation, known as Operasi Ini Dadaku [Operation ‘This is my 
Chest’] on 9 September. This operation was aimed to: (a) detect the British 
warships routes, (b) perform show of force at the Sunda Strait, (c) to shadow 
the British warships, and (d) conduct instant retaliation, if needed.842 Regarding 
instant retaliation, the KOGA had identified several strategic targets in the 
Malayan Peninsula, Singapore and North Kalimantan such as Kuala Lumpur, 
Singapore Port, Kuching and Tawao Airfield.843 The aim of this attack was to 
pack the political punch. In this regard, the Indonesian informed the British that 
the Sunda Strait would be closed from 10 September to 10 October for naval 
training. The British Chiefs of Staff noted that the ABRI was in a high state of 
alert. Intelligence report concluded that 
In their present truculent state of mind the Indonesians had decided 
to refuse and resist passafe of the Sunda Strait to HMS Victorious, 
and that they were prepared for any naval clash and retaliatory 
British/Malaysian air attacks, which, in Indonesian eyes, would have 
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no conclusive military affect but would considerably improve 
Indonesia’s political standing as a victim of ‘Western 180nfiltrati’.844 
 
The Sunda Strait Crisis did not spark the open clash. The British decided the 
HMS Victorious used the Lombok Strait on her return passage to Singapore.845 
As the Indonesian would not resist if the HMS Victorious would passage 
through the Lombok Strait between Bali and Lombok.846 Indeed, British 
recognised the return route might be considered as a provocation. But the 
return of HMS Victorious to Singapore was a requirement in the improving of 
defensive posture to counter any Indonesian attacks in Malaya or Singapore, as 
the Indonesian changed the pattern of the operation.847  
On 31 October, the KOTI issued an operation manual to assist the KOGA in 
delivering military operation. On this manual, the KOTI created a list of force 
requirement for the Dwikora Operation that covered number of troops, 
weaponry and military equipment. 848 The KOTI divided three stages of military 
operation, namely preparation, implementation and consolidation. This manual 
also provided detail explanation regarding the roles and responsibility of each 
combat element in the KOGA structure. The KOTI planned the shifting of troops 
to the border areas including logistics support could be done in the end of 
March 1965.849 Thus, the stage of implementation of Dwikora Operation could 
be started in April 1965. Later, the KOTI issued Instruksi Operasi [Operation 
Instruction] No INSOP-05/1964 to ensure the process of shifting of troops.850 
                                            
844 TNA, DEFE 24/105, Part I to COS 55th Meeting/64, 10 September 1964 
845 TNA, DEFE 24/105, Telegram No 1615, Foreign Office to Jakarta, 11 September 
1964 
846 FRUS, 1964-1968, 160 
847 TNA, DO 169/405, Part I to COS 54th Meeting/64, 7 September 1964 
848 Petunjuk Operasi ‘Jaladara’ [Operation Manual of ‘Jaladara’] No POPS-02/64 dated 
31 October 1964 
849 Dokumen Sejarah Dwikora SP-002/D/2014 





Following the preparation stage, the KOLAGA planned to execute the military 
campaign to crush Malaysia. The operation, under the code name Operation 
Sajjita Yudha (Operasi Sajjita Yudha), was scheduled in April 1965 and 
controlled by the KOLAGA Commander. The operation upheld five main tasks, 
namely: (a) to develop deterrence forces, (b) to win the Konfrontasi without 
open war, (c) to deliver reprisal, if needed, (d) to defend the territory from 
attacks, and (e) to improve resilience of revolution.851 In addition, the operation 
would deliver in several forms: subversive operation, territorial operation, instant 
retaliation and reprisal. In subversive operation, military would assist local 
resistance movement. Meanwhile, in territorial operation, military would assist 
local people to establish their own government. Instant retaliation and reprisal 
would be delivered simultaneously if the KOLAGA Commander has instructed 
to execute those operations.  
Until March 1965, the KOGA failed to hit almost all targets. In intelligence 
section, the KOGA was unable to gather the intelligence data properly. It only 
relied on monitoring mass media. Beside lack of intelligence personnel, the 
KOGA complaint that it did not get any data from the Operation A. Even the 
KOTI did not share any intelligence information to the KOGA.852 In operation 
section, there was no activity regarding implementation of the operation. There 
were only military planning and preparation activities. Prepositioning of troops in 
Sumatra, Kalimantan and Riau, respectively were only 10 per cent, 80 per cent 
and 15 per cent of the target. Dani argued this failure was a result of vague 
policies between the KOTI and the SAB.853   
Undeniably, the lukewarmness of army command in pursuing the Konfrontasi 
policy contributed to the KOGA’s failure. Excessive delay in naming the Combat 
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Commanders and assigning combat troops to the KOGA were evidences to 
support that observation. In addition, the KOTI, which was dominated by the 
army, also overtly hampered the process of the deployment of the army 
forces.854 Dani explained, up to August 1964, all services except the army had 
deployed the troops.855 In October, Yani demanded all services should deploy 
three brigades near the Indonesia-Malaysia border in North Kalimantan by end 
of December. But, until November 1964, none of the army soldiers had 
deployed in that area.856 When visited Medan in January 1965, Dani was 
reported by the First Theatre Commander, Mokoginta that the shelter for the 
troops from Java was never utilised as the troops had not yet came up to 
Medan.857  
In personnel issue, the KOGA admitted lack of supporting staffs. Besides many 
officers had held dual position, some of officers also were not well performing at 
their posts.858 For instance, the First Battle Commander in Sumatra, Kemal 
Idris, who was knowingly as Suharto’s aide. It is evidence that Kemal remained 
loyal to Suharto. In supporting the Suharto’s Opsus plan, Kemal delayed the 
deployment of troops to Sumatra.859 Unlike Kemal, Suparjo, Second Battle 
Commander in Kalimantan, still showed his commitment to uphold the 
Konfrontasi mission. Suparjo was known as a pro-Sukarno officer, also had 
good relationship with the PKI. He had maintained the close relationship years 
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before the Konfrontasi.860 Suparjo took combat strategy and organisational 
discipline seriously.861 Although, three day before the G30S launched on 30 
September, he left his troops in Kalimantan and joined the movement.862 
In logistics matters, the fund to support the operations was insufficient. The 
budget was limited with complicated procedures.863 West Kalimantan Regional 
Commander, Brig Gen Ryacudu admitted he paid his troops needs by his own 
money due to lack of funding from Jakarta.864 Indeed, on 20 March, the KOTI 
had provided a building for the KOLAGA Headquarter at the Halim 
Perdanakusuma Air Force base. However, the Headquarters were not equipped 
with proper communication installation. Consequently, flow of information at the 
KOLAGA was not well developed.865 
Different with the army, the KKO reinforced its presence in Sumatra and 
Kalimantan following the tension escalated. The KKO deployed two Landed 
Brigades [Brigade Pendara/Brigrat] to border areas.866 In Kalimantan, the First 
Brigrat KKO had to protect strategic areas from surprise attacks. Meanwhile, in 
Sumatra, the Second Brigrat had to deliver instant retaliation and occupy 
strategic targets and also defend the area. In this regard, the KKO deployed 
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one Battalion Landing Team and one Light Battalion to Tarakan, East 
Kalimantan, and also one Battalion Landing Team to Riau, Sumatra Island.867   
It was noted that the Sukarno administration tried to utilitise all resources in 
enhancing the implementation of the Konfrontasi against Malaysia. On 14 
September 1964, Sukarno decided to establish Regional Authorities for the 
Implementation of the Dwikora (Penguasa Pelaksana Dwikora 
Daerah/Pepelrada).868 However, this decision did not apply to all provinces 
throughout Indonesia. Sukarno only appointed the Pepelrada for all provinces in 
Sumatra, Java and Kalimantan Islands.869 The main task of Pepelrada was to 
lead the implementation of the Dwikora in the area based on the President’s 
policy. In upholding the task, Pepelrada was directly responsible to the 
President.  
Although the status of emergency was revoked, Sukarno still granted several 
extraordinary authorities to the Pepelrada. First, authority reserved the right to 
demand any items could be utilised for the Dwikora. Second, authority 
reserved the right to search and seize any items that might hamper the 
implementation of Dwikora. Third, authority reserved the right to restrict the 
freedom of movement of persons. Fourth, authority could perform search of 
suspicious person. Fifth, authority reserved the right to ban people lived in 
particular area. Sixth, authority reserved the right to bar people from leaving 
particular area. Seventh, authority reserved the right to arresting person with 
warrant for a maximum of 30 days.870 
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As tension has steadily increased, Sukarno expanded the authority of the First 
and Second Theatre Commander. On 19 May, Sukarno appointed them as 
Vigilance Authorities for the Implementation of the Dwikora (Penguasa 
Pelaksana Dwikora Mandala).871 By holding this position, they authorised to 
control any demonstration, publication, communication, lockouts, and meeting 
hall.872 They also allowed controlling air, land and sea traffic and militarising 
state owned or private companies. 
Failures and Successes of Operations  
As explained previously in this chapter, the KOTI rebuffed to attach the 
Operation A into the KOGA. The KOTI insisted to control the implementation of 
the Operation A. However, due to poor preparation, at least two incidents were 
notably recognised as mission failures, Pontian and Labis Landing.  
Pontian Operation (Operasi Pontian) aimed at delivering seaborn infiltration in 
Johor Bahru, Malaysia. The KKO from the Base II/KOTI in Sumatra scheduled 
the assault to coincide with Indonesian Independence Day — 17 August 1964. 
This operation employed 97 personnel including volunteers. The KKO set three 
target locations for this operation, namely Ayer Baloi, Pontian Besar and 
Kukup.873 However, the operation did not go as planned. The plot was 
presumably leaked to the enemy. Before the operation was launched, Malaysia 
had intensified her sea patrol, surveillance and smuggling prevention. Since 14 
August, Malaysia prohibited fishermen to sail in international water surrounding 
the Malayan Peninsula. Malaysia also strengthened patrol in the villages to 
prevent unwanted activity.874  
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Although Malaysia strengthened her security patrol, the KKO was successfully 
landing its troops in Kukup on 17 August.875 This was marked as the first 
Indonesian military attack in Malaysian mainland.876 However, both Nasution 
and the navy denied the allegation of the KKO’s landings at Pontian.877 
Several clashes between the KKO and its opponents occurred shortly following 
the landings. Helicopter and dog patrol were involved as part of the search for 
the KKO. Later, the raid was a failure as Malaysia ambushed the KKO troops in 
Pulai, a meeting point in Pontian.878 In this raid, the KKO stated that had lost of 
more than seven personnel and several troops were captured by the enemy.879 
Meanwhile, the Malaysian authorities announced they had killed seven and 
captured 16 men.880 As a result, on 17 August, Malaysia protested to the UN 
Security Council against this landing.881  
Another failed mission was Labis Landing on 1-2 September. This was an 
airborne operation that involved one company of the Air Force’s Quick Reaction 
Force Command (Komando Pasukat Gerak Cepat/PGT) paratroopers and 
volunteers. Prior to this operation, Brig Gen Magenda of the KOTI trained the 
infiltrators.882 Unlike previous operation, the PGT was acknowledged as solely 
performer from the military element for the Labis Landing.883 In this regard, the 
PGT was requested to send one company to be trained. During the training, 
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several Malaysian were introduced as trusted contacts in Malaysia after 
landing.884  
On 2 September, the operation was launched by using three US made C-130B 
Hercules transport. At least 96 troops were successfully landed near Labis, 
about 85 miles south of Kuala Lumpur.885 However, one airplane, which was 
carrying 47 personnel of the PGT, crashed into the Malacca Strait. Wreckage of 
the plane was found in the sea. No survivors were found at the crash site. An 
experienced pilot, Major Jalaluddin, operated the plane. Before the crash, the 
plane had flown low to evade British military radar. Dani accused the incident 
was suspicious after he met one of the PGT troops that involve in the operation. 
The soldiers said that Malaysian could capture the infiltrators in less than 48 
hours after landing. In addition, the soldiers blamed ‘trusted contacts’ of 
betraying the PGT after revealing the Labis Operation to the Malaysian 
authorities.886  
The cause of the C-130 crash remained unclear. Dani questioned the airplane 
crash, whether it was caused by human error or shot down.887 Former chief 
navigator at one of the Air Force Bases during the Konfrontasi, who prefers to 
remain anonymous, said that the incident was caused by pilot error.888 He said 
the case was discussed shortly after the incident. He claimed Jalaluddin was 
widely known as a pilot who did not trust the flight instruments. Thus, former 
chief navigator suspected Jalaludin could not maintain a constant distance to 
the surface of the earth during his low-altitude flight. But, Wasiman Siswanto, 
former soldier who was involved in the Operation A rejected this explanation. 
He insisted that the plane was shot down by British military.889 There is 
insufficient evidence to support the accusation that the UK was behind the 
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crash incident. Reflecting the incident, only Talking Points with the US 
President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, 
provided a clue: “after our attack on the Indonesian Air Force, the Indonesians 
might be expected to seek help from China and the Soviet Union.”890 
Although Pontian and Labis Landings were unsuccessful, British noted those 
raids as the significant changing pattern of the ABRI Operation against 
Malaysia.891 The US observed that the infiltrations were intended to heighten 
internal security, and increase the pressure on Rahman to negotiate with 
Sukarno. Other than that, in the long run, those were aimed at dissolving the 
UK military bases. If the British failed to respond the incidents properly, so it wil 
encourage the Indonesians to expand the infiltration.892    
In spite of the fact that several the KOGA’s mission were abortive, there was 
one mission that had been successfully delivered by the Operation A: 
conducting demolition and sabotage of military and economic targets in the 
Malayan Peninsula, especially Singapore. Singapore was chosen as the main 
target because she was seen as a decisive factor in lifeline imperialism 
structure, especially in political, economy and military sector.893 At that time, 
Singapore was also playing essential role in controlling all military activities.894 
And Indonesia tried to divert her trade from Singapore and break the economic 
dependency.895  
Malaysians, however, have alleged the presence of infiltrator bases surrounding 
the country. As Figure 3-5 (p.143) shown, the KKO formed the Base II in Riau 
which was to target the Malayan Peninsula and Singapore. Since November 
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1963, several Indonesian were captured by the authority. And on 26 March 
1964, Malaysia’s Minister of Internal Security Dato Ismail alleged the ABRI were 
directing sabotage and subversive activities in his territory.896   
The first sabotage was a bomb that went off at the Ambassador Hotel, 
Singapore, on 24 September 1963. Although, no people were injured or killed, 
this incident was a major surprise for Singapore.897 Hall, Ross and De Heer 
noted that, at least 88 significant incidents related to bomb explosion and 
sabogate in Singapore during 1963-1966.898 The most notable attack in 
Singapore was a bomb blast at the MacDonald House on 10 March 1965. The 
impact killed three and injured 33 people.899 This sabotage was conducted by 
two KKO soldiers, Janatin alias Usman, Tohir alias Harun and one volunteer, 
Gani.900 Prior to this mission, Usman, Harun and Gani were part of Sub Base X 
that had overtly emphasised Singapore as the main target. They were under 
leadership of Captain Paulus Subekti of the Sub Base X.901  
The main factor to be noted behind the attack is the ‘killing’ of Lieut Wasiman 
Siswanto, Leader of First Brahma Team on 13 December 1964. According to 
Amir Zainuddin902 and Siswanto903, the attack was completely a form of 
retaliation. Siswanto and his group were assigned to infiltrate Singapore using 
sea route. However, the attempt was not going as planned. The New Zealand’s 
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minesweeper fired shots at their boats in the Malacca Strait. Following the 
incident, the KKO believed Siswanto was ‘dead’.904 The ‘killing’ of Siswanto 
further angered the KKO troops.905 Thus, Paulus prepared to attack Singapore 
as a retaliation mission. The mission target was MacDonald House in Orchard 
Road.906  
On 8 March, the team, led by Usman, sailed the Malacca Strait to Singapore by 
using a rubber boat. After arrived in Singapore on 9 March, they observed and 
indicated the specific location for planting 12.5kg bomb. Later, on 10 March 
midnight, they decided to blast a bomb at MacDonald.907 At 03:07 AM, a bomb 
went off on the mezzanine floor and destroyed 20 stores and cars.908 Following 
the incident, Singapore strengthened her security measures. To avoid the 
suspicion, they decided to disperse. On 11 March, they reconvened and agreed 
to go back to home base at Sambu Island, Riau. On 13 March, Malaysian patrol 
captured Usman and Harun in the Malaysian territorial sea and detained in 
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4.2.5 Key Actors Network Prior to the G30S Affair 
During the first year of Dwikora Operation, the informal relationship of main 
actors was developed in different degrees. The relationship among main actors 
is represented in Figure 4-5, located on the next page. Although, no one overtly 
opposed the Konfrontasi, Yani and Suharto evidently developed the 
‘resistance’group.911 They were actively obstructing the implementation of the 
Dwikora Operation. In particular, Yani and Suharto had betrayed Sukarno by 
conducting the Konfrontasi whole-heartedly. This can be seen from the 
implementation of the Opsus in 1964-1965. By having Yani’s authorisation, 
Suharto led the Opsus to settle the dispute and hamper the Dwikora Operation. 
Meanwhile, the rest of main actors during this period were still supporting the 
Konfrontasi. Meanwhile, the rest of key actors still committed to uphold the 
Crush Malaysia mission. 
Following the appointment of Suharto as the First Deputy Commander of the 
KOLAGA, the relationship between Suharto and Dani was poor. The friction 
between them was obvious since they worked as a team. They disagreed 
sharply over the idea of changing the KOLAGA structure. Suharto maintained 
the troops along the border with Malaysia understaffed and underequipped.912 
Majority of key actors were reluctant with Dani’s appointment as the KOLAGA 
Commander. Suharto, Yani, Subandrio and Martadinata were half-heartedly 
supporting Dani leadership by different reason. As Yani did not favour the 
military approach for the Konfrontasi, he tried to obstruct Dani’s work in 
delivering the Dwikora Operation. The KOTI did not equip the KOGA with 
several essential documents and guidelines such as Strategic Directives 
Intelligence Assessment, and Planning Directives. Meanwhile, Subandrio 
denied handing over the Operation A to the KOLAGA. He also did not share 
any intelligence information to the KOLAGA. Indeed, the navy has assured its 
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even recognised the navy as the only service, which has become more 
committed to the Konfrontasi.913 However, Martadinata shared similar view with 
Subandrio that the handover of the Operation A. He was uninterested if the 
Operation A should be under the KOLAGA. He argued it would hamper the plan 










Figure 4-5 Informal Main Actors Network during the Dwikora Operation, 
1964-1965 (Pre the G30S Affair) 
Source: Author 
 
Regarding the relationship with the PKI, almost the army’s generals were 
having poor relationship with the communist. Yani, Nasution and Suharto were 
known as anti-communist generals. Meanwhile, according to Mrazek, both the 
navy and the air force were much less suspicious of the PKI. Dani intended to 
arrange Marxism as basic subject at the Air Force Staff and Command 
                                            




School.914 Although Martadinata has considered as a supporter of Nasution, 
Navy Chief made “a pilgrimage to PKI headquarters, the first time a service 
head did so.”915 The visit has built up the PKI political confidence significantly. 
Regarding the GPPR, he let the movement group faced more pressure from the 
IBAL, which was presumably being sponsored by the PKI. In addition, 
Martadinata seemed to have a good relationship with almost all main actors 
except Dani, as he resisted transferring the Operation A. Moreover, relationship 
between Subandrio and the PKI was closer than before.916 This was 
understandable as Subandrio did not have any party and he needed real 
political support to ensure his position in the Cabinet. 
4.3 Second Year of Dwikora Operation (1965-1966): The G30S 
Affair Changed the Direction 
This part discusses the second year of the implementation of the Dwikora 
Operation. During this time, there was a political event, the G30S affair that 
significantly changed constellations of Indonesia’s politics and foreign policy. 
This event led to Sukarno’s political defeat and demise of the PKI and other key 
actors. To capture the effect of the 30 September Movement affair, the 
explanation of this section covers the conditions prior and post the G30S affair, 
the changing of military leadership and the suppression of the PKI. The 
illustrations include the initial changing direction of the implementation of the 
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4.3.1 Pre the G30S Affair 
Since 1965, the dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia was worsening. It can 
be seen through the new policy of Sukarno. On 7 January, Sukarno decided to 
withdraw from the United Nation. This was a response to the election of 
Malaysia as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. 
The decision obtained global attention. China supported the withdrawal, 
meanwhile the Soviet criticised. Although up to 1965, the UN never attempted 
to resolve the Indonesia-Malaysia dispute.917  
On 12 July, Sukarno established another defence-related institution, Defence 
Command (Komando Pertahanan/KOHAN).918 However, the new institution did 
not apply throughout Indonesia. The KOHAN only covered all provinces in Java, 
Bali, West Nusa Tenggara, East Nusa Tenggara, Eastern Indonesia and West 
Irian. This command was a unified command that had main task was to defend 
the territory to ensure the implementation of Indonesian Revolution. As a 
consequence, this institution might lead and employ the ABRI, Civil Defence, 
Volunteers and all national defence resources.  
Clearly, the Singapore’s withdrawal from the Malaysia Federation on 9 August 
1965, in some extent, had affected Indonesia. On 11 August, Sukarno issued 
the detail structure of the KOHAN.919 The KOHAN Commander led this 
organisation. In general, the structure was quite similar to the KOLAGA or the 
KOTI that the KOHAN structure comprises Commander, Deputy Commander 
and the Joint Staffs.920 Sukarno also improved the structure of National Coastal 
Defence Command (Komando Pertahanan Pantai Nasional/Koppanas). 
Sukarno then changed the name into the National Maritime Defence Command 
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(Komando Pertahanan Maritim Nasional/Kohanmarnas). The main tasks of the 
Kohanmarnas were: (a) to defend maritime territory, and (b) to secure the 
archipelagic sea-lanes. Alike the Kohan, the Kohanmarnas would be led by a 
Commander.  
In sum, it was clear that an inevitable outgrowth of the Konfrontasi required the 
militsry-related organisations to match this reality. The new landscape of 
defence-related organisations is represented in Figure 4-6. However, the 
changes did not solve the problem of organisational effectiveness, and a 
particular concern about relationship among military institutions. The 
establishment of the KOHAN therefore created overlap with other existing 








Figure 4-6 Structure of Defence-Related Organisations Landscape 




The Indonesian government and the KOLAGA, however, claimed that they had 
involved in the process of the Singapore’s withdrawal. They claimed 
successfully had accelerated the process of withdrawal through covert 
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operation.922 Pitut Suharto, former Indonesian Consular official in Singapore, 
stated that there was a secret agreement between Lee Kuan Yew and the army 
intelligence to kick out British from Singapore.923 Following the Singapore 
independence, Indonesia declared had reached part of victory.924 Subandrio 
recognised the secession of Singapore from the Malaysia Federation was a 
complete defeat for British policy.925 Nevertheless, the Singapore’s withdrawal 
did not affect much Indonesian strategy over the Konfrontasi.926 Singapore 
remained as political threat to Indonesia and the main target for the Konfrontasi, 
as the UK military bases was in Singapore. And the KOLAGA still perceived 
Singapore as the British neocolonialist project.927  
In this regard, the KOLAGA prepared a striking plan to destroy Singapore, in 
particular the British military bases. On 11 August, Nasution warned Singapore 
that Indonesia would destroy the bases.928 The KOLAGA would attempt to 
isolate Singapore and occupy Johor. Due to the limitation of operational 
capability, the KOLAGA categorised two types of operations to uphold the 
mission, military and non-military. Military type included establishing military 
enclave, intelligence gathering operation, infiltrations, raids, simultaneous 
destructive operations and decisive operation. Meanwhile, non-military type 
covered economic pressures, fomenting civil unrest, and develop national 
awareness regarding the need of gaining independence. As the KOLAGA 
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recognised Britain has air and sea superiority, the operation would be delivered 
in subversive activities. Even though, Britain would not start the open war by 
attacking Indonesian strategic targets, 929 the KOLAGA demanded President 
Sukarno declared state of war status.930 
As the agreement of division of labour in top management provided more power 
to the army, the structure of KOLAGA was changed for the third time. On 2 
September, the structure of the KOLAGA reapplied the component system.931 
So, composition of the components would be decided by each service. As 
depicted in Figure 4-7, the new structure of the KOLAGA changed the name of 
the First Theatre Command and Second Theatre Command. First Theatre 
Command changed into Inter-regional Defence Command for Sumatra, while 
Second Theatre Command became Inter-regional Defence Command for 
Kalimantan. To overcome understaffing problem, some posts in the Inter-
regional Defence Command for Kalimantan and Sumatra would be occupied by 
local army commands. Meanwhile, under the new structure, Vigilance Logistics 
Command was abolished. All related logistics matters would be directly handled 
by each service command. The new structure also changed the form of Battle 
Command into Task Force.932 The changing reduced Suparjo’s authority 
significantly. Since the Task Force was a temporary unit, he could not fully 
control his troops. Suparjo admitted he had instructed to dispatch the troops to 
West Kalimantan. But the army leaders disobeyed Suparjo’s order and the 
troops had not been deployed.933  
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Figure 4-7 Structure of the Vigilance Command 
Source: Surat Keputusan [Decree] No KEP-39/1965, dated 2 September 1965 
 
As the Konfrontasi progressed, Indonesian domestic political tension also was 
heightened. Left Sukarnoist and the Communist dominated the mainstream of 
Indonesian politics in 1965.934 As the tension increased, Sukarno’s health 
began to decline.935 Both the PKI and the army then were counting on 
Sukarno’s poor health. Thus, the clash between the army and the PKI could not 
be avoided. Regarding the Konfrontasi, the army leadership considered the 
event would enhance the offensive capability and not jeopardise the social 
status quo. Meanwhile, the PKI assumed the Konfrontasi as a means of social 
revolution.936 
One of crucial issues, of that time was the proposal of establishing the Fifth 
Force. In 1965, the PKI desired to create the Fifth Force of armed peasants and 
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organised workers in conjunction with the existing four services.937 Sukarno 
then raised the idea of establishing the Fifth Force comprised of twenty-one 
millions volunteers of the Dwikora.938 In his Independence Day address to the 
nation on 17 August 1965, Sukarno stated 
Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia harus menjadi inti daripada 
pertahanan yang mulia itu, tetapi dengan pulau sebanyak pulau kita, 
dengan pantai sepanjang pantai kita, dengan angkasa selebar 
angkasa kita, kita tak bisa menegakkan kedaulatan Negara kita 
tanpa Rakyat, kalau perlu juga dipersenjatai – Rakyat, kaum buruh 
dan kaum tani dan kaum-kaum lainnya…  
[The Indonesian Armed Forces should be the core of the noble 
defence, but with the number of islands as many as that of ours, with 
coastal line as long as that of ours, with air space as wide as that of 
ours, we are not able to uphold our state sovereignty without the 
People, ithey should be armed if needed – People, workers and 
peasants and others…] 939   
 
However, the army leadership decided to stand firm against Sukarno and the 
PKI proposal.940 According to Mrazek, the Fifth Force might break the army’s 
monopoly in defence decision-making.941 On the contrary, both the navy and 
the air force were less resistant to the Fifth Force. Omar Dani overtly agreed to 
Sukarno’s effort to establish the Fifth Force. He had shown his loyalty to the 
President. Later, Martadinata also indicated his acceptance to the President’s 
idea.942  
Shortly after midnight of 30 September, Commandant of the First battalion of 
the Presidential palace guard (Cakrabirawa), Lieut Col Untung led a bloodshed 
movement, so called September 30th Movement (Gerakan 30 September).943 
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The Movement attacked houses of seven army’s Generals. Only General 
Nasution was survived from the raid, while the other Generals including the 
Army Commander, Ahmad Yani, had lost their lives.944 On 1 October, Untung 
set up Indonesian Revolution Council. Untung stated the Movement was solely 
in order to end Generals who were members of Council of Generals (Dewan 
Jenderal) and other officers, their accomplices and supporters of the Council of 
Generals.945 This announcement was widely circulated through the RRI. 
4.3.2 Post the G30S Affair 
By late morning, Suharto only knew that six Generals had been kidnapped and 
did not know of their fate.946 He also knew that Sukarno was at the Halim 
Perdanakusumah Air Force base and Nasution was escaped. At the KOSTRAD 
Headquarter in Jakarta, Suharto started organising the army and contacted the 
commanders of other services. All the commanders, except Dani, supported 
Suharto.947 At that time, Suharto assumed he was Acting Commander of the 
Army.948 Sukarno then asked the Jakarta Military Commander, Brig Gen Umar 
Wirahadikusumah and Maj Gen Pranoto Reksosamudro949 to report at the 
Halim. But, Suharto prohibited them to meet Sukarno at the air force base. 
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Suharto allegged several air force officers were involved in the G30S. He 
argued that he did not want to risk any possibility of losing another general.950 
At the Halim Perdanakusumah Air Force base, Suparjo reported the G30S to 
Sukarno. As Sukarno was aware of Nasution’s escape and the killing of 
Generals, he instructed Suparjo to cease all activities.951 Indeed, few days prior 
to the G30S affair,952 Suparjo left his command in Kalimantan to Jakarta 
because his child was sick.953 Sukarno then started thinking of appointing an 
army’s general to replace Yani. There were several candidates for the next 
Army Commander, namely: Maj Gen Suharto, Maj Gen Pranoto, Maj Gen 
Basuki Rahmat of the East Java Military Commander, and Maj Gen Mursid of 
First Deputy Commander of the Army. Later Sukarno issued an Order that 
stated the army was directly under his leadership and assigned Pranoto as the 
Army Caretaker for day-to-day matters.954    
Evidently, Suharto was not happy to hear the Pranoto promotion. Suharto 
admitted he distrusted Pranoto.955 Both Suharto and Nasution disobeyed the 
Presidential Order by refusing to accept Pranoto as the Caretaker.956 They 
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affirmed the appointment of Pranoto could not be implemented due to the fate 
of Generals were still unaware and the crisis was not resolved yet.957 In his 
speech on 1 October, Suharto declared that the leadership of the army 
temporarily held by himself.958  
On 2 October, Sukarno called Suharto to the Bogor Palace for a meeting. 
Beside Suharto, there were Omar Dani, Pranoto, and Mursid. The meeting was 
heated because Suharto insisted that the army would rebuff the Pranoto 
leadership.959 Suharto explained he already took over the leadership of the 
army since 1 October.960 In the end, Sukarno decided to assign Suharto to 
restore security and order,961 along with the appointment of Pranoto as the 
Caretaker.962   
It seemed clear that considerable tension had arisen between Suharto, 
Nasution, Dani, Suparjo and the PKI in October 1965. Following the affair, Dani 
made strong statement that the G30S was aimed to secure Indonesian 
Revolution against CIA subversion. In this regard, the Movement has been 
purging those elements in the army, who are controlled by foreign subversives 
and who jeopardised the Indonesian Revolution.963 This statement sparked 
polemics. The air force was accussed of being involved in the affair.964 On the 
following day, Dani recalled his statement and stated that his institution did not 
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interfere in the internal affairs of other services. He also denied the alleged of 
the involvement of his sevice in the G30S.965 Meanwhile, Suharto and Nasution, 
on 1 October, had suspected there was a link between the air force officers and 
the Movement. Also, Suharto alleged the Halim Perdanakusumah Air Force 
base was the central command of the Movement.966 At that time, Suharto has 
charged the PKI as the mastermind of the affair.967 In the meeting at Bogor 
Palace on 2 October, Suharto repeated his allegation of the air force 
involvement in the event. On the fourth, Sukarno defended the air force by 
insisting they were not involved in the September 30th Affair. Sukarno then 
ordered all services to unite and avoid any clash between services.968 However, 
the conflict between Suharto and Dani was even worse. In his speech on 4 
October, Suharto overtly charged the involvement of the air force officers and 
demanded the air force to purge them.969 
In addition to the allegation, in fact, Suharto and the army gained positive 
response in terms of popular support. Ostensibly, the charge against Dani was 
shocking for general public. Suharto has violated one of basic tenets of the 
Guided Democracy that responses to Presidential statements be affirmatory or 
silent.970 But, as Paget explained, Suharto’s political move brought advantages 
to the army. The manoeuvre has successfully potrayed the army as a hero and 
anti-PKI. As the friction within the army could resolve itself and be out of the 
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public eye, the army leaders retained a more power nationally. They were easily 
gathering support to purge the PKI from many elements of society.971 
As pressure to his leadership increased, Dani maneuvered by arresting officers 
who were involved in the Movement.972 But, it was too late. This action did not 
help Dani’s position. Since the funeral of the Generals on 5 October, pressures 
to the leadership of the Air Force, and the PKI increased significantly. One of 
consequences was Martadinata refused to sit near to Dani in one occasion.973 
On 14 October, Omar Dani wrote a resignation letter due to the raising pressure 
to the Air Force, but Sukarno refused to approve it.974 Nevertheless, on the 
following day, Sukarno assigned Sri Mulyono Herlambang as interim 
Commander in Chief of the Air Force to manage political tension.975 
Likewise, Suharto alleged the PKI should be responsible for the bloodbath. 
Elson argued there were two motives of Suharto in moving so rapidly against 
the PKI.976 First, he desired to dispose the dangerous enemy for ideology. 
Second, Suharto seemed to capitalise the momentum to unite anti-communist 
elements behind him. The army newspaper, Angkatan Bersenjata, wrote an 
editorial on 8 October that clearly mentioned the PKI and Aidit were the 
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mastermind of the affair.977 On 12 October, Nasution even blatantly accused the 
PKI was behind the affair and urged government to annihilate the PKI.978  
It seemed noteworthy that the affair did not create tension between Suharto and 
Martadinata. On the one hand, Suharto and Martadinata made a phone 
conversation. Suharto claimed that Martadinata cooperated with him to handle 
the crisis. Suharto claimed there was an agreement between the army, the navy 
and the police that they would stamp out the G30S.979 According to 
Panggabean, Nasution persuaded Martadinata to support Suharto.980 In his 
official statement on the same day, Martadinata admitted that he would not 
interfere the army’s internal affair. In addition, he also denied involving with the 
event and disagreed with the Movement. 981 In addition, Martadinata has moved 
quickly to secure his relationship with the army by discharging Lieut Col 
Soemardi, who involved with the movement, dishonorably.982  
Following the event, Subandrio seemed willing to cooperate with Suharto. On 8 
October, he persuaded Sukarno to appoint Suharto as the Army Commander in 
Chief. Subandrio also encouraged Sukarno to move from the Bogor Palace to 
the State Palace in Jakarta.983 However, Suharto was still determined to 
exclude Subandrio from the Cabinet. 984 To sum up, the changing of informal 
relationship of main actors following the G30S Affair in October 1965 is 
represented in Figure 4-8, located on the next page. 
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Figure 4-8 Informal Main Actors Network during the Dwikora Operation, 
October 1965 (Post the G30S Affair) 
Source: Author 
 
4.3.3 Changing the Leadership 
It is clear that the G30S affair affected the Dwikora Operation. On 1 October, 
activities paralysed at the KOLAGA Headquarter, as it located at the Halim 
Perdanakusuma Air Force Base. All communication lines, both telephone and 
radio, were shut down. Staffs, especially from the army, became 
suspicious of each other, as the victims of the Movement were the army’s 
generals. 985 Thus, the office only focused on current situation at the Halim for 
few days. On 4 October, Dani requested a meeting with the Joint Staffs at the 
Bogor Palace. In the meeting, Dani asked the staffs to be aware with the 
possibility of British attack. The following day, Suharto also demanded all the 
KOLAGA staffs returned to work.986 However, to prevent Suparjo’s manouvre, 
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Suharto, as First Deputy Commander of the KOLAGA, established Joint Task 
Force Command (Komando Satuan Tugas Gabungan/Kosatgasgab) ‘Sumpit’ 
for East Kalimantan.987 The command replaced Task Force Command ‘Mandau’ 
that was led by Suparjo. The main task of joint task force command was to 
develop military and non-military operation in assisting people of Sabah and 
Brunei to gain independence. 
On 11 October, Dani had considered resigning as Air Force Commander. The 
following day, Sukarno rejected Dani’s proposal. However, on the same day, 
several air force officers such as Commander of the National Air Defence 
Command, Commodore Suyitno Sukirno, and the Air Force Attaché in Moscow, 
Commodore Rusmin Nuryadin (later became Commander of the Air Force), met 
Sukarno at the Bogor Palace. They demanded Sukarno to reshuffle the 
leadership of the Air Force, as Dani was accused of being involved in the affair. 
This action hopefully would vindicate the Air Force.988 Sukarno then said that he 
would consider the demand.989 And three days later, Sukarno assigned 
Herlambang as interim Commander of the Air Force.  
It seemed clear that the generals, following the affair, challenged Sukarno’s 
influence over the Army. According to Crouch, Sukarno was under pressure to 
appoint Suharto officially as the Army Commander and Chief of Staff of the 
KOTI.990 Nasution admitted that he urged Sukarno to assign Suharto, the solely 
candidate, as Commander of the Army.991 Nasution argued Pranoto was 
unacceptable to lead the Army because he linked to the Movement. The Army, 
Nasution claimed, had found a letter from one of the Movement leader, Colonel 
Latief.992 Sukarno approved Nasution request. On 14 October, Suharto was 
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appointed as the Army Commander in Chief.993 Later, Sukarno also assigned 
Suharto as Chief of Staff of the KOTI and rejected the nomination of 
Nasution.994  
As Dani was assigned to accelerate the development of aviation industry, 
Sukarno then appointed Suharto as interim Commander of the KOLAGA.995 
Sukarno also adapted the KOLAGA Decree No KEP-39/1965 as a basis for 
restructuring the KOLAGA.996 Consequently, most of the articles of the 
presidential decree were similar to the KOLAGA Decree. Although, the structure 
of KOLAGA still remained, new decree reinforced the authority of the 
Commander. The Commander might control his deputies and decide the 
composition of the Strategic Components.997 
It is clear that the new Presidential Decree brought several consequences to 
the KOLAGA.998 First, the KOLAGA only divided into two elements: (a) offensive 
element covered Land, Sea and Air based Strategic Components; and (b) 
defensive element comprised Inter-regional Defence Command for Sumatra 
and Inter-regional Defence Command for Kalimantan. Second, Commander of 
the KOLAGA authorised to fully control the Strategic Component operations. 
Third, the removal of Logistics Command. Any Logistics Support Operation 
(Operasi Bantuan Logistik) would be handled by the Fourth Joint Staff. Last, the 
establishment of Seventh Joint Staff for Treasury might improve planning and 
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supervision matters. Regarding the new structure, Suharto sent a radiogram to 
his commanders to ensure the restructure of the KOLAGA was well 
implemented.999 As part of consolidation, he also demanded the integration of 
the Operation A.1000 According to Langenberg, following the G30S, Subandrio 
lost his political power rapidly.1001 It was not surprising that, in November, 
Subandrio agreed to compromise with the army demands. Unlike previous 
incidents (pp.161-2 & 166-7),1002 handover of the Operation A run smoothly on 
16 November.1003 
There has been no change in the Konfrontasi policy.1004 Sukarno still continued 
to reiterate his hostility to the West.1005 The army, including the Generals, also 
echoed Sukarno’s voice, though the Konfrontasi have been more defensive 
than offensive. On 16 October, Suharto issued his first order. One of his orders 
was to increase readiness in implementing the Dwikora Operation.1006 Small-
scale incidents in both Kalimantan and the Malayan peninsula, including 
Singapore, then continued.1007 Although, the British still doubted the Konfrontasi 
would terminate soon, they were not willing to engage the Indonesian military in 
fighting.1008 Besides they did not want to distract the army in dealing with the 
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PKI, British saw the G30S affair might provide opportunity to lessen the 
intensification of Indonesian operations against Malaysia.1009   
One should note that the abortive coup had changed the direction of the 
Konfrontasi. Secret peace talks started just a few days after the Affair when the 
army envoy met Ghazalie in Kuala Lumpur. Ghazali believed the army would 
call of the Konfrontasi if Sukarno were disappeared.1010 Sukendro was 
authorised by the Generals, also made a move. He requested to meet Rahman 
agent in Bangkok. Tunku then asked Ghazali to meet Sukendro in Bangkok.1011 
As the Konfrontasi was linked with Sukarno, Subandrio and the PKI, Sukendro 
explained the army would carry out a scenario that linked the PKI with the 
policy. He ensured this plan would speedy up the dispute settlement. 1012  
The role of Suharto’s Opsus has accelerated the de-escalation of the dispute. A 
more promising peace talks begun when the Opsus continued approaching 
Malaysian official on 18 December. At that day, the Opsus team, led by Ali 
Murtopo, met Razak and Ghazalie in Malaysia.1013 The aggressiveness of the 
army campaign against PKI has reassured Malaysian negotiators that there is 
possibility of reaching peace deals with Indonesia. As a follow up to the 
meeting, both parties agreed to exchange liaison officers as a willingness to 
end the conflict.1014 
Indeed, on 9 December 1965, Subandrio tried offering peace negotiation to 
Malaysia. Subandrio suggested a separate negotiation between Indonesia, 
Malaya, Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak. The aim of the negotiation, Subandrio 
argued, was to reach mutual understanding, which would provide a foundation 
                                            
1009 TNA, FO 371/180320, “Attempted Coup in Indonesia,” Andrew Gilchrist to Stewart, 
19 October 1965. 
1010 TNA, FO 371/181455, Telegram No 1703, Kuala Lumpur to CRO, 12 October 1965 
1011 TNA, FO 371/181456, Telegram No 1794, Kuala Lumpur to CRO, 2 November 
1965 
1012 TNA, FO 371/181457, Letter British High Commission Kuala Lumpur to CRO, 19 
November 1965 
1013 Pour, Benny, 153 




for better relationship.1015 However, Razak of Malaysia rejected the proposal, as 
it seemed to aim to split his country.1016   
4.3.4 The Suppression of the PKI 
Tension continued to increase between the PKI and the army. On 12 
November, Nasution issued an Instruction to clean up the military institutions 
from the G30S affair.1017 This instruction provided a classification and sanction 
for military personnel and civilians in the ABRI who involved the G30S including 
all related-activities. Suharto then used this situation to widen his role and 
authority in the KOTI. On the same day, Suharto met Sukarno at the Palace to 
propose the idea of reorganising the KOTI. Suharto argued this action was 
needed in order to achieve the national goals. He demanded the tasks of the 
KOTI should cover social, economy, politics, and military.1018 On 13 November, 
Sukarno agreed to restructure the KOTI.1019  
As depicted in Figure 4-9, Sukarno formed five positions to take advisory role in 
the KOTI structure. Those five positions are Deputy Prime Minister; Deputy 
Supreme Commander for General Affairs; Deputy Supreme Commander for 
Military Affairs; Deputy Supreme Commander for Economics; and Deputy 
Supreme Commander for Socio-Politics. Sukarno then empowered the role of 
Chief of Staff. Under the new structure, the Chief of Staff of the KOTI was the 
main assistant to the President that authorised to assess, evaluate, plan, 
prepare, control and oversees all implementation of the President’s directives. 
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By this decree, Sukarno widened the function of KOTI, not only focused on 
military matters but also covered economic issue. This could be seen in the 
composition of the KOTI Joint Staff: Intelligence, Operations, Manpower 
Deployment, Logistics, Socio-Politics, Monetary and Economics. Sukarno also 












Figure 4-9 Structure of the KOTI (Post the G30S Affair) 
Source: Keputusan Presiden [Presidential Decree] No 161/KOTI/1965 dated 13 
November 1965 
 
It was evident that Suharto was gaining more power following the new structure 
of the KOTI. On 15 November, Suharto did manoeuvre by issuing two KOTI 
Instructions, on behalf of President Sukarno. The first instruction ordered the 
main commands of the KOTI should take actions to clean up the commands by 
referring the Nasution instruction.1021 For the second instruction, he adapted the 
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1965 [sic]. 
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Nasution’s Instruction and applied it for all departments.1022 In addition, Suharto 
reshuffled the KOTI officials including Subandrio who was removed from his 
position as the First Joint Staff for Intelligence.1023 Suharto suggested Sukarno 
re-assigned Nasution as Deputy Supreme Commander for Military Affairs.1024 
Suharto’s authority was even bigger when Sukarno established the full structure 
of the Koopslihkamtib.1025By this decree, Suharto might control all the 
Pepelrada, task forces, joint task force and special unit. The main task of the 
Koopslihkamtib was to restore security and public order through physics-military 
and mental operation. 
The expansion of KOTI and establishment of the Koopslihkamtib effected 
immediate changes. The army had more power to hunt the PKI members and 
its sympathisers. On 4 December, Suparjo was discharged dishonourably, 
along with Latief and Untung.1026 As the domestic political tension heated, on 11 
March 1966, Sukarno signed an executive order, which gave Suharto full 
authority to restore security and order.1027 On the following day, Suharto 
manoeuvred by dissolving the PKI.1028 Suharto then, on 17 March, arrested 
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Supersemar see, for instance, Crouch, Militer dan Politik, 200-219; Elson, 135-139; Wanandi,  
57-83; Damien Kingsbury, Power Politics and the Indonesian Military, (London-New York: 
Routledge-Curzon, 2003), 59-61 
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fifthteen minister including Subandrio, who were alleged of the involvement of 
the affair.1029 Later, Suharto disbanned all PKI affiliates.  
Suharto gained more power following the arrest of Sukarno’s cabinet ministers 
and cabinet reshuffle on 31 March. Together with Adam Malik as Foreign 
Minister/Deputy Prime Minister for Social and Political Affairs and Sultan of 
Yogyakarta, Hamengkubowono IX as Deputy Prime Minister for Economic, 
Financial and Developmental Affairs, Suharto established a triumvirate to 
control the cabinet.1030 And the triumvirate started eroding Sukarno’s authority 
gradually, as they were aware the fact that Sukarno still had strong attachments 
to the Indonesian people.1031 Suharto was responsible for security affairs, Malik 
for international affairs, and Sultan for economic affairs.  
In short, informal key actors network during November 1965-March 1966 had 
changed significantly. As Suharto was more powerful than Nasution, he 
seemed to be a central military figure. He controlled all military matters. None of 
military elites, including the new Air Force Commander Air Marshall Sri Mulyono 
Herlambang and Navy Commander, Martadinata, tried to challenge Suharto’s 
authority. Moreover, Suharto was determined to abolish the PKI and get rid 
Subandrio and Dani from the Cabinet. Meanwhile, Sukarno insisted to keep 
Dani and Subandrio. Sukarno also rejected the idea of abolishing the PKI. As 
the navy shared similar stance with the army, Martadinata supported Suharto’s 
effort to eliminate the PKI. His relation with Dani was still cold, as Martadinata 
sought to keep the Leftist-Sukarnoist at a distance. Regarding the Konfrontasi, 
Suharto still kept his lukewarmness. He secretly boosted the peace talk efforts. 
On contrary, Nasution strongly reiterated Sukarno’s view that Britain and the US 
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provided the power of army backing, Malik, a Sumatran with practical diplomatic experience, 
provided the brains, and Hamengku Buwono IX, represented the traditionalism. Time, 
“Indonesia: Vengeance with a Smile,” TIME, July 15, 1966. 
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were threatening Indonesia through encirclement. He believed the separation of 
Singapore from Malaysia would be followed by other Malaysian states including 













Figure 4-10 Informal Main Actors Network during the Dwikora Operation, 
November 1965-January 1966 
Source: Author 
4.4 Third Year of Dwikora Operation (1966-1967): End of the 
Konfrontasi 
This section emphasised on the de-escalation process of the Konfrontasi. 
Following the G30S affair, Suharto gained more power and control in 
Indonesia’s politics. Meanwhile, Sukarno, who was ‘President for life’, lost his 
grip on power after the signing of executive order. As Suharto became leader 
by March 1966, he intensified the peaceful approach to end the dispute. Thus, 
this discussion comprises the success story of Suharto’s Opsus, ABRI’s 
                                            





‘ambiguous’ tactics, and Sukarno and Nasution resistance toward Suharto’s 
peace mission. 
4.4.1 Intensifying the Peaceful Approach 
The uprising in the capital city affected Indonesian public and government life 
significantly. Following the G30S affair, the army started taking initiative in 
annihilating the PKI and its affiliates by all means. Consequently, military 
commands under the KOLAGA were merely more focus on the eradication of 
the PKI rather than delivering operations against Malaysia. Following the G30S 
affair, a number of military clashes regarding the Konfrontasi seemed declining. 
This can be seen in the Chronology reports from the Task Force Command. 
The ‘Rencong’ Task Force, for instance, during October-December 1965, was 
mainly devoting its duty in searching out and capturing the PKI members and 
associates in Sumatra.1033  
It was clear that Suharto intended to end the dispute by peaceful way. In a 
meeting on 29 January-1 February 1966, Suharto demanded the KOLAGA 
adjusted its operations.1034 The changes were needed for several factors, such 
as (a) insufficient funding; (b) shortfalls in combat readiness; (c) enemy had no 
intention of undertaking offensive operations; (d) the army still needed to 
consolidate following the affair.1035 As a consequence, the KOLAGA applied 
some adjustments for the operations in 1966. First, military operations would 
only be implemented in North Kalimantan area, as Singapore has detached 
from Malaysia. Second, only nine battalions would remain for the Konfrontasi: 
two infantry battalions in Rencong Task Force; four infantry battalions and two 
battalions combat team in Mandau Task Force; one infantry battalion and one 
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the KKO’s battalion in Sumpit Task Force. Third, intensifying psywar operations 
in all areas.1036 
However, Sukarno seemed to limit Suharto’s influence following Suharto had 
developed a political base of imposing strength. Suharto was 
Minister/Commander in Chief of the Army, Commander of the Koopslihkamtib, 
and Commander in Chief of the KOLAGA as well as Chief of Staff of the KOTI. 
At that time, the authority of the Chief of Staff of the KOTI was powerful.1037 
Thus, Sukarno attempted to curtail Suharto’s alliance. On 21 February, Sukarno 
removed Martadinata from the office. Rear Admiral Mulyadi replaced his 
position as Minister/Navy Commander in Chief. Probably, Martadinata lost his 
job because of his stronger stance over the PKI. At the funeral of Nasution’s 
daughter, Ade Irma Suryani who was one of the victims in the G30S affair, 
Martadinata encouraged the students to ‘sweep’ (sikat) the PKI. He guaranteed 
the military would not hinder the purges of the PKI.1038 Sukarno then assigned 
Martadinata a new post as Ambassador for Pakistan.  
To retain his desire on the Konfrontasi, on 22 February, Sukarno established 
the Crush Malaysia Command (Komando Ganyang Malaysia/KOGAM) 
replacing the KOTI.1039 The main task of the KOGAM was only to accelerate the 
Crush Malaysia mission. However, the political move was failed. As his political 
position was in jeopardy, Sukarno had no choice than assigned Suharto as 
Chief of Staff of the KOGAM. Thus, Suharto could easily control the 
KOGAM.1040 Sukarno also assigned Air Marshal Rusmin Nuryadin as Air Force 
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Commander in Chief to replace Herlambang due to Suharto’s pressure on 7 
April.1041 
Following the handing over of emergency power by Sukarno to Suharto on 11 
March, Suharto was keen to push the peace process. As discussed earlier in 
this chapter, several people had acted as peace feelers (Table 4-1). However, 
only the Suharto’s Opsus was successful to execute this mission which Malik 
joined the Opsus team after the G30S affair. After the effective control of the 
cabinet had passed into the hands of the triumvirate, Suharto and Malik had 
more room to manoeuvre in accelerating the peace process.   
 
Table 4-1 List of Indonesian Peace Feelers 
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On 16 March, the leadership of the KOLAGA was changed. Maj Gen Umar 
Wirahadikusumah led the KOLAGA as Commander in Chief replacing 
Suharto.1042 As the peace talk was on a motion, the KOLAGA still issued a set 
procedure to prevent any surprise attack.1043 Regular patrols were conducted 
along the Indonesia-Malaysia border. On 20 May, Suharto sent a delegation of 
twenty military officers, led by First Deputy Commander of the KOLAGA Rear 
Admiral OB Sjaaf, to Kuala Lumpur for a goodwill mission.1044 The main task of 
the team was to meet Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman in 
preparation for the Bangkok peace negotiation between Indonesia and Malaysia 
on 29 May-1 June. 
The Bangkok conference was a foreign ministerial meeting to discuss basic 
principles in normalising the relation between Indonesia and Malaysia. Malik, 
who was assigned as the new Indonesian Foreign Minister led the Indonesian 
delegation, while Razak led the Malaysia delegation. During the conference, 
there was a dissenting opinion within the Indonesian team. Military 
representatives demanded Malik to bring sensitive issues such as Sabah and 
Sarawak status in the meeting.1045 Well-defined statement from Malaysia over 
Sabah and Sarawak status was needed, as the main task of Konfrontasi was to 
assist people of Sabah and Sarawak to gain independence from the Britain. 
Malik and Razak then reached the agreement, known as Bangkok Accord, on 
three principles: (a) people of Sabah and Sarawak would be given opportunity 
to reaffirm their status; (b) diplomatic relation would be restored immediately; 
and (c) end the hostilities.1046  
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1966. 
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The evidence indicates that Suharto applied coercive diplomacy during the 
peace process. Indeed, following the Bangkok conference, Wirahadikusumah 
ordered his troops to avoid any clash along the border.1047 He also instructed 
the main commands to prepare the possibility of delivering joint border patrol 
with Malaysia. Still, the KOLAGA insisted to deliver ‘special operations’ that 
aimed to separate Sabah and Sarawak from Malaysia and to dissolve the 
Federation in order to establish Maphilindo.1048 And the operations were 
designed to support the Opsus.1049 
From the very beginning of the Konfrontasi, Suharto considered military force 
was a necessary element of diplomacy. In 1963, he argued that the deployment 
of Kostrad troops to Sarawak border aimed to bolster diplomacy.1050 Thus, it 
might not come as surprise that the Malaysian and British leaders doubted 
Suharto’s goodwill. Razak admitted that he could not be completely sure of 
Suharto’s sincerity. Although the triumvirate has indicated it stance toward 
Sukarno, Razak remained uncertain about the continuity of subversive 
activities, which conducted by the ABRI.1051 Up to April 1966, British noted that 
there was no evidence that Suharto indicated to discontinue military 
confrontation, as level of disposition of the ABRI in the frontier remained the 
same.1052 
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Avaliable materials indicate that Suharto changed the nature of offensive 
operation against Malaysia post the G30S Affair.1053 All military operations in 
Kalimantan were not mainly targeted at crushing the physical facilities. As the 
missions was more focus in socio-political aspect, the ABRI only conducted 
territorial and intelligence operations. The operations included infiltration, 
counter-intelligence and psychological operation.1054 Both Mandau Task Force 
and Sumpit Task Force were responsible to conduct the operations. Mandau 
Task Force formed two teams, Jalak and Manjar that employed 43 personnel 
with Kuching-Serian Road in Sarawak as the main target. Meanwhile, Sumpit 
Task Force established ‘Ngayau Iting’ Operation that comprised of five teams: 
Beo, Kelabang, Hendrik, Oga and Anji Apoi. For ‘Ngayau Iting’ Operation, at 
least 195 people were deployed for delivering mission in several locations in 
Sabah: Lawas, Limbang, Jesselton, Selayang and Miri-Marudi. All teams 
comprised of military personnel, TNKU, and volunteers.1055    
But, majority of those operations failed.1056 The major cause of the failure was 
that the British military successfully detected and intercepted the teams before 
they could siege.1057 The operations also were unsuccessfully encouraging local 
people to join the fight against British and Malaysia.1058 As British captured 
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Confrontation, June-November 1966,” War in History, 24, 1 (2017): 102-107.  
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operation plan documents and interrogated the prisoners, the teams did not 
have enough room to manoeuvre for implementing the operations.1059  
As the KOGAM authorised to make a national policy, it decided to accept the 
Bangkok agreement on 30 July. Further, to show goodwill, the KOLAGA 
ordered his troops to stop any operation on 10 August.1060 On the following day, 
the peace agreement, known as Jakarta Accord, signed by Indonesian Foreign 
Minister, Adam Malik, and Malaysia Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Abdul 
Razak.1061 As a response to the Jakarta Accord, the KOGAM issued a Directive 
for implementation of operational concept.1062 For instance, regarding Sabah 
and Sarawak isu, the KOGAM suggested the KOLAGA to prevent the merger 
between Serawak and Singapore. The KOGAM also demanded the KOLAGA to 
raise the awareness regarding anti-subversion, anti-sabotage, anti-infiltration 
and anti-illegal smuggling.1063 Later, KOLAGA terminated all covert operations 
in Malaysia. 1064 
In reflecting on this stage of the Konfrontasi, it is worth observing that the 
KOGAM continued the socio-political operations. The US document noted that 
Indonesia’s interest in crushing Malaysia remained active.1065 As smale scale 
border incursions still have continued, the US assumed there were some 
elements within the army attempted to delay the ratification.1066 
The US assumption toward the army’s group perception appears accurate. 
Although the peace talk was led by the Opsus Team, Suharto apparently had 
‘hidden agenda’ toward the peace result. Suharto still admitted Malaysia as a 
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British project that should be dissolved.1067 Following the Jakarta Accord, the 
KOGAM ordered the KOLAGA to give more emphasise to socio-politics 
operations than ‘conventional’ military operations. This could be seen on the 
Main Directive of the KOGAM No 17/KOTI/10/1966.1068 Even though, it did not 
indicate any intention to employ aggressive military. 
As the peace deal indicated good progress in reducing the tension, the 
KOLAGA started dislocating the troops on 15 December 1966.1069 According to 
the KOLAGA Joint Staff Report, both Indonesia and Malaysia were consistent 
to maintain the cease-fire.1070 The KOLAGA then launched Operation Tertib I 
and II to liquidate irregular force, which had helped the ABRI during the 
Konfrontasi.1071 The operation covered the decommissioning of all arms and 
ammunition held by the militias.1072 This measure was taken in order to control 
Kalimantan security post the Jakarta Accord. Later, the KOTI officially dissolved 
the KOLAGA on 26 May 1967.1073 On 26 July, Suharto disbanded the KOTI.1074  
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Despite their limitation, both Sukarno and Nasution still insisted to continue the 
Konfrontasi policy. Even though, in general, the relationship between Sukarno 
and Nasution was poor. On 8 June at the KOGAM meeting, Sukarno admitted 
that he was disappointed with the Bangkok result. Sukarno argued Malaysia 
should provide further explanations before the signing of peace agreement. His 
stance toward the agreement was clear. Sukarno refused to sign it, even 
though Malaysia accepted the Bangkok Agreement.1075 As the political tension 
heated, Sukarno announced transfer of power to Suharto as acting president on 
22 February 1967. Nevertheless, the ABRI still recognised Sukarno as the 
President, but daily tasks were handled by Suharto.1076 
Similarly, Nasution who was elected as Chairman of the Temporary People's 
Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara/MPRS), 
called the continuation of the Konfrontasi.1077 Nasution argued the peace 
process should not discarded Maphilindo and Indonesian principles.1078 So, 
any peace agreement should be referred to the Manila Agreement. In the 
matter of the Konfrontasi, British noted Nasution as the biggest surprise in 
being more anti-Malaysia than Sukarno. Also, he was even more rigidly 
attached to carrying out the Konfrontasi.1079 In spite of the fact that Nasution’s 
voice gained considerable support among officers who feared international 
humiliation, Suharto and all military leaders ignored the demand to revoke the 
accord. Informal key actors network is represented in Figure 4-11, located on 
the next page. 
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When Sukarno launched the Dwikora Operation, it was evident that he did not 
want to lead the dispute into open war. As the army leaders were disappointed 
with the appointment of Omar Dani as the KOLAGA Commander in Chief, the 
army was half-heartedly supporting the Konfrontasi. This lukewarmness 
affected the implementation of the Dwikora Operation. The KOTI, which was 
dominated by the army, intentionally obstructed the execution of the operation. 
Thus, in the first year of the Dwikora Operation, Dani missed several targets, 
which led to the failure of infiltration missions. 
The intensity of interservice rivalry increased drastically following the 
assignment of Dani. Both Dani and Yani seemed to exercise their power and 
influence toward the Dwikora Operation. Consequently, the structure of the 
military operation command has changed for four times. Also, the rivalry 
between Dani and Suharto exposed complications. Under Yani’s approval, 
Suharto conducted a covert operation (Opsus) to settle the dispute. Indeed, 
several people had actively involved in peace efforts. But, most of them were 




It was evident that the G30S affair turned the direction of the Konfrontasi. 
Following the affair, most of key actors lost their power. On the contrary, 
Suharto, who was a pheripheral actor, was successfully turned into central 
player. He capitalised his power after the G30S. He then became a principal 
player in the military organisation and political sphere. Thus, as he succeeded 
concentrating power in his hand, Suharto could end the Konfrontasi by signing 





5 UNDERSTANDING THE FAILURE OF DWIKORA 
OPERATION 
 
Victory is an outcome of battle; it is not what a military organisation does in 
battle. Victory is not a characteristic of an organisation but rather a result 
of organisational activity 
Millett, Murray and Watman1080 
 
5.1 Introduction 
As explained in Chapter Three and Four, the Dwikora Operation failed to 
achieve its main goal, crushing the Malaysia Federation. Suharto, who was not 
the main player in the beginning of the Konfrontasi, succeeded in changing the 
direction of the ABRI’s operation. This chapter aims at addressing the research 
questions as to why and how did the ABRI become politicised, and how did 
military political behaviour affect the implementation of the Dwikora Operation. 
This analysis explores two enabling objectives of the dissertation (pp.14-5), 
namely, (d) to examine the failure of the Dwikora Operation; and (e) to 
contribute to the literature in explaining the effect of politicisation of the ABRI on 
the Dwikora Operation during the Konfrontasi. To achieve the aim and 
objectives, the research adapts PT technique and test several theories whether 
the theories can confirm the case study.  
This chapter will start by investigating the causal process of how political 
behaviour in the ABRI contributed to to the failure of the military operations. The 
discussion will follow the building blocks that are illustrated in the analytical 
framework. The chapter then concludes with the recap of the disunity of 
command during the Konfrontasi.  
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There are three sections in this chapter. The first section presents the 
introduction of the chapter. The second section traces the failure of the 
operation. The division of this section refers to the boxes in the analytical 
framework (p.20), namely policy of political warfare; main actors and coalitions; 
politicised military; and military operation. Several relevant existing theories that 
are discussed in Chapter Two will also be tested. The analysis of how political 
behaviour of the ABRI affected the implementation of the military operations 
during the Konfrontasi concludes the process tracing. The third section covers 
the summary of research findings of the study. 
5.2 Tracing the Failure 
Since the present study examines an historical single case study of the 
Indonesian military operations during the Konfrontasi, process tracing was 
adapted as an outcome-oriented method. PT provides necessary tools to 
explain the important characteristics of how politicisation of the ABRI affected its 
operations during the Konfrontasi. The outcome-oriented approach uncovered 
five causal mechanisms that contributed to political behaviour of theTNI and link 
directly to its operations, which has led to the failure. 
To investigate implementation of the ABRI operations during the Konfrontasi, 
the researcher examined the process change and political behaviour of the 
ABRI. To understand how the changes occurred, the researcher employed 
several theories about military involvement in politics to rationalise how the 
ABRI became more politicised. The four building blocks (Figure 1-2) discussed 
in this chapter aimed at revealing the relationship between politicisation of the 
military and the implementation of military operations. As stated in Chapter 1 
Section 1.4, in order to answer the research questions, the analysis focuses on 
two aspects: process of politicisation of the military and political behaviour in 
organisation. The first three building blocks discuss aspect of process of 
politicisation of the ABRI from the outset of the Konfrontasi. Meanwhile, the last 




Dwikora Operation. The explanations include organisation’s political propensity, 
characteristics, and key actors’ political behaviour. As this research recognised 
the politicisation of the ABRI has been intertwined in the political process of 
Indonesia, the network with civilian elites, and foreign countries, particularly the 
US and UK, will be also illustrated. The following analysis (Table 5-1) maps the 
causal process and existing theories that will be tested. 
Table 5-1 Mapping of Process Linking the Politicisation of the ABRI to the 




Aspects Theory-testing Building 
blocks Description 
Policy of war 
Discussing how various 
motivations of key actors 









Examining two aspects that 
influenced the key military 
actors’ behaviour toward the 
Konfrontasi, namely, 






Bennett (1980)  
Politicised 
military  
Identifying characteristics of 
the ABRI that were central 
in shaping the politicisation, 
level of influence and 





Examining the relationship 
between political behaviour 
in the ABRI and the Dwikora 
Operation. This part also 
probes the consequences of 
political behaviour in the 
ABRI at three levels, 
namely, individual, 
organisational and national 
Political behaviour 
in organisation  
Buchanan and 








The researcher considered the Indonesian Armed Forces as the unit of 
analysis. Since the research and data collection focused on the implementation 
of the ABRI operations during the Konfrontasi, it appeared natural to consider 
the various levels of analysis: individual, organisational and national/state. 
Besides collecting archives, the researcher also managed to obtain interviews 
from a spectrum of witnesses and experts using semi-structured interview. The 
breakdown of respondents can be seen in Table 1-1 (p.28). 
Individuals were selected for a variety of reasons but mostly for their expertise 
and experience in the Konfrontasi. Nine respondents had military background 
and six of them were witnesses of the Konfrontasi. Other interviewees were 
civilians who witnessed the case study or had expertise on the Indonesian 
military and the Konfrontasi. Five of the nine respondents, who have military 
background, were content that their personal identification remained in 
confidential status, because it allowed them to speak more openly regarding 
particular incidents. All interviews were conducted face-to-face and in 
Indonesian. The subject of interviews with witnesses covered specific events in 
the Konfrontasi, which they might have thought about the issues. Meanwhile, 
contents of interview with experts included their judgement on several issues 
surrounding the Konfrontasi.      
This case study offers useful insights about internal dynamics of the ABRI 
during the Konfrontasi. The nature of the factions was fluid and much affected 
by the domestic politics situations. Indeed, military factions within the ABRI 
have deeply rooted before the Konfrontasi. However, the involvement of non-
military actors promoted a more intense rivalry within the ABRI during the 
period. Following sections provides a close analysis of the effect of politicisation 
of the ABRI into its operations during the Konfrontasi and provides links to 






5.2.1 Policy of War 
Brooks explained one of critical factors for determining individual, group and 
organisational success is motivation.1081 Generally, motivation can be defined 
as the direction and persistence of action.1082 Mitchell argued motivation may be 
defined as individual phenomenon, intentional, multifaceted and to predict 
behaviour.1083 Motivation can be divided into two types: intrinsic motivation, 
which refers to doing something for its inherent satisfactions, and extrinsic 
motivation, which refers to doing something for attaining some separable 
outcome.1084 As the motivation to work varies widely, illustration of the diversity 
of motivation may indicate of how people determined the direction of action.1085  
As discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.4, it was evident that all key actors tended 
to agree with the Konfrontasi policy. Each actor, both from military and civilian, 
owned several motivations regarding the Konfrontasi. In general, as shown in 
Table 5.2, located on the next page, there are two classifications of motivations 
over the Konfrontasi, namely: self-preservation and striving to grow. Self-
preservation included survival, self-defence, self-actualisation, ego needs, and 
eliminate obstacle.  
Heterogeneous nature in the ABRI reflected the way factions perceived the 
Indonesia-Malaysia dispute.1086 Key military actors in all levels (individual, group 
and organisational) have a wide range of motivations toward the Konfrontasi 
policy. In organisational level, the ABRI was highly motivated to eradicate the 
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perceived threat, the Malaysia Federation. Meanwhile, the army supported the 
Konfrontasi in order to impede China influence in the region and maintain its 
budget. As Nasution argued, the Konfrontasi might help the military to resist 
budget cut. In addition, the navy and the air force endorsed the policy because 
for eradicating the perceived threat and maintaining close relationship with 
Sukarno. 
Table 5-2 Diversity of Key Actors Motivations, Implications and Standpoint 









*As factionalism in the army seemed apparent, the present research illustrates the motivation in 
two levels: service and faction/group leader. 
Source: Author 
 
Given that the key generals were also leaders for their factions, individual-level 
motivation also reflected group-level motivation (pp.113-22). Nasution and his 
faction upheld the hostile policy in favour of maintaining the army’s unity, while 
Yani and his group were motivated by maintaining relationship with Sukarno 
and opportunity for improving army’s capability. Apparently, the need of 
improving the army’s striking capability was also encouraging Suharto and his 





Similarly, main civilian actors, both individual and group, had various 
motivations about the Konfrontasi (pp.107-13 & 122-5). Sukarno launched the 
policy for countering UK intimidation, eradicating the perceive threat, 
maintaining his political position and self-esteem. Subandrio agreed with the 
policy in order to maintain his relationship with Sukarno and impede China 
influence. Besides keeping close ties with Sukarno, the PKI promoted the 
Konfrontasi for gaining political popularity and eradicating the perceive threat. 
The important implication follows from the diversity of key actors’ motivation. 
The diversities resulted in the different policy support level. In lower level, 
majority of key military actors, as well as civilian actors shared similar stance, 
provided moral support to the TNKU rebellion (pp.118-20). Only Suharto’s 
position was unknown whether he supported the TNKU. However, in upper 
level, the key military actors were obviously divided into two camps: full and less 
support the policy of Konfrontasi. This condition was reflecting the intensity of 
inter and intraservice rivalry. Nevertheless, the standpoint of the majority of the 
actors over the dispute was clear that the Konfrontasi policy also should not 
spill the conflict into an open war.1087 This standpoint was a result of Sukarno’s 
firm decision that he was reluctant to deliver a full military operation as big as 
the Trikora Operation and launch open war.  
It was worth noting how the intense rivalry enhanced the development of fluid 
coalition among key actors during the military operation making. As Kilduff et.al 
explained, rivalry entailed a focus on a specific, identifiable, opponent.1088 Next 
section discussed how the key actors form the coalition including what elements 
shape the process.  
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5.2.2 Main Actors and Coalitions 
Rivalry is often used interchangeably with competition. However, as Kilduff et 
al. suggested, those two words are not similar. Competition has neglected to 
highlight the importance of existing competitors’ relationships. Also, a series of 
interactions has developed the relationships.1089 This section discusses two 
main aspects that shaped the interactions among actors from the outset of 
Konfrontasi, namely, opportunity (p.55) and motives of military involvement in 
politics (pp.57-8). 
Opportunity 
Indonesia was a new state during the period of Konfrontasi. According to Betts, 
traditionally there was a dichotomy between politics and administration.1090 So, 
civilian authorities established policy and military implemented the politicians’ 
decision. As discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.5, there was no clear 
demarcation between political officials and professionals in Indonesian Cabinet 
during the Konfrontasi. The 1959 Dekrit Presiden has provided greater roles for 
military in civilian affairs.  
It is noted that Sukarno tried to boost his position and influence over the armed 
forces. As he intended weakening Nasution’s grip in military, Sukarno applied 
professional-political method in selecting military leadership. Betts explained the 
problem of choice remained between maximising professionalism and expertise 
and maximising political control over military.1091 The routine-professional mode 
of service chief selection optimised the value of professional standards but left 
more autonomy to the military than did the more politicised of selection. 
Meanwhile, exceptional-political appointments downgraded professional 
standards. Thus, the professional-political mode was a compromise method.  
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The integration of military leaders into the political structure, of course, affected 
the professionalism. There are four explanations of why the ABRI became more 
politicised from the outset of Konfrontasi. First, military elite manoeuvres. 
Undeniably, since its formation in 1945, the military had always been politically 
oriented.1092 Although the 1957 martial law allowed military officers to involve in 
political affairs, they did not have any guidance and concept regarding the 
ABRI’s socio-political role. Until Nasution introduced the ‘Middle Way’ principle 
in 1958, the political role of the ABRI had a clearer direction.  
It was then no wonder that following the integration of military chiefs into 
Cabinet, the army gained the dominant position in Indonesian politics. Number 
of officers in the cabinet was significantly increased. In this regard, according to 
Lev, military did not desire to topple Sukarno.1093 Soon afterwards Sukarno was 
the central figure for Guided Democracy, politics became more highly 
personalised.1094 The chiefs then actively involved in the struggle to influence 
Sukarno. Consequently, as Nasution said, there was no unified leadership in 
the matter of preparing for war because the chiefs could act independently.1095  
This act can be seen when Yani and Martadinata deployed their troops for 
covert offensive intelligence operation in 1963 independently.1096     
Second, the declining of military reputation. Undeniably, the liberation of West 
Papua boosted Indonesia’s military build-up. In January 1961, Indonesia gained 
a loan of USD450 million for military equipment from the Soviet.1097 Even 
though, the government budget deficit reached 12.8% in 1962, military still 
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enjoyed 48 per cent of the state budget revenue.1098 Also, around 75 per cent of 
government expenditure has been allocated for the annexation of West 
Papua.1099 Thus, this condition endangered the Indonesian economy and 
threatened the development programme.1100 At that time, government was 
under pressure to curb the inflation. The PKI also attacked the army leaders as 
the persons who should primarily responsible for economic chaos and 
corruption.1101  
In addition, the involvement of officers in economic affairs also damaged 
military reputation, especially the army. As the martial law legalised military to 
take over the civil administration, the officers could continue already-established 
corrupt practices and advance their own economic interest. And Nasution was 
concerned at this situation. When he headed the Committee for Retooling the 
State Apparatus (Panitia Retooling Aparatur Negara/PARAN), he conducted 
inquiries into the corruption cases in state owned enterprises, which were 
allegedly involving officers and other officials.1102 It was suspected that the 
investigation into the officers on corruption charges might harm Yani’s 
faction.1103 As Crouch explained, the funds from the army’s involvement in the 
economy were transferred directly to the central command, rather than to the 
government.1104 So, the army could reduce its dependence on the state budget.      
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Third, civilian dependency on the military. Understandably, Sukarno and the 
military elites, especially the army leaders, have been developing unique 
relationship since the beginning of Guided Democracy. Cooperation and conflict 
were colouring their partnership. Following the declaration of a state of war, 
they needed each other in order to rule, as Sukarno had legitimacy and the 
army had coercive power. At the same time, Sukarno and the army elites were 
struggling for a dominant role in the military.1105 Indeed, Sukarno has strongly 
dissatisfied with the multi-party parliamentary system of government. Since the 
martial law provided greater power for the military, it then shared similar view 
with Sukarno, a limitation of political parties’ prerogatives.1106 Legge added 
Sukarno’s administration could not survive without support from a united army 
leadership.1107 As a result, Sukarno and the army coalition successfully brought 
parliamentary government collapse. The military, then, has become a decisive 
part of Sukarno’s polity and supervised all political activities.1108  
Indeed, Sukarno-military leaders’ relationship became strained following the 
rapid military expansion in civilian affairs. Although, it was not political party, 
Sukarno perceived the special powers of the Army might pose a threat to his 
rule. According to McVey, Sukarno was the only civilian element that could 
influence the top level of military.1109 Sukarno’s dependency on the military 
remained high, even though, he had solid mass support, which was provided by 
the PKI. Sukarno was unable to abandon military support. When he launched 
the policy of Konfrontasi, Sukarno had to employ coercive power to enhance his 
political pressure on Malaysia. Without military involvement, Sukarno could not 
execute the policy of Konfrontasi to any effect.   
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Fourth, domestic circumstances. As a new state, Indonesia’s party system 
shared some similar experiences with other countries that adopted multi-party 
system.1110 Not only there was a tendency of ‘mutual destruction’ among 
political parties,1111 but also each party was torn by factionalism.1112 The failure 
of parties to form strong parliamentary coalition has led to inefficient 
government.1113 The chaotic in domestic political landscape then contributed to 
the birth of Guided Democracy. On 5 March 1959, the military high command 
issued a decree to ‘freeze’ the parliament. With increasing internal instability, 
the stagnation of the domestic economy, and the strong assertion of 
presidential power, the military could assure its greater role in civilian affairs. 
The army’s civic action programme, for instance, was an evidence of how the 
army maintained its participation in the government.1114 The programme 
included building roads, dams and bridges. Besides useful in economic 
development, this mission also attempted to balance the PKI’s influence in the 
grass-root level.1115 The US has assisted the mission by providing technician, 
equipment and technical trainings.  
Given the fact that the military reputation was declining at the outset of 
Konfrontasi, Finer’s theory on the military opportunities to intervene civilian 
affairs seems partially fit with the case study. He explained three situations, 
which provides opportunity for military to involve in political affairs: civilian 
dependency, domestic circumstances and popularity of military.1116 However, 
corruption cases which allegedly involved some military officers had affected 
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the prestige of the armed forces. Meanwhile, Perlmuter and Bennet theory1117 
fits the case study. Social and political condition during the beginning of the 
Konfrontasi clearly contributed to the opportunity for military to engage in 
politics. 
Motives of Intervention 
As presented in Table 5-2 (p.232), key actors have shown a variety of 
motivation toward the policy of Konfrontasi. None of the actors has single 
motivation. Consequently, as Legge argued, the policy has not been applied 
with uniform firmness.1118 Furthermore, the diversity of motives that initiated 
military to expand its involvement in civilian spheres can be explained in two 
main clusters: internal and external. Internal cluster covers sectional interest, 
birthright and competency. Meanwhile, external cluster includes national 
interest and civilian inadequacy. 
Sectional interest. It is noteworthy to emphasis the effect of existence of 
sectional interest into the disposition of the military involvement in politics. In 
this regard, sectional interest may include corporate and individual interest. As 
the ABRI has certain corporate interests including sufficient budget support and 
maintaining political domination, Crouch argued material interests affected 
military propensity toward politics.1119 Indeed, the ABRI recognised Sukarno’s 
political domination during Guided Democracy. All military chiefs had shared 
many of the president’s nationalist foreign policy goals. Yani, for instance, has 
sought the Indonesian diplomacy applied ‘fighting diplomacy’ to overcome the 
imperialist encirclement since the outset of Konfrontasi.1120 This indicated the 
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army’s faith in the effectiveness of a confrontation strategy against the Western 
power.1121  
As the ABRI did not operate in a vacuum, it was also natural to consider that 
the military might be strategic in its pursuits of the corporate interest during the 
Konfrontasi. In this regard, the military should deliberate many aspects while 
dealing with the policy. As noted in Chapter 4, Section 4.2, to overcome 
economic problem, government demanded military budget cut to meet the IMF 
requirement of a balanced budget in 1963-1964. If it applied, budget cut would 
bring significant consequences. The ABRI should reduce its size gradually from 
350,000 to 200,000. Apparently, this plan caused the army the most suffering 
service. Undeniably, the army feared that the policy would lead to a military 
clash with the UK.1122 Although, both Yani and Nasution favoured with a 
rationalisation of the military, they concerned possible effect of the reduction 
plan. 
Clearly, the PKI and the army were the backbone of Sukarno’s administration 
during Guided Democracy. They shaped many important policies including 
elimination of the PRRI, anti-imperialism and neo-colonialism, liberation of West 
Papua and the Crush Malaysia.1123 Also, it is noted that the army was the 
epicentre of the ‘communist-phobia’ community.1124 As the PKI was mastering 
mass-mobilisation, the Army leaders feared gradual demobilisation might attract 
to the PKI-related organisations.1125 As a result, the half-hearted Army in 
supporting the Konfrontasi stemmed primarily from its fear of PKI gains. 
Furthermore, military interest also could be viewed from the perspective of 
individual officers and factions. They often have personal or group material 
interest in military involvement in politics. Suharto’s case, for instance, was 
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clear evidence that how the desire of power affected the operation. As 
explained in Chapter 3, Section 3.4, Suharto was keen to take a leadership role 
for the Konfrontasi, as he had served as Commander of the Trikora Operation. 
But, soon after Sukarno appointed Dani as Commander of the KOGA, Suharto 
was frustrated. Comparing to Dani, Suharto had successfully established an 
image as a key combat commander.1126 He then showed his disappointment 
through several resistances in order to obstruct the operation such as the 
Opsus and the delaying of troop deployment.    
Birthright. It is clear that military political behaviour may have roots in the early 
experiences of the institution. The historical experience may reflect in military 
tradition, values and culture. Crouch explained the orientation of military officers 
toward political activity is influenced by the military origin.1127 Since the ABRI 
was formed in order to fight the colonial power, it is noted that the military has 
basic orientation toward political activity and is not indoctrinated to accept the 
Western concept of apolitical professionalism. As a consequence, military 
leaders rejected to accept the principle of civilian control over military.1128 
Undeniably, the officers’ political orientation does not automatically indicate 
there is military intervention in civilian spheres. It requires certain condition to 
dispose officers toward involvement. In Indonesia, the weakness of civilian 
institutions and instability provide justification for the military interference. Lev 
argued that until 1956, the military, in particular the army was on political 
defensive.1129 But the State of Emergency declared in 1957 had provided the 
army leaders with vital sources of finance and expanding their activities into the 
political spheres.1130 As the strong civilian institutions including politicians are 
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yet to come, unsurprisingly military participation in politics remains the long term 
feature of Indonesian politics.      
Competency. It is commonly argued that the armed forces are one of state 
institutions that legitimate to use of force. The use of military is clear, a means 
to political objects.1131 As military cannot be separated from politics, it has 
certain versatility. Clausewitz explained warfare consisted of everything related 
to the armed forces, including creation, maintenance and the use of military.1132 
So, military power can be utilised for physical, threat and a mean to influence 
political calculations of actors. When the state used military power forcefully, the 
effects of military are easy to identify, either it achieves the objectives or 
fails.1133  
Following the instability at the outset of Guided Democracy, the government 
decided to boost military capability. Even though there were some economic 
problems, government spent large portion of foreign aid for the military. The 
Sukarno administration argued that well-equipped and cohesive armed forces 
were vital to protect the polity.1134 Compared to the army, the air force and the 
navy increased their capability significantly during Guided Democracy period. 
Meanwhile, the army enjoyed greater role in civilian affairs than other services. 
Indeed, the Indonesian military strength was smaller than the UK. Prior to the 
Konfrontasi, British noted that at least the navy had one operational cruiser, 
eight frigates and 12 submarines. Meanwhile, the air force was capable of 
operating in the fighter, bomber, transport, and reconnaissance roles, with good 
effectiveness of forces.1135 The air force owned 495 aircrafts including P-51 
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Mustang, LA-11, MIG-15, MIG-17 and B-26 bomber.1136 In general, the ABRI 
was capable of delivering infiltration by land, sea and air. Also, it was capable to 
carry out amphibious and airborne operation.1137 
National interest. Clearly, the ABRI’s involvement in the Konfrontasi has 
constitutional basis. According to the Preamble to 1945 Constitution, there are 
four national interest of Indonesia: (a) protect the whole people of Indonesia 
and the entire homeland of Indonesia; (b) advance general prosperity; (c) 
develop the nation's intellectual life; and (d) contribute to the implementation of 
a world order based on freedom, lasting peace and social justice. In particular, 
the Constitution also stated that any form of colonialism should be erased as 
not in conformity with humanity and justice. Since the establishment of Malaysia 
Federation might also be perceived as threat and form of neo-colonialism 
(pp.119-20), the performing of the military in backing the Konfrontasi was 
justified. The ABRI, as a tool of state for defence has to protect the country from 
any threats, both from internal and external. Also, it had no choice but affirmed 
the policy when Sukarno as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and 
primary source of legitimation of Guided Democracy has argued for military 
backing of the Konfrontasi.1138 
Civilian inadequacy. Arguably, military involvement in politics often occurs when 
civilian government could not govern effectively. Normally, military intervention 
follows the failure of government. In other words, the weak civilian provides 
opportunity and motive for military interference.1139 As explained in previous 
subsection in this chapter, the birth of Guided Democracy has marked by the 
political instability. Multi party system has brought the full range of political 
conflict into Indonesian democracy. There was no effective control over the 
state’s finance. The parliament also lacked of initiatives to assist the 
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government remedy the economic poor performance.1140 Since warfighting is 
complex and dangerous activities, it requires a professional military who 
qualified to do the job.1141    
In sum, theory of motive that proposed by Finer,1142 Koonings and Kruijt1143 and 
Edmond1144 fit with the case study. As stated earlier in this subsection, each key 
actor possessed some motivations toward the Konfrontasi. It means behind any 
actions regarding the hostility against Malaysia might own mix motives. And 
those theories are useful to explain motives of the Indonesian military 
involvement in civilian spheres.   
This part has already highlighted opportunity and motives of military 
involvement in civilian affairs. Did the diversity of motivation toward the 
Konfrontasi lead to coalition formation within the ABRI? Kelley described a 
coalition as a group of individuals who agreed to pursue a common goal; willing 
to pool their sources in achieving the goal; engaged in communication and 
agreed on the distribution of the benefits received.1145 In general, a coalition 
among key leaders often exists in the formal organisation. In other words, 
coalition within institution indicates there is consolidation of power, which is 
essential for institution. Zaleznik explained organisation could not function 
without a consolidation of power. Overt rivalry amongst the leaders and inability 
to make strategic decisions are several outcomes that may be occurred due to 
the failure of coalition formation in the organisation.1146 
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However, the diversity of motivation of military leaders toward the Konfrontasi 
contributed to the failure of coalition formation in the ABRI. Indeed, all key 
actors agreed to support the Konfrontasi. They also recognised Sukarno as the 
most important source of power in Guided Democracy. But, these two elements 
were insufficient to drive the elites to form the solid coalitions. As presented in 
Figure 3–6 (p.150), relationships amongst actors were dynamics. Yani and 
Nasution, for instance, although both of them were anti-PKI and supporting the 
Konfrontasi, their relationship was bitter following the incident of bypassing 
army chain of command. Meanwhile, Martadinata and Dani were less 
resistance to the PKI than the army.  
This situation, at least, can be explained in two reasons. First, politicisation of 
the ABRI increased after all services were under Sukarno’s responsibility. The 
military leaders tended to maintain good relationship with the president. 
Consequently, all military chiefs were competing to gain enormous influence 
with Sukarno. 
Second, Sukarno’s decision regarding the inserting all chiefs into the cabinet 
has boosted interservice rivalry. Undeniably, the army and the air force had a 
history of interservice rivalry. Although Sukarno installed the new air force chief 
as Commander of the KOGA/KOLAGA, this did not restore the army-air force 
good relationship. The different motivations and military strategy proposals over 
the Konfrontasi even created deeper friction.1147 The fear of rivalry, later, 
headed to the isolation of one of key actors. Zalesnik explained people become 
more suspicious one of another due to fear of rivalry and it creates a world of 
plots and counterplots. This can be seen when Yani and Suharto challenged 
Dani’s leadership with activities such as the Opsus, delaying of budget and 
troops deployment.  
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In fact, the various motivations toward the Konfrontasi seem successfully to 
lead the elites form fluid coalition. It means coalition was shifting, unstable, 
temporary and only working on specific issue. For instance, Martadinata, who 
was knowingly as Nasution’s ally,1148 had good relationship with Yani, as they 
agreed to launch the Operation A. Coalition between Suharto and Yani 
following the appointment of Dani as Commander of the KOGA also confirmed 
the existence of fluid coalition. They agreed to obstruct the operation with 
different causes and reasons. This situation fits with Gamson argument. He 
defines coalitions as temporary alliances among individuals or groups which 
differ in goals and means oriented.1149 Next part will explain the characteristics 
of the ABRI that was more politicised during the Konfrontasi.  
5.2.3 Politicised Military  
Given the fact that politicisation of the ABRI increased significantly during 
Guided Democracy, this block attempted to illustrate the features of the ABRI 
from the outset of the Konfrontasi. The discussion covered political strengths 
and weaknesses (pp.53-4).1150 Later, in this part, level of influence (pp.58-9) 1151 
and direction of politicisation (p.59) 1152 will elaborate further. 
Political Strengths and Weaknesses 
Finer argued one of political strengths of the military, compare to civilian is 
superiority in organisation.1153 Military institution is highly structured than any 
civilian group. Cohesive, hierarchical and esprit de corps are some features, 
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which are highly organised than civilian. However, this characteristic could not 
be found in the ABRI in Guided Democracy. In fact, factionalism in the 
Indonesian armed forces was deeper from the outset of Konfrontasi. This 
situation could be found in all services: the army, the air force and the navy. For 
instance, the Army was divided in 1956. Each regional commander possessed 
a considerable of independence.1154 Gregory explained, at that time, there was 
an obvious factionalism in the army. The split was based on territorial 
division.1155 There were three main territorial divisions, which dominated the 
army, namely the Diponegoro (Central Java), the Siliwangi (West Java) and the 
Brawijaya (East Java). Those divisional had played important role on the 
political scene. Also, each division had significant ideological and religious 
differences. Islamic parties had influenced the Siliwangi elites. Meanwhile 
various secular parties had influenced political orientation of the Brawijaya and 
Diponegoro elites.1156 However, as Gregory added, the faction was not tightly 
integrated and may be cohesive depending on personal and certain issues.1157 
Following the expansion of military role in the period of Guided Democracy, 
Nasution claimed the army had become a more congenial, homogeneous and 
obedient.1158 However, such claim seemed to lack bases. In fact, the decision 
making process in the army remained collegiate.1159 The top army leaders’ 
attempt in boosting their control failed to improve military hierarchy.1160 Still, the 
territorial commanders favoured involving in the forum of discussions on the 
army policies.1161 Another case that weakened Nasution’s statement was the 
deployment of the Battalion 600R in East Kalimantan in order to support the 
                                            
1154 At that time, there were seven military regions: two in Sumatra, three in Java, on ein 
borneo and one was responsible for the eastern islands of Indonesia. Legge, 143. 
1155 Ann Gregory, “Factionalism in the Indonesian Army: The New Order,” Journal of 
Comparative Administration, 2, 3 (1970): 342.  
1156 Gregory, 345-7. 
1157 Gregory, 342. 
1158 McVey, “Part II,” 150 
1159 In making decision, the heads of the army involved the regional commanders. 
1160 The army leaders established the general staff in order to reduce the involvement of 
senior generals in decision making process. 




TNKU. This incident was an evidence of factionalism and patronage in the 
army. It was completely violating the army chain of command. Nasution, who 
was issued the order, was not the Army Commander, but Minister of Defence 
and Security/KSAB. Although, Yani, who was the Army Commander, had 
ordered to abort the mission, the troops disobeyed him. 
Did the factionalism completely weaken the political role of the army? The 
answer was not necessarily. Indeed, the factionalism in the army was deep. As 
the number of officers in civilian posts increased significantly, the army elites 
continued to gain power in almost all sectors. Feith added it only resulted in 
fragmentation of the army’s influence in the government.1162 The officers were 
no longer behind one leader, Nasution. But, the army’s grip on political sphere 
remained. 
In addition, typical of the factionalism in the air force and the navy is quite 
similar. At that time, factionalism in these two services was based on rank. In 
the air force, for instance, some middle officers, led by Nuryadin and Sukirno in 
1963, challenged Dani’s leadership. They overtly showed their disrespect to 
Dani due to his sympathy toward the PKI. They also criticised Dani’s office 
performance.1163 As a result, Nuryadin was sent to Bangkok as the air force 
attaché in 1963. Later, in 1965, he occupied the same post in Moscow. This 
assignment could easily perceived as a means of Dani to alienate his rivals. 
Indeed, Dani was close to the PKI. But, following the G30S affair, rivalry 
between Dani and Nuryadin was more intense. Nasution asked Nuryadin, who 
was in Moscow, to returning to Jakarta.1164 As Nuryadin had good support from 
the army, especially Nasution and Suharto, he succeeded to eliminate Dani’s 
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faction and became the Air Force Chief.1165 In addition, the intraservice rivalry 
within the Navy happened between the middle officers and the generals 
(pp.175-7). Different with the air force, the mutiny in the navy was caused by 
‘dishonesty’ issue. And, in the Navy case, the Generals faction still could secure 
their positions.   
It is noted the foreign aid from super power had substantial effects to the ABRI. 
First, it boosted the modernisation of the armed forces. As explained in Chapter 
3, Section 3.3, the navy and the air force had increased their capability 
significantly. Second, the aid also fostered cohesion within the army and helped 
the army to expand its socio-political role. Even though, the army capability did 
not increase drastically, the central army command might spend military aid for 
greater rewards such as supporting study trips abroad and better housing for 
the privates.1166 The Army’s Civic Action Programme, which was supported by 
the US, helped the army to counter the PKI’s influence on the ground. 
Meanwhile, for the US, the civic programme facilitated her to maintain pro-
American orientation of the Indonesian Army.1167 The programme included 
transmigration, farming, improving communication and roadways through all 
regions. And the US supplied heavy engineering equipment, farm tools, training 
to support the operation and maintenance of the heavy equipment.1168  
The last effect of the foreign aid was made the inter-service rivalry worse. 
Indeed, Indonesia gained benefit from the Cold War competition. The East and 
West rivalry has provided Indonesia substantial sources for military 
requirements.1169 As stated earlier, Soviet offered more aid to the ABRI than US 
government (pp.99-100). The navy and the air force were enjoying the bigger 
portions of the Soviet aid than the army. Meanwhile, the army enjoyed the 
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major US support. Following the declaration of Dwikora Operation, the US aid 
was reduced significantly. The only aid was only for military training, especially 
for the army. The US perceived it could strengthen the relationship with the 
Army.1170 During Guided Democracy, at least 2,641 officers were trained in the 
US.1171  
Further, the US also deliberately played in heightening tension between the 
army and the air force. There are two evidences to support the notion. First, the 
US encouraged the established the Indonesian Army Flying Cavalry. The aim 
was clear, to counterbalance the influence of the air force. For the army leaders, 
the creation of Flying Cavalry corps would decrease their operational 
dependence on the air force.1172 Second, the US turned down Nasution’s 
request on a large weapon purchase in 1960.1173 Thus, this forced Nasution to 
visit Moscow to conclude  an arms deal, worth USD400 million.1174  
Understandably, the US was resistant to support the modernisation of the air 
force and the navy. This situation can be explained in three ways. First, as 
Indonesia was launching the Konfrontasi against the Dutch over the West 
Papua, the modernisation would enable Indonesia to attack a member of 
NATO.1175 Second, the US perceived these two services were ‘pro-Soviet’ in 
their professional and political orientation. It was because the services reacted 
on the neglecting the desire of arms modernisation and turned for help to other 
countries.1176 Third, the US perceived the Navy and the Air Force were too 
strong to be incorporated in the US ‘constabulary’ concept. Mrazek described at 
that time the US applied the policy to keep the military force of underdeveloped 
countries on a ‘constabulary level. It meant the military should only focus on 
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internal security, while the US forces in the Far East would cover the external 
threats. As the offensive capability of the Indonesian Air Force and the navy 
was the biggest in the Southeast Asia region, Washington argued there was no 
need to help Indonesia in supplying military weapon.1177 
It was also noteworthy that Guided Democracy provided the ABRI legitimacy to 
have a permanent role in politics. Since the imposition of martial law over the 
whole of Indonesia in 1957, the military has been authorised to appoint officers 
to oversee the civilian administrations. Then recognition of the armed forces as 
a functional group by the Parliament and the Cabinet in 1958 was major 
breakthrough in Indonesian politics, which was dominated by civilian parties.1178 
Following the establishment Guided Democracy, the Middle Way concept has 
become the military corporate ideology. Rinakit argued it was because the ABRI 
considered the concept might useful for the sake of military unity and position 
within the state.1179 The return to the 1945 Constitution also provided the 
military a legal basis for socio-political position. Reinstating the 1945 
Constitution meant the military has opportunity to have representatives in the 
MPR. According to Article 2 of the Constitution: 
The MPR membership consisting of members of the House of 
Representative (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat/DPR) and delegates from 
the provinces and from functional groups in accordance with rules 
prescribed by law.1180 
 
Not surprisingly, the ABRI has technical inability when dealt with economic 
sectors. The involvement of the military in economic affairs has brought big 
impact to its character. Military image has appeared as the manager and the 
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bureaucrat.1181 McVey noted that many officers who were appointed to manage 
or supervise the state enterprises were incompetent.1182 Inexperience officers 
have caused the declining of productivity significantly and led to crisis. Indeed, 
the central command had tried to control all appointments to civilian posts 
through career promotion system. So, any incapable or unreliable officers might 
be removed easily by the command. The officers also engaged civilians as 
partners in business concerns. However, such effort was still insufficient to 
avoid poor performance of military presence in the economic affairs. Worse, as 
the state enterprises were sources of funds for the military, some officers 
allegedly involved in corruption cases.1183  
To sum up, Finer’s theory regarding political strengths,1184 and weaknesses1185 
partly fit the case study, since the military has legitimation to involve in civilian 
spheres. Deep factionalism within the armed forces also affected the hierarchy, 
command and esprit de corps. Although, the case study confirmed that the 
military still monopolised the use of firearms and played as a symbolic status. In 
the case study, technical inability in the military also was presence as political 
weaknesses.   
Level of Influence 
As stated earlier in this chapter, Guided Democracy has strengthened the 
socio-political role of the military. Even though Sukarno was discomfort with the 
armed forces, it has become the centre of attention in Indonesian politics.1186 
Following the increasing number of officers in the Sukarno’s administration, the 
military actively attempted to influence government policy in its favour. As 
illustrated in Chapter 4, Section 4.3, military involvement in decision making 
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process regarding military-related policy was higher since Sukarno created the 
KOTI and attached all military chiefs to his Cabinet. 
In general, the military stance regarding the policy at the outset of Konfrontasi 
was clear, avoid escalation of the conflict into open warfare. However, as 
presented in Table 5.2 (p.232), there was a fragmentation on supporting the 
policy. Majority of the army was less supporting the policy than the air force and 
the navy. So, key actors might have different approach in influencing Sukarno. 
As the army leaders occupied key positions in the government, such condition 
provided significant effect to the execution of the policy.  
Adapting Betts’ theory on the level of influence, there are four possible levels of 
military influence in shaping the government policy.1187 First, direct and positive 
that means military supported the policy and explicitly recommended the use of 
force. Second, indirect and positive that means military did not explicitly support 
the policy but recommended force. Third, direct and negative, which means the 
armed forces supported the policy but did not recommend the use of force. 
Fourth, indirect and negative that means military did not support the policy and 
the use of force. 
As the army leaders were half-hearted supporting the policy, the fragmentation 
influenced Sukarno and the Cabinet regarding the Konfrontasi in two levels. 
First, direct and positive.  This level was played by Nasution. Bypassing the 
army chain of command was clear evidence to support this notion (pp.132-3). 
Second, direct and negative. Majority of the army elites played in this level. 
They supported the policy but preferred to exploit the diplomacy than military 
force. In order to manage the conflict as low as possible, as explained in 
Chapter 4, Section 4.2, Yani resisted with Dani’s leadership. Thus, he has 
several times attempted to hamper Dani in executing the Dwikora Operation. 
One of the best examples is when Suharto could convince Sukarno regarding 
                                            
1187 Betts divided the level of influence into four: direct and negative (the highest); 
indirect and negative; indirect and positive; direct and positive (the lowest). He employed the 




the division of labour in top management of the KOLAGA that has curtailed 
Dani’s power (pp.164-9). Meanwhile both the navy and the air force were 
exercising their influence on the level of direct and positive. These two services 
had indicated their commitment in supporting the policy by employing their 
offensive units.       
Moreover, Betts’s theory on level of influence did not fit the case study. In his 
research, Betts proposed a degree of level of influence from the highest to the 
lowest in assessing the postwar situation.1188 However, the present research 
made an adjustment in order to create the Betts’s theory workable for the case 
study. The study ignored a degree of level of influence. So, the ‘adapting’ theory 
did not estimate degree of influence. The outcome of level of influence will be 
discussed in the following paragraphs. 
Direction of Politicisation 
Certainly, the attachment of military chiefs into the Cabinet has brought 
substantial effect to the military. As all services were under direct presidential 
jurisdiction, military chief positions were more prone to politicisation. Chief can 
be politicised in two ways: positive which means military will support and 
advocacy the administration policies; and negative which means military will 
oppose the policies.1189 As stated in previous part, there were two levels of 
military influence during the Konfrontasi: (a) direct and positive; and (b) direct 
and negative. These levels were a result of half-hearted military support. 
Consequently, these also affected the direction of politicisation of the ABRI. 
Two opposite directions of politicisation of the ABRI had developed during the 
Konfrontasi simultaneously: positive and negative politicisation. Nasution, Dani 
and Martadinata were linked to positive politicisation as they supported the 
policy of Konfrontasi. Meanwhile, Yani including Suharto were associated with 
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negative politicisation. The Opsus case has provided clear explanation on how 
the army elites curtailed the policy (pp.169-74).   
Arguably, Betts’s theory regarding direction of politicisation1190 in certain part fits 
the case study. It is practicable to explain the orientation of politicisation. But, 
the gap exists. The theory does not cover the mixed direction of politicisation 
that may be occurred at the same time. In this regard, direction of politicisation 
can be divided into three: positive, negative and mixed politicisation.  
5.2.4 Military Operations 
The last building block examines political element in the military operation. As 
stated in Chapter 1, Section 1.2, the present research recognised the ABRI as a 
political military institution. So, this part discusses the relationship between 
politicisation of the ABRI and the implementation of Dwikora Operation. In 
particular, this part attempt to verify the hypothesis whether the politicisation of 
the military was a caused of disunity of command in the Dwikora Operation. To 
discover the relationship, this part adapted the A-B-C of organisation politics 
model to assess political behaviour in military organisation.1191 The model 
consists of three parts: antecedents, behaviours and consequences. 
Antecedents discuss the triggers of political behaviour. The illustration included 
a mix of individual and contextual factors. Behaviours identify political tactics of 
key players. And consequences explain the outcomes of political behaviour in 
the ABRI during the Konfrontasi. The outcomes will be described at three 
levels: individual, organisational and national. The flow of analysis in this 
building block is illustrated in Figure 5-1, located on the next page. 
 
 
                                            
1190 Betts, 53 













Figure 5-1 Assessment of Political Behaviour in the ABRI during the 
Konfrontasi 




Buchanan and Badham explained political behaviour in organisation might be 
triggered by two factors: individual and contextual.1192 As presented in Table 5-2 
(p.232), motivations of key actors toward the Konfrontasi are diverse. These 
motivations encompassed personal and organisational interest. In individual 
level, the diversity of motivations reflected two important features: personal 
ambition and self-interest.1193 Suharto’s desire to be the KOGA commander has 
marked the existence of personal ambition. Meanwhile, Yani’s interest on 
developing striking forces (p.117) was one of best examples to illustrate self-
interest.    
In the context of organisation, the involvement of the ABRI in the Konfrontasi 
generally can be perceived as a means of protecting its existence in domestic 
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politics. As the PKI was aggressively sponsoring the event, the ABRI had no 
choice but to support the policy. The ABRI’s involvement in this policy can be 
interpreted in four ways. First, there was a widespread emotional popular 
support for the Konfrontasi.1194 Sukarno, with the PKI’s assistance, successfully 
encouraged civilians to be volunteers. Up to April 1964, British estimated 2 
million civilians might involve in the Konfrontasi.1195 Thus, the objection of the 
policy was an unpopular option. Second, adherence to constitutionality, the 
military should support the policy. Indeed, civilian control of the military was 
ineffective. However, it did not release the ABRI from its obligation to protect the 
country from any threat. Article 10 of the 1945 Constitution also stipulated the 
President as the Supreme Commander of the Army, the Navy and the Air 
Force.  
Third, the ABRI was aware of the possible risk of Sukarno’s mass 
mobilisation.1196 Since Sukarno and the PKI keenly mobilised civilian volunteers 
to involve in the Konfrontasi, the military worried the PKI would gain benefit. 
Also, as Nasution argued, military leaders found in Sukarno 
a symbol of unity for a divided nation. Thus, they perceived Sukarno’s decision 
was taboo to be disobeyed.1197 Fourth, the ABRI attempted to secure its budget, 
as the government planned a reduction in military spending. Hopefully, through 
the Konfrontasi, Sukarno would reimpose the State of Emergency, which was 
revoked since 1 May 1963.1198  
Behaviours 
Following paragraphs will identify basis of power and political tactics of key 
actors during the implementation of Dwikora Operation. As elaborated in 
Chapter 2, Subsection 2.3.2, bases of power consisted of reward, coercion, 
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authority, referent, expert, information, affiliation and group power.1199 In order 
to avoid confusion, the study will not apply any divisions while explains political 
tactics. As the G30S affair provided significant impact to the implementation of 
Dwikora Operation, the discussion will be split into two: pre and post the affair. 
Pre the G30S Affair 
 
One of the important elements of winning battles is battlefield effectiveness. It 
defines the ability of the military to carry out the tasks on the battlefield.1200 
Reiter and Stam explained that battlefield military effectiveness is based on two 
factors: behaviours of the soldier that means the willingness of personnel to 
lead and execute the orders; and organisational efficacy, which means 
executing tasks including planning, logistics and intelligence gathering.1201 In 
addition, Lider posited the effectiveness of the use of force will depend on the 
aims of the policy.1202  
To establish an effective leadership, according to Reiter and Stam, an officer 
should be able to persuade his troops to execute the command.1203 And the 
ability to persuade subordinates will rely on how the leaders acquire and wield 
power. However, leaders in the organisation may possess different bases of 
power. In other words, power may distribute among elites unequally. If leaders 
fail to recognise the unequal distribution of power, it will damage interpersonal 
relation and productivity.1204 
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It is likely that key actors possessed unequal power (Table 5-3). Nasution, for 
instance, only owned expert and referent power since Sukarno assigned him as 
Minister of Defence and Security. He wielded referent power1205 when he asked 
Basri to deployed troops to East Kalimantan (pp. 132-3). All military chiefs 
automatically owned coercion, authority and expert power. But, Yani gained 
information and affiliation power since he held position as the KOTI Chief of 
Staff. As he established alliance with Suharto, both of them owned group 
power. Martadinata expanded more power since his troops involved in the 
Operation A. However, Dani failed to obtain information power as other key 
actors frequently attempted to challenge his leadership including withhold useful 
information for the KOGA/KOLAGA (pp.161-2 & 166-7).   
It is noteworthy that Suharto‘s political skill was high. Although he was not the 
service chief, Suharto possessed power as many as Yani. As the KOSTRAD 
Commander and First Deputy Commander of the KOLAGA, he owned coercion, 
authority and expert power. He then expanded his power when he launched the 
Opsus and established an alliance with Yani. He obtained information power 
from the Opsus and gathered affiliation and group power from coalition with 
Yani. 
Meanwhile, civilian actors held less power than military actors. Although he was 
the president and supreme commander of the armed forces, Sukarno only 
acquired reward, coercion, authority, and referent power. In addition, Subandrio 
owned authority and information power since he also held position of the Head 
of BPI and involved in the Operation A. Meanwhile, the PKI only held referent 
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The unequal power distribution clearly affected the implementation of the 
Dwikora Operation. As Bartolome and Laurent warned, power differences can 
disturb interpersonal relations at work and undermine organisational 
effectiveness.1206 This condition also fostered the intensity of interservice rivalry. 
Key actors played certain tactics during the implementation of Dwikora 
Operation. Following the attachment of military chiefs to the Cabinet and 
establishment of the ABRI, Nasution admitted there was no unified leadership in 
the matter of preparing for war. All military chiefs could act independently.1207 
The most common political tactics prior the G30S affair were keeping Sukarno’s 
happy and informal influence.1208 It is noticeable that the ABRI recognised 
Sukarno as a symbol of unity and essential to the development of the armed 
forces.1209 Thus, all key actors echoed the Sukarno’s foreign policy.1210 This can 
                                            
1206 Bartolome and A Laurent, “The Manager,” 
1207 AH Nasution, “Unity of Command,” in Indonesian Political Thinking, 1945–1965, 
edited by Herbert Feith and Lance Castles, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), 418.  
1208 Cobb categorised lateral influence among peers and influence exercised by 
subordinates over their supervisor as informal influence. Anthony T Cobb, "Informal Influence in 
the Formal Organization: Perceived Sources of Power among Work Unit Peers," The Academy 
of Management Journal, 23, 1 (1980): 155 
1209 Howard M Federspiel, "The Military and Islam in Sukarno's Indonesia," Pacific 
Affairs, 46, 3 (1973): 408. doi:10.2307/2756576. 




be seen in many statements and speeches of military chiefs in various 
occasions.1211 Those actions were very likely aimed at showing their overt 
support to the Konfrontasi. The military leaders attempted to retain their public 
face of support for the hostility policy.1212   
The appointment of Kemal Idris as the First Battle Command in Sumatra Island 
(p.165) was the best example to illustrate some political tactics. The relationship 
of Sukarno and Idris prior to the assignment was bitter. Kemal had been 
opposing Sukarno for years. Since, during 1956-1963, Sukarno several time 
rejected the promotion of Idris to be military attache.1213 Thus, the assignment 
of Idris in the KOGA could possibly indicate informal influence practices. 
Moreover, Idris promotion also could explain other tactics: using key player to 
support initiative, breaking the rule to achieve objective and delaying tactics. As 
Suharto was in charge for the Dwikora Operation, he might need an officer who 
also resisted the Konfrontasi. And Idris’s profile fitted Suharto’s requirement: a 
KOSTRAD’s officer and resistance to the Konfrontasi. Thus, the presence of 
Idris helped Suharto in controlling the implementation of the operation. In other 
words, the appointment of Idris was aimed at blocking any offensive plan.1214 
And Suharto used Idris to maintain the forces in Sumatra’s Battle Command 
understaffed and underequipped.1215 
Another variants of political tactics, which were deployed by key actors, were 
withholding useful information and building a network of useful contact. Yani 
and Subandrio employed withholding information tactics while they 
implemented Operation A during the Dwikora Operation. As they refused to 
hand over the operation (pp.161-2 & 166-7), they also did not willing to share 
any current developments to the KOLAGA. In addition, building a network 
tactics can be seen in the Opsus. The covert operation was an example of 
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applying such tactics. Although it was a form of insubordination, the Opsus 
succeeded to establish network with Malaysians that later were useful to boost 
the peace process.   
In addition, another example for delaying tactics to block others is the changing 
of the military operation command. During the period of Konfrontasi, the military 
command has changed five times, as represented in Figure 5-2, located on the 
next page. At least, there are six elements of structure differences: (a) number 
of joint staff unit, (b) the presence of logistics command, (c) concept of 
command structure, (d) type of command structure, (e) type of combat unit, and 
(f) the existence of theatre command.  
In particular, the frequently changing structure could be interpreted in four ways. 
First, the changing indicated the ABRI ill-prepared for the military operation. 
Clearly, the expansion of joint staffs units, the changing of concept of command 
structure, and the presence of theatre command showed the complexity of the 
Konfrontasi. Indeed, the ABRI has experienced to establish the military 
command for the Trikora Operation against the Dutch. As the nature of conflict 
and opponent were completely different, the ABRI could not easily adapt the 
previous operation for the Konfrontasi.  
Second, the changing structure was the result of interservice rivalry. 
Undeniably, the army elites reluctantly accepted Dani as the KOGA 
Commander. So, the ill-prepared operation also might be a form of deliberate 
and wilful attempt to weaken Dani’s leadership. Several manoeuvres, such as 
ignoring Sukarno’s letter (pp.163-4), the implementation of Operation A 
(pp.126-48), and limited support of the KOTI (pp.158-64), have provided strong 








     
 
   
 
   
































Figure 5-2 Comparison of the KOGA/KOLAGA Structures 
Note:  A: Keputusan Presiden [Presidential Decree] No 28/KOTI/1964 dated 19 May 1964 (p.156); 
 B: Keputusan Presiden [Presidential Decree] No 33/KOTI/1964 dated 2 June 1964 (p.158); 
 C: Surat Keputusan [Decree] No 01/1964 dated 30 September 1964 (p.163); 
D: Keputusan Presiden [Presidential Decree] No 10/KOTI/1965 dated 1 March 1965 (p.165); 
E: Surat Keputusan [Decree] No KEP-39/1965 dated 2 September 1965; Keputusan Presiden 




Third, the changing structure also was designated to curtail Dani’s power in 
leading the KOGA/KOLAGA. The dispute over the presence of logictics 
command, type of command structure and combat unit were completely 
decreasing the KOGA/KOLAGA’s capabilities. As the command structure 
applied component system, Dani did not have any authority to urge other 
services to provide sufficient troops. He also could not monitor supply of military 
logistics, since the distribution was under military chiefs. The KOGA/KOLAGA 
did not have any details over logistics issue, since the KOTI dispensed logistics 
budget directly to the service.1216 As component system provided greater 
authority for the military service in deploying the troops, the services especially 
the army delayed the deployment of troops. Thus, unsurprisingly, logistics and 
personnel remained the major problems for Dani to execute the Dwikora 
Operation.1217 
Fourth, the changing structure might reflect the exercising of relative authority, 
which was possessed by each main actor. Osborn emphasised the importance 
of recognition in implementing the authority. This means followers may ignore 
leader’s authority even though it count as legitimate. But authority could be 
recognised, although it count as illegimate.1218In addition, Grimes explained four 
characteristics of authority as follows: (a) it is invested in a position; (b) 
voluntary obedience; (c) the suspension by subordinates of their judgment in 
advance of a command or decision; and (d) authority can arise only in a 
collective context.1219  
Indeed, as presented in Table 5-3 (p.260), all main actors had authority power. 
However, not all actors could exercise their legitimate power effectively. Figure 
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5-3 indicated that the possession of legitimacy was still insufficient to exercise 
authority effectively. Possession greater of power would boost leader’s ability to 
restrict outcome.1220 This means asymmetric power distribution among main 
actors contributed to the ineffectiveness of implementation of main actor’s 
authority. Although Dani was the Commander of the KOLAGA, he could not use 
his authority power effectively. This situation can be explained, at least, in two 
reasons. First, Dani might be considered to be inexperienced in combat. 
Zaleznik argued the authority vested in expertise and reputation for 
competence.1221 Prior to Dwikora Operation, most of the ABRI operations was 
conducted by the army. The highest position that Dani ever held in military 
operation was Deputy Commander of the Trikora Command. Meanwhile, his 
rival, Suharto had involved in several operations. His highest position was the 












Figure 5-3 Relative Authority of Main Military Actors 
Source: Author 
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Second, the asymmetry in power relations contributed to the frequent military 
operation changing structures. Suharto and Yani could easily hamper any 
Dani’s plan, as they owned greater power than Dani. Also, as the majority of 
troops for the Konfrontasi came from the Army, Suharto and Yani could 
exercise their dominant control of the KOLAGA. In this regard, the degree of 
exercising authority corresponded with power possession.  
Post the G30S Affair 
 
Notably, the G30S event provided significant impact to political behaviour in the 
ABRI. The putsch has decreased the number and power of key players. Also, it 
affected the political tactics deployed by key actors significantly.   
It is noted that Suharto has become the most prominent actor in the ABRI since 
the G30S affair. Even though, Suharto was not the most senior army officer, he 
successfully developed his image as the new leader of the army. The army’s 
immediate reaction under Suharto’s command was providing the heroic image 
and retaining a clearly anti-PKI figure.1222 Thus, he was easily to gather 
immediate sympathies and support from many elements. 
Suharto employed many non-sanctioned political tactics post the abortive coup. 
He used blame others tactic to attack the PKI. He alleged the PKI was 
mastermind of the event. To support his goal to annihilate the PKI, his engaged 
the RPKAD, civilian elements and foreign countries. Following the affair, the 
Malaysian and Britain secretly provided support to Suharto. They contributed to 
the counter propaganda campaign mounted by Radio Television Malaysia and 
the Malaysian Information Department. The counter propaganda was aimed at 
debunking the PKI.1223 
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Tension between Suharto and Dani increased drastically since the affair. Dani’s 
statement regarding the affair generated polemics (pp.202-3). Soon after 
Suharto seized control in Jakarta, he attacked Dani by employing some tactics. 
Suharto highlighted in bold Dani’s ‘blunder’ where the air force supported the 
affair and recognised it as the army’s problem. Suharto then alleged there was 
a link between the air force officers and the G30S affair as several officers 
including Dani were listed as member of the Indonesian Revolutionary 
Council.1224 Later, Nasution also engaged in attacking Dani by accusing him 
has known about the affair beforehand. In addition, both Nasution and Suharto 
were also determined to eliminate Subandrio. Nasution requested assistance of 
the US Embassy to attack Subandrio. 1225 Although Sukarno tried to protect 
Subandrio, the army was very keen to get rid him. The army also asked the 
British in the character and political assignation of Subandrio.1226  
As Vatikiotis argued, the ABRI did not have a clear plan for managing its 
involvement in political affairs.1227 The ABRI was divided regarding Sukarno’s 
attitude toward the PKI. Following the 30 September outbreak, military elites 
were reluctance to lead any political manoeuvre against Sukarno. Vatikiotis 
added this situation probably was created by the uncertainty. So, no one was 
firmly whether any move would gain solid support from the military.   
It is noted that the G30S affair affected the distribution of power amongst 
actors. As shown in Table 5-4, located on the next page, Suharto obtained 
almost all power. A forthnight after the event, Sukarno assigned Suharto as the 
Army Commander (p.207). By December 1965, at least Suharto occupied four 
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strategic posts at the same time: the KOLAGA Commander, the Army Chief, 
the KOTI Chief of Staff, and the Koopslihkamtib Commander.1228 Thus, he has 
become the most powerful person in Indonesia.   
 
 










The following paragraphs will identify the consequences of political behaviour of 
the ABRI during the implementation of Dwikora Operation. As explained earlier, 
the Konfrontasi was multifaceted. The research analysis above shows that 
wider issues provide certain effects on the execution of the operation. Such 
condition also fosters the interservice rivalry. The presentation of consequences 
will be illustrated at three levels: individual, organisational and national.  
Individual Level 
Clearly, the only key actor who gained the most functional outcomes was 
Suharto. Through the Konfrontasi, he obtained promotions and greater power. 
Surprisingly, compare to other key military actors, Suharto was not considered 
as influential player during the outset of Konfrontasi. But, his manoeuvres and 
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decisiveness succeeded to enhance his image and expand his power. And 
what he has done after the affair has boosted his career significantly. 
On the contrary, other key military actors received dysfunctional consequences. 
Due to the affair, six high level military officers were assassinated including 
Ahmad Yani. Even though Nasution was able to escape without serious injury, 
his daughter and aide were murdered. He also lost his job as Defence and 
Security Minister. Even though he could occupy the position of Chairman of the 
MPRS, he still lost his grip in the ABRI. Both Dani and Martadinata also had to 
hand over their positions as military chief to their juniors. After the downfall of 
Sukarno government, Dani and Subandrio were arrested and sent to prison. 
Although it was never carried out, the Extraordinary Military Court sentenced 
both of them to death. The PKI is banned from national politics. 
Organisational Level 
For the ABRI, political behaviour provided, at least, two consequences. First, 
the Dwikora Operation failed to achieve its aim, dissolution the Malaysia 
Federation. It confirmed Nasution’s argument that war is not only military 
matters, but it involves political and economic fields.1229 Mortimer argued the 
failure of the anti-Malaysia campaign was caused by ill-defined objective, as the 
dispute was not a clear-cut issue of colonialism versus national self-assertion. 
Thus, the campaign failed to gather international sympathy.1230  
Second, the G30S affair, evidently, accelerated the integration of the 
Indonesian Armed Forces significantly. Shortly after Suharto was being Acting 
President, he imposed dormant plant of the integration of the military.1231 The 
ministry also introduced main doctrine for defence and security. To enhance the 
integration, the new government abolished the ministries of the army, the navy 
and the air force and stripped cabinet status from the military chiefs. All 
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commanders were downgraded to chief of staffs and under responsibility of 
Defence and Security Minister.1232 Lowry explained the ABRI’s centralisation 
and unity of command only depended on one man, Suharto.1233  
Furthermore, the army could maintain its domination in the armed forces. 
Following the New Order government, the ABRI established four defence area 
command with consisted of several regional military commands. In essence, it 
was the implementation of territorial defence concept.1234 And, the army 
reoriented its doctrine from the theme of continuing the ‘revolution’ to the theme 
of ‘development’ in order to comply with the ideological hallmark of Suharto 
government.1235 Regarding the socio-political function, the army officers 
remained occupied many civilian positions. The role performed through 
kekaryaan (‘functionals’ – personnel serving outside the ABRI). The officers 
served in many agencies as ministers, governors, and legislators.1236 In the 
Suharto’s Cabinet in 1966, the Army officers occupied several strategic posts 
such as Ministry of Defence and Security and Ministry of Home Affairs.1237    
Meanwhile, the navy and the air force capability were gradually decreased. 
Following the hand over operational responsibility to Defence and Security 
Minister, both services were lack of fund. Consequently, most of eastern bloc 
supply weaponary sytem were disrepair.1238 The allegation of the air force 
involvement in the affair, in some extent, affected the air force image.1239  
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The most obvious consequence of political behaviour in the ABRI was the 
collapse of Sukarno’s government. It has marked as the establishment of 
authoritarian regime. After he completely controlled the government, Suharto 
curtailed the number of political parties. The annihilation of the PKI also led to 
massacre that spread across Indonesia. The estimated 500,000-1,000,000 
people were killed during the mass violence.1240 The National Commission for 
Human Rights concluded the massacre in 1965-66 as the case of gross human 
right violation.1241  
Moreover, there were two functional consequences of political behaviour. First, 
Government was granted USD500 million of loan in 1967-8. The US also 
extended long-term credit over USD400 milion. The new government also was 
granted credit initially fixed at USD200 milion from the Intergovernmental Group 
for Indonesia (IGGI). However, those loans were not for expanding military 
capability but economic recovery.1242 Leifer noted that the dispute settlement 
facilitated a revision of economic cooperation.1243 Suharto set primary initial 
target for economic recovery was reducing the inflation. Surprisingly, the rate of 
inflation declined significantly, from over 600 per cent in 1966 to 10 per cent in 
1969.1244 
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Second, reorientation of foreign policy. Suharto government refreshed the 
foreign policy outlook. The new foreign policy centered around three issues, 
namely, maintaining adequate defence capability; maintaining a large foreign 
aid; and upholding free and active policy.1245 Indonesia then resumed 
membership of the United Nation on 28 September 1966. To affirm the political 
transformation, Suharto expressed his interest on promoting a regional 
association, which the result was establishment of the Association of South 
East Asian Nations (ASEAN).1246Following the affair, Indonesian diplomatic 
relations with the East Bloc was though. Diplomatic relation between Indonesia 
and Soviet remained, but relation between Indonesia and China was 
suspended.1247  
5.3 Summary of Findings 
Findings from the data analysis aim to answer the research questions as to why 
and how did the ABRI become politicised, and how did military political 
behaviour affect the implementation of the Dwikora Operation. The analysis 
focused on two important aspects, namely, politicisation of the military and 
political behaviour in organisation. The case study has revealed that the ABRI 
has become more politicised during the Konfrontasi. Thus, this condition 
fostered political behaviour in military organisation, which contributed to the 
failure of Dwikora Operation. Summary of findings as follows: 
(a) Why and how did the ABRI become politicised? 
The politicisation of the ABRI has occurred since its birth in 1945. However, it 
has become more politicised during Guided Democracy. The Indonesian 
military especially the army had dominated the government with Sukarno. As 
wars influenced domestic politics, the Konfrontasi also boosted the politicisation 
of the ABRI. As presented in Table 5-5, located on the next page, there are four 
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reason of why the ABRI became more politicised from the outset of Konfrontasi 
era. The ABRI was more fragmented. So, this condition led to military’s 
ambivalence toward the Konfrontasi. 
 
Table 5-5 Summary of Politicisation of the ABRI during the Konfrontasi  
 
Building 
blocks Short explanation Theoretical contribution 
Policy of war 
Key actors have various motivations 
toward the Konfrontasi. Majority of actors 
possessed self-preservation motivation. 
Although there was a division regarding a 
degree of support for the policy, almost 
all key actors agreed to avoid open war.  
- 
Main actors and 
coalitions 
The ABRI has become more 
pollicised because of four reasons: elite 
manoeuvres, failing of military reputation, 
civilian dependency, and domestic 
circumstances. 
Motive of military involvement in 
politics can be divided into two groups: 
(a) internal, namely, sectional interest, 
birthright and competency; and (b) 
external, namely, national interest and 
civilian inadequacy. 
Various key actors motivations 
resulted in the failure of solid coalition 
formation in order to uphold the hostility 
policy.  
Finer’s theory on the 
military opportunities to 
intervene civilian affairs 
partially fit with the case 
study since many officers 
allegedly involve in 
corruption cases and those 
brought certain damage to 
military image.  
Perlmuter and Bennett 
theory over the military 
opportunity to involve in 
civilian spheres fits the case 
study.  
Finer, Edmonds, and 
Koonings and Kruijt theories 
regarding motive of military 




Characteristics of the ABRI during 
the Konfrontasi were:  
(a) Strengths: legitimacy, monopoly of 
arms, and symbol of people’s army  
(b) Weaknesses: less cohesive, 
command control, and esprit de corps; 
lack of technical ability 
Cold War contributed to improve 
military capability and foster interservice 
rivalry. 
Fragmentation within the ABRI 
The study proposes an 
improvement for Finer’s 
theory regarding political 
strengths and weaknesses 
of the military. Military 
legitimacy and superiority in 
organisation aspects are 
possible to be strength or 
weakness, depend on how 
deep military factionalism 
and civil-military relation. 




toward the Konfrontasi affected the level 
of military influence. The navy, the air 
force and minority in the army endorsed 
the use of force for the Konfrontasi. 
Meanwhile, majority of the army elites 
resisted the using of hard power.   
As a result, there were two opposite 
directions of politicisation of the ABRI 
during the Konfrontasi at the same time: 
positive and negative politicisation. The 
situation affected the implementation of 
the Dwikora Operation.  
adjustment for Betts theory 
regarding level of influence 
to make it workable for 
examining pre-war situation. 
The study suggests an 
improvement for Betts’s 
theory regarding direction of 
politicisation: positive, 




Table 5-5 confirms that the ABRI was a political structure, which provided 
channel for the expression of individual and group motives. So, main actors 
should perform to gather more power. But, competition for power led to the 
failure to establish solid coalition amongst main actors. The rivalry resulted in 
several problems in delivering the policy of Konfrontasi, including inability to 
make decisions regarding the Dwikora Operation.     
 
(b) How did military political behaviour affect the implementation of the Dwikora 
Operation? 
The evidence from the present research also confirms a wider range of political 
tactics. Clearly, a significant event, the G30S affair, contributes to change the 
behavioural repertoire significantly. Buchanan and Badham argument regarding 
the possible consequences of political behaviour in organisation fits the study. 
Political behaviour in the ABRI toward the Konfrontasi also generates both 
functional and dysfunctional individual, organisational and national outcomes. 
Political behaviour in the ABRI during the Dwikora Operation is represented in 







Table 5-6 Political Behaviour in the ABRI during the Implementation of 
Dwikora Operation 
Source: Author  
 
 
Antecedents of political behaviour 
Individual Contextual 
Personal ambition To protect service interest 




Top leader domination 
Behaviours (political tactics) 
Pre the G30S Affair 
Building a network of useful contacts Using delaying tactics to block others 
Using key players to support initiatives Keeping boss happy 
Deliberately withholding useful information Informal influence 
Breaking the rules to achieve objectives 
 
Post the G30S Affair 
Blame others Avoiding criticism 
Using key players to support initiatives Informal influence 
Using others to deliver bad news  Creating a favourable image 
Keeping dirt files to blackmail others  Forming powerful coalitions 
Highlighting other people’s errors and flaws Breaking the rules to achieve objectives 
Consequences of uses of political behaviour 
Functional  Dysfunctional 
Individual  Individual 
Power building Personal injury 
Career advancement  Loss of strategic position and power  
Succeed as a change agent  Damaged credibility 
Enhance personal reputation Casualties 
Organisational  Organisational 
Succeed to maintain service domination  Fail to deliver operation 
Improving the cohesion Damaged organisational image 
Succeed to retain military status quo  Block organisational development 
National National 
Improving economy Damaged politics 




As Table 5-6 shows, political behaviour in organisation can be found in the 
Indonesian military organisation. A mix of individual and contextual factors is 
held to be the trigger factor that encourages key military actors to play politics 
during the implementation of Dwikora Operation. Given some variation, the 
overall judgement is that political tactics, which were employed in military 
institution, were having commonalities with private organisation.1248 But, the 
two-factors of politicisation of the military, both intra-military as well 
as external to the institution have become the distinctive feature. As the ABRI 
was the prominent political institution in Indonesia, the outcomes political 
behaviour of the military also can be found in national level, not only individual 
and organisational level.  
In addition, the A-B-C Model, which introduced by Buchanan and Badham, 
fitted with the case study. The model is practicable to capture political behaviour 
in the ABRI during the execution of Dwikora Operation. It also supported the 
notion that military organisation has similarities with private organisation (pp.68-
9). 
  
                                            






This dissertation has attempted to analyse the effect of politicisation of the 
Indonesian military on its operations during the Konfrontasi, 1963-67. The 
preceding chapters included detailed expositions of the nature of political 
behaviour in the ABRI, interservice rivalry and the reciprocal relationships 
amongst key actors during the execution of military operations. Even though 
each chapter contained essential summary regarding its own subject scope, 
none was capable of offering fundamental and definitive conclusion about the 
research subject as a whole.  
The ultimate chapter aims at exploring the last enabling objective (p.15), 
namely, (f) to draw conclusions, lessons learned and propose 
recommendations for future research. This chapter is structured into four 
sections. The first section contains an overview of the entire thesis. 
Subsequently, the second section provides conclusions drawn from the 
research findings on political behaviour in the ABRI during the Konfrontasi. The 
third sections illustrates lessons learned for the Indonesian Armed Forces, 
which might reasonably valuable to improve the implementation of joint 
operation, as it has been better equipped and showing improvements in the 
management of officers. The last section offers potential areas for further 
research. 
6.1 Summary of Chapters 
The main question this research seeks to investigate is in what way did the 
politicisation of the military affect the implementation of the Dwikora Operation. 
To help answer the central question, this research established three sub-
questions, as follows: (a) how was the Indonesian military operations delivered 
during the Konfrontasi; (b) why and how did the Indonesian military become 
politicised; and (c) how did military political behaviour affect the implementation 




As stated in Chapter One, this study aimed to examine the effect of 
politicisation of the military on Indonesian military operations during the 
Indonesia- Malaysia Konfrontasi (1963-1967). The enabling objectives guiding 
the research are six folds, namely to: (a) critically review the key literature and 
seminal works regarding the Konfrontasi and Indonesian politicised military 
theme; (b) evaluate the concept of politicisation of the military and political 
behaviour in organisations; (c) discuss the implementation of the Indonesian 
military operations during the Konfrontasi; (d) examine the failure of the Dwikora 
Operation; (e) contribute to the literature in explaining the effect of politicisation 
of the ABRI on the Dwikora Operation during the Konfrontasi; and (f) draw 
conclusions, lessons learned and propose recommendations for future 
research. Enabling objectives (a) and (b) are concentrated in Chapter Two on 
the examination of political element in military operation. Subsequently, the 
enabling objective (c) is addressed in Chapter Three and Four through the 
illustration of the complexity of the Dwikora Operation. Next, the enabling 
objectives (d) and (e) are emphasised in Chapter Five through process tracing 
method. Finally, the enabling objective (f) is tackled in this chapter.  
Chapter One identified the problem statement and the gap that existed in the 
politicisation of the Indonesian military literature with regards to its operation. It 
showed that the effects of political behaviour of military during crisis are 
underexplored. This was mostly because extant literature predominantly 
associated with civil-military relation studies. This study argued military political 
behaviour during crisis has certain effect to its operations. Terms were 
explained that were applicable and employed throughout the study. This 
chapter presented the research questions, hypothesis and contribution to 
knowledge. This chapter also discussed the research methodology for the 
study. The techniques of data collection and analysis were reviewed.  
Chapter Two detailed an in-depth literature review. The chapter began with a 
reviewing of the context of the case study. In this part, the examination of extant 
literature was focus on two themes: the Konfrontasi and Indonesian politicised 




examine how the Indonesian military operations were conducted and why they 
were unsuccessful. In particular, the extant literature regarding Indonesia-
Malaysia conflict was employing western perspective. In addition, existing 
studies on Indonesian politicised military theme failed to explore the effect of 
the ABRI’s political behaviour on its operations. This chapter also discussed two 
key concepts: politicised military and political behaviour in organisation. Eight 
essential aspects of military involvement in politics were identified. Since 
politicisation of the ABRI during the Konfrontasi was legitimised, the existing 
studies failed to provide a balance and comprehensive view toward the military 
political behaviour. In order to address this gap, this study suggested the need 
to adapt model on political behaviour in organisation. Since political behaviour 
in organisation model was usually generalised from the private organisation 
behaviour, the study argued the model is still useful to assist the investigation of 
military political behaviour. The study further pointed out in Chapter Two that 
there was a need to examine the effect of politicisation of the ABRI on the 
operation. Chapter Two presented the analytical framework on which the study 
is based.  
Chapter Three and Four presented more specific information on the case study. 
Chapter Three explained the period before the implementation of Dwikora 
Operation. Five key issues were identified: national politico-security landscape 
since independence, situational context of the Konfrontasi, the main actors’ 
motivations, Operation A, and informal main actors’ network. This chapter 
introduced the complexity of the Konfrontasi prior to the Dwikora Operation 
Chapter Four discussed the implementation of the Dwikora Operation. This 
chapter showed how political behaviour of the ABRI affected the operations. It 
also emphasised the significant effect of G30S affair on the Dwikora Operation. 
Chapter Three and Four mainly use primary data to show how the Indonesian 
military operations were implemented. These two chapters essentially served as 
the foundation for the analysis that follows in Chapter Five. 
Chapter Five detailed the data analysis and the analytical framework use for the 




military operations were failed. It started with an examination of policy of 
Konfrontasi. This part discussed how key actors’ motivations affected the 
Konfrontasi policymaking process. The analysis then continued with the 
investigation of two aspects that influence key actors poitical behaviour toward 
the Konfrontasi, namely, opportunity and motive. In this part, several relevant 
theories were tested. Subsequently, this chapter identified key characteristics of 
the ABRI, which were significant in shaping the politicisation of the military 
institution. The occurrence of political behaviour in the ABRI during the 
Konfrontasi was thoroughly examined in penultimate part in this chapter.  
6.2 Conclusions 
The predominant conclusion drawn from this research is that the hypothesis is 
proven - the political behaviour in the ABRI contributed to the failure of the 
Dwikora Operation. Based on the findings of the analysis conducted in Chapter 
Six, the following conclusions are offered:  
1 The friction and interservice rivalry in the ABRI were already deep prior 
to the Konfrontasi. The research findings indicated that key actors have 
various motivations toward the policy of Konfrontasi (pp.105-26). The 
motivations reflected that each main possessed own agenda or goal toward 
the Konfrontasi. Those differences caused more friction and reflected the 
intensity of military rivalry, which has existed for years before the Indonesia-
Malaysia dispute. As the standpoint of almost main actors was not keen to 
open war, this might provide a hint that the Konfrontasi was more serving a 
domestic political interest than truly aiming at crushing the Malaysia 
Federation. 
2 Unhealty military rivalry resulted in poor combat proficiency. It is noted 
that one of reasons behind Sukarno’s decision to appoint Dani as 
Commander of the KOGA/KOLAGA was political consideration (p.156). In 
this regard, aspect of political loyalty was being more obvious than 




the Konfrontasi.  The unhealthy military rivalry then eroded enthusiasm in 
delivering military missions. According to Newel, passion is essential in 
encouraging the fighting at the tactical perspective of war. Although, too 
much passion may overwhelm the planning.1249 Fragmentation in the ABRI 
during the Konfrontasi resulted in half-hearted military operation. Even 
though the air force and the navy supported the Dwikora Operation, but in 
general, combat performance was still poor. Because the implementation of 
Dwikora Operation was highly depending on the army, as it size was the 
biggest in the ABRI. 
3 The imbalance of power possession has contributed to ineffectiveness 
of Dani’s leadership. The research findings showed that there was unequal 
power distribution among main actors (pp.259-68).1250 Sources and 
influence among leaders lies on their social network. But, this inequality 
caused organisational dysfunction. Meanwhile, to ensure the effectiveness 
of military command, Nye argued that it requires a concentration of power in 
one person.1251 As power distribution is central to the task of organisational 
planning, Dani failed to fully control over the Dwikora Operation. In addition, 
the existence of fluid coalitions between certain actors also indicate that 
almost all actors were aware that they need to form a fluid coalition in order 
to achieve their own goals. 
4 The failure of Dwikora Operation helped the army to maintain its 
dominance in the armed forces. The research findings demonstrated that 
the military rivalry during the Konfrontasi was intense. Each service tried to 
utilitise the Konfrontasi for its own purposes. The air force, several time 
challenged the army’s dominance after Sukarno appointed Dani as 
Commander for the KOGA. But, the army could retain its dominance 
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following the G30S affair occurred. And Dani failed to consolidate the air 
force post the affair. 
5 At the individual level, Suharto was the only main actor who enjoyed 
the most benefits from the Konfrontasi. In the outset of the Konfrontasi, 
Suharto was not counted as one of main military actors. His position as 
Commander of the KOSTRAD was not counted as a strategic position in the 
army. However, he started to be part of key Indonesian military players since 
he maintained close relationship with General Yani and launched the Opsus. 
Suharto then succedded to capitalise his bases of power during the period of 
Konfrontasi. Following the issuance of Supersemar, Suharto was the most 
powerful person in Indonesia and widely seen as de facto leader.  
6.3 Lessons Learned 
It was observed in the Chapter One that the present research attempted to 
investigate the relationship between political behaviour of military and its 
operation. However, the failure of Dwikora Operation provides military leaders 
insights in how they can manage the fragmentation and rivalry during 
crisis/wartime. In this regard, the findings from the research should be seen 
within the spirit of enhancing the TNI professionalism. Furthermore, it is also 
clear that a great deal of further work would be needed to increase the 
effectiveness of the TNI. These lessons are important considerations for 
improving the implementation of joint military operation.  
The following four lessons that could be utilised for practical purposes, are 
listed, below:  
a) Joint military operation requires clear command structure. During the 
implementation of Dwikora Operation, problem of joint operation remained 
unsolved. The establishment of an efficient land, naval and air force team is 




services.1252 Military operation structure can be changed but constant 
revision may increase uncertainty. So, the structure should address the uses 
of limited resources and problem of power distribution.  
 
b) Fundamental issue behind the failure of military operation is the profile of 
joint force commanders. The appointment of commander should consider 
the nature of military operation. Besides based on rank and chain of 
command, future military operation will guide the leadership style. President 
should limit political loyalty aspect in selecting the commander,  
 
c) Existence of joint force logistics command in the military operation command 
is vital. During the first year of Dwikora Operation, the KOTI did not equip 
the KOGA with adequate logistics support (p.183). Even though, the KOGA 
was set up as unified command, the KOTI and military chiefs disagreed to 
assign the joint force logistics under the KOGA. Consequently, the KOGA 
could not hit the target in 1965, as each service remained control the 
logistics support.1253 In this regard, the Joint Military Operation Command 
Headquarter should be equipped with a full authority of logistics command 
and control. The TNI Headquarter should establish mutual understanding 
and promote best practice with all services headquarter in order to meet the 
future joint logistics requirements. Any problems of supply may affect the 
course of military campaigns.1254 As Jomini said, “Logistics is the art of 
moving armies… Logistics comprises the means and arrangements, which 
work out the plans of strategy and tactics. Strategy decides where to act; 
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logistics brings the troops to that point; grand tactics decides the manner of 
execution and the employment of the troops.”1255   
 
d) The need of more joint training and education to reduce rivalry and improve 
jointery. Joint training is essential to successful joint military operation. As 
each service has own doctrine, joint training helps military to improve joint 
effectiveness and addresses future interoperability issue. Tellis, et al argue 
that military forces that are inadequately trained will fail to make effective 
use of the equipment at their disposal.1256 Besides training, joint education 
will also help in decreasing interservice rivalry. Although, this option is not a 
panacea, frequent joint training and multi service education may improve 
jointness in military in the long run.   
6.4 Recommendations for Future Research 
From the conclusions and lessons learned stated above, four areas where 
further research can be conducted but is beyond the scope of this thesis, are: 
a) This study was constrained with tracing the living witnesses. It would be 
helpful to conduct further research by also emphasising oral history. The 
more stories from living witnesses may provide clearer view regarding 
the implementation of Dwikora Operation. 
 
b) This research was limited to the implementation of the Dwikora 
Operation. Yet, there was specific TNI’s operation, which aimed at 
expanding territory of Indonesia. It was launched when Suharto’s 
government want to annex East Timor in 1975. It would be helpful to 
conduct further research on other Indonesian military operations to 
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provide comparative explanation regarding political behaviour in the TNI 
during that period. 
	
c) This study suggested an improvement for joint education and training to 
reduce interservice rivalry. Since Suharto administration era, joint 
educations were held in two levels: cadet level at the military academy 
(Akademi TNI)1257; and senior officer level (colonel rank) at the Joint 
Service Command and Staff College (Sekolah Staf dan Komando 
TNI/Sesko TNI)1258. Thus, it would be worthwhile to conduct research on 
examination of military education whether joint education and training 
could significantly decrease rivalry.	
	
d) This research recognised there were limited access and data availability 
regarding intra service rivalry in the Air Force and the Navy. Therefore, 
when such data are available, empirical research should be conducted to 
provide a more detailed exposition of the intraservice rivalry, especially 
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APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS  
 
Participant Information Sheet for Thesis Interview 
 
“How Politicisation of the Military Affected the Indonesian Military 





I would like to ask you to participate in the data collection for my PhD research 
project on “How Politicisation of the Military Affected the Indonesian Military 
Operation during the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation, 1963-1967.” You will 
find more information about the study on the attached project proposal.  
 
I hope better to understand the following issues: 
• How was the Policy of Confrontation developed? 
• How was the Dwikora Operation developed? 
• How was the Dwikora Operation implemented? 
• How did the TNI during the Confrontation become politicised? 
• How was military political behaviour affecting the outcome of the Dwikora 
Operation?  
• What kind of other factors were influences the TNI during the 
Confrontation?  
 
Participation in this study is entirely voluntary. It will involve an interview of 
approximately 60 minutes in length to take place by arrangement. I will initially 
contact you by email or telephone.  
 
You may decide not to answer any of the interview questions if you wish.  You 
may also decide to withdraw from this study at any time by advising the 
researcher interviewing you or by emailing a.aliabbas@cranfield.ac.uk or using 
the contact detail at the end of this document. If you notify me of your 
withdrawal, all identifiable data will be destroyed. Once data has been 




I may ask for clarification of issues raised in the interview some time after it has 
taken place, but you will not be obliged in any way to clarify or participate 
further.   
There are no known risks to participation beyond those encountered in 
everyday life. The information you provide is confidential, except that with your 
permission your name, personal identifying information and quotes may be 
used. If you request confidentiality, beyond anonymised quotes, information you 
provide will be treated only as a source of background information, alongside 
literature-based research and interviews with others.  
 
If you ask me to, your name or any other personal identifying information will 
not appear in any publications resulting from this study; neither will there be 
anything to identify your place of work.  
 
The information gained from this interview will only be used for the above 
objectives, will not be used for any other purpose and will not be recorded in 
excess of what is required for the research.  
 
Even though the study findings will be published in international conferences, 
journals or book, only me will have access to the interview data itself. There are 
no known or anticipated risks to you as a participant in this study.  
 
If you have any questions regarding this study or would like additional 
information, please ask me. 
 






PhD Research Student 
Centre for International Security & Resilience 
Wellington Hall 228 
Cranfield University 
Defence Academy of the UK 
Shrivenham, Swindon, SN6 8LA 
E: a.aliabbas@cranfield.ac.uk 







Issue Respondent's initial 
I have read the information presented in the information letter 
about the study “How Politicisation of the Military Affected the 




I have had the opportunity to ask any questions related to this 
study, and received satisfactory answers to my questions, and any 
additional details I wanted.  
 
  
I am also aware that excerpts from the interview may be included 
in publications to come from this research.  Quotations will be kept 
anonymous, if requested.   
 
  
The researcher has informed me that I can withdraw from the 
project at any time upon request. 
 
  
I give permission for the interview to be recorded using audio 
recording and/or photography equipment. 
 
  




With full knowledge of all foregoing, I agree to participate in this study.  
I agree to being contacted again by the researchers if my responses give rise to 
interesting findings or cross-references. 
o no 
o yes 
 if yes, my preferred method of being contacted is: 
 o telephone …………………………………………………….. 
 o email …………………………………………………………. 












Signature:   
 Signature  























APPENDIX 2: LIST OF INTERVIEWS 
 
No Title/Rank Name/ Code 
Expertise/ 
Background 
Place and Date 
of Interview 
WITNESSES 
1 Col (rtd) Siswanto 
He is former officer in the 
Indonesian Marines, who 










He is former officer in the 
Indonesian Army. During 
the Dwikora Operation, 
he was an officer at 
Army Headquarter.  
Jakarta, 30 
November 2016 
3 Colonel (rtd) Sugiyanto 
He is former officer in the 
Indonesian Army, who 




4 Mr M1 
He is former officer in the 
Indonesian Air Force. 
During the Dwikora 
Operation, he was a 
chief navigator 
Jakarta, 8 December 
2016 
5 Private (rtd)  Amir Zainuddin 
He is former private 
soldier in the Indonesian 
Marines, who was 
involved in the Operation 
A 
Jakarta, 1 October 
2015 
6  Mr M2 
He is former officer in the 
Indonesian Navy, who 




7  Mr Harry Tjan Silalahi 
He is a civilian who was 




8  Mr Jusuf Wanandi 
He is a civilian who was 




9  Mr Sarmadji 
He is an exile who lives 
in the Netherlands. He 







10  Mr Dharmawan Isaak 
He is an exile who lives 
in the Netherlands. He 




11  Mr Bambang 
He is an exile who lives 
in the Netherlands. He 
was a Navy graduate 
bursar in 1962-1965. 
However, due to the 
1965 event, government 
terminated his bursary 





12 Lieutenant General (rtd) 
Suryo 
Prabowo 




13 Rear Admiral (rtd) 
Budiman 
Djoko Said 





14 Rear Admiral (rtd) 
Soleman B 
Ponto 
Navy and intelligence 





15 Mr Bejo Untung 
Head of the Foundation 










17 Mr Atmadji Sumarkijo 
Military historian. 
Published some 
biographies of the TNI' 
generals. He is former 
journalist 
Jakarta, 1 December 
2016 
18 Dr Greg Poulgrain 
Historian who has 
expertise on the 
Konfrontasi 
Jakarta, 1 December 
2016 
19  Mr Peter Kasenda 
Military historian. 
Published some 




20 Prof Dr  Saskia Wirienga  
HistorIan who has 
expertise in the G30S 
affair 





APPENDIX 3: THE INDONESIAN MILITARY FORCE LIST 
 
A. Personnel:  
• During the KOGA period: 58,233 troops  
• During the KOLAGA period (1 March – 1 September 1965):  108,128 
troops, including 1,967 troops for Operation A 
• During the KOLAGA period (2 September 1965 – 26 May 1967): 108,132 
troops, including 1,967 troops for Operation A. 
B. Main equipment: 
1 squadron of helicopter, 1 cruiser, 3 destroyers, 4 light destroyers, 5 
submarines, 6 motor torpedo boats, 5 minesweepers, 1 salvage ship, 4 Landing 
Ship Tanks, 6 submarine chasers, 4 merchantman, 2 attack transport ships, 3 
oiler ships, 8 TU-16 bombers, 3 TU-16 KS bombers, 4 P-51 Mustangs fighters, 
7 B-25 bombers, 3 C-130 aircrafts, 11 C-47 aircrafts, 4 LL-14 transport aircrafts. 
200 sampan motorboats      
 
Source: Laporan Komando Bidang Staf Gabungan III Personel [Command 
Report of the Third Joint Staff for Personnel], dated 15 May 1967; Pusat 
Sejarah Markas Besar TNI, Operasi Dwikora, 118-120 
 
